Hall v. Hall
Decision Date | 26 July 1991 |
Parties | Robert Lee HALL and Jessie Mae Hall v. Willie Jane HALL and Tommy G. Hall, as co-administrators of the Estate of L.C. Hall, Sr., deceased. 89-1825. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
James W. Cameron of Cameron & Cameron, Montgomery, for appellants.
Robert Eugene Ely, Montgomery, for appellees.
Robert Lee Hall and his wife, Jessie Mae Hall, appeal from the denial of their Rule 60(b), A.R.Civ.P., motion to set aside the default judgment entered against them and in favor of Willie Jane Hall and her son, Tommy G. Hall. 1
Willie Jane, as administratrix of the estate of her ex-husband, L.C. Hall, Sr., and Tommy G. Hall, as co-administrator, sued Robert (who is also Willie Jane's son) and Jessie Mae, seeking a constructive trust covering the home that Robert and Jessie Mae allegedly purchased with funds provided by another of Robert's brothers, Barnett Hall, who is now deceased. Willie Jane and Tommy alleged in their complaint that, on February 15, 1979, Barnett came to Montgomery from Chicago with $35,000 in cash, which he gave to Robert to buy a home for their father, L.C. They alleged that title was initially to be in Robert's name but later was to be put in L.C.'s name, because L.C. could not read or write. On February 21, 1979, Robert and Jessie Mae bought the house in which L.C. lived until he died in 1987. Title to the house, however, remained in Robert's name.
On March 30, 1988, Willie Jane and Tommy filed their complaint seeking a constructive trust, as well as $50,000 in punitive damages, and attorney fees. After no response whatever from the defendants (this is undisputed), the trial court entered a default judgment for Willie Jane and Tommy on December 8, 1988, awarding them $50,000 in punitive damages and $8,000 in attorney fees, and ordering that a general warranty deed concerning the disputed property be issued to them as the personal representatives of L.C.'s estate. 2
On December 1, 1989, Robert and Jessie Mae filed their independent action, which is the subject of this appeal, in which they alleged fraud on the court as a basis for setting aside the default judgment. Specifically, they argued that Willie Jane had fraudulently represented to the court that she was L.C.'s widow when she, in fact, had been divorced from him on October 20, 1975. On July 31, 1990, the trial court issued the following findings of fact and conclusions of law:
In reviewing the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion, we look to see whether the trial court abused its discretion. DaLee v. Crosby Lumber Co., 561 So.2d 1086 (Ala.1990). To prevail on a Rule 60(b) motion, "[a] defaulting party seeking to have a default judgment set aside must prove one of the grounds for relief set out in the rule, and must allege and prove a meritorious defense to the action." Surette v. Brantley, 484 So.2d 435, 435-36 (Ala.1986) (citation omitted). In addition to the six enumerated grounds, Rule 60(b) also provides, "This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action within a reasonable time and not to exceed three years after the entry of the judgment ... to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court."
"Fraud on the court" has been defined as "fraud perpetrated by officers of the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial task of adjudging cases that are presented for adjudication." 7 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice § 60.33 (2nd ed. 1990). Such fraud must be "extrinsic," that is, perpetrated to obtain the judgment, rather than "intrinsic." Brown v. Kingsberry Mortgage Co., 349 So.2d 564 (Ala.1977). In discussing "fraud on the court," the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Gore, 761 F.2d 1549, 1552 (11th Cir.1985).
We find that the fraud alleged to have been exercised here, that Willie Mae characterized herself as L.C.'s widow when in fact she was not, is intrinsic rather than extrinsic and that it could have been brought out in the original action to which Robert and Jessie Mae chose not to respond. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion.
AFFIRMED.
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