Hall v. Director, Patuxent Institution

• Decision Date: 15 February 1967
• Docket Number: No. 57,57
• Citation: 226 A.2d 669,245 Md. 687
• Parties: David V. HALL v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION. Defective Delinquent
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 687

245 Md. 687

226 A.2d 669

David V. HALL v. DIRECTOR, PATUXENT INSTITUTION.

Defective Delinquent No. 57.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Feb. 15, 1967.

Before HAMMOND, C. J., and HORNEY, MARBURY, OPPENHEIMER and BARNES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

After a jury determined that David V. Hall was still a defective delinquent and he was recommitted to Patuxent Institution by order of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Shure, J.) dated February 2, 1965, Hall filed an application for leave to appeal. We consider the applicant's contentions in the order that they were raised.

I.

The applicant claims the instructions of the trial judge were weighted in favor of the State and against the appellant. He first contends that it was error for the court to tell the jury that the 'expert findings of the personnel at Patuxent are to be accorded very serious consideration because of their personnel, * * * their facilities * * * and the type of institution', while not mentioning the qualifications and findings of the defense psychiatrist. Statements similar to this instruction have been made by us when passing on the sufficiency of the evidence. Purks v. State, 226 Md. 43, 171 A.2d 726 (1961); Cooper v. Director, 234 Md. 622, 198 A.2d 301 (1964); Muhly v. Director, 234 Md. 624, 198 A.2d 244 (1964); Silvestri v. Director, 234 Md. 641, 199 A.2d 784 (1964); Washington v. Director, 237 Md. 311, 206 A.2d 244 (1965). We have never stated or implied, however, that the jury should be instructed on the weight to be given to evidence of any type. On the contrary, as Judge Sloan stated in Western Maryland Dairy Corporation v. Brown, 169 Md. 257, 268, 181 A. 468, 474 (1935):

'His (the trial judge's) attitude should be, as between the parties, one of strict impariality, and he should make no remark or comment which would tend to minimize the value, weight, or effect of the evidence.'

But comments on the evidence are usually not grounds for reversal if they are corrected by proper instructions to the jury. 'Ordinarily, a caution to the jury that it should disregard any expression of opinion by the court, and the advice to them that they are the judges of all questions of fact, will be sufficient unless, as sometimes happens, the admonition is worse than the offense.' Western Maryland Dairy Corporation v. Brown, supra; see also Nicholson v. Blanchette, 239 Md. 168, 210 A.2d 732 (1965); Crews v. Director, Md., 225 A.2d 436, filed January 11, 1967.

Judge Shure's instructions, viewed in their entirety, clearly corrected his comment on the weight of the evidence:

'What I say to you about the facts is advisory only, because you twelve ladies and gentlemen are the determiners of the weight to be given to the evidence.

'Now you just have one question to answer, and that is whether or not this man is a defective delinquent, David Vernon Hall.'

And again,

'* * * Now he is entitled to have his examination and his witnesses, and it is for you to determine the weight to be given to the evidence * * *.'

And again,

'It is your job to decide the weight to be given to the evidence, and I know you will give it careful consideration.'

We think the defendant was not prejudiced by the judge informing the jury that the defendant would receive treatment if sent to Patuxent, since treatment is expressly contemplated under Article 31B, section 5. As the above quoted instructions show, the jury was plainly told that its sole function was to decide the question before it, i. e., 'whether or not this man (the defendant) is a defective delinquent.'

After a careful review of the instructions, we disagree with the applicant's final objection to them, that the trial judge emphasized the State's case while minimizing the defendant's case. Besides the comments about the weight of certain evidence, already discussed, nothing possibly prejudicial to the defendant was said about the State's evidence.

II.

The trial judge declined to instruct the jury that they were judges of law and fact and that the State was required to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Neither of these contentions have merit because Article 31B proceedings are civil in nature. Blizzard v. State, 218 Md. 384, 147 A.2d 227 (1958); Purks v. Director, supra; Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397 (1966).

III.

There was no error in permitting Dr. Florenzo, a staff psychologist at Patuxent, to express an opinion that the applicant was a defective delinquent, even though he failed to produce the tests upon which that opinion was based. The admission of this hearsay testimony did not violate either the Fourteenth Amendment or the law of this State. 'The...