Hall v. Hall

• Decision Date: 04 April 1927
• Citation: 93 Fla. 709,112 So. 622
• Parties: HALL v. HALL.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

112 So. 622

93 Fla. 709

HALL v. HALL.

Florida Supreme Court, Division A.

April 4, 1927

Suit by Mary Austin Hall against Clinton Mudge Hall to set aside and annul a decree of divorce. From a judgment for the complainant, defendant appeals.

Reversed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Bill of review, based on errors apparent on face of record, must ordinarily be brought within statutory period for appeal which is 6 months. A bill of review, based upon errors apparent on the face of the record, must ordinarily be brought within the period limited by statute for taking an appeal from the decree sought to be reviewed, which in this jurisdiction means within 6 months.

Leave of court for filing bill of review on ground of newly discovered evidence must be obtained; bill of review on ground of newly discovered evidence must set out specifically new matter showing it would have required different determination of case; bill of review for new testimony must show discovery thereof after decree and that it could not reasonably have been discovered before hearing or decree. When a bill of review is brought on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must appear that leave of the court for the filing of same was obtained, must set out specifically such new matter, showing its materiality--that it would have required a different determination of the cause, that injury had resulted to the complainant in the bill of review, and that such new matter was not discovered until after the rendition of the decree attacked, and could not by the exercise of reasonable diligence have been discovered before the hearing or the rendition of the decree.

Bill of review for error apparent on record cannot be predicated on formal irregularities nor discretionary matter; decree complained of by bill of review must be contrary to statute or recognized and acknowledged principle or rule of law or equity; on bill to review decree, practice is to go back of decree into whole record of pleadings and proceedings excluding evidence. A bill of review for error, apparent on the face of the record, cannot be predicated upon mere formal irregularities, nor upon matters resting in discretion. The decree complained of must be contrary to some statutory enactment, or some principle or rule of law or equity recognized and acknowledged or settled by decision; and in order to ascertain if there be error in the decree, the general practice is to look back of the decree into the whole record of the pleadings and proceedings, but excluding the evidence.

Bill to review divorce decree, not showing error on face of record is in essence original bill to impeach decree for fraud. The bill in this case, not showing any error upon the face of the record, is in its essence an original bill to impeach a divorce decree for fraud in its procurement, and hence is considered as such, regardless of the name by which it was designated by the pleader.

Admission or confession of adultery, without substantive evidence, is not sufficient or proper evidence for divorce. The mere admission or confession of adultery on the part of a defendant in a divorce proceeding, without any substantive evidence of the delictum, is not sufficient or proper evidence to authorize a court to dissolve the marital bond, as such admission, standing alone, smacks of collusion.

On discovery of fraudulent collusion before termination of court's jurisdiction of divorce case, divorce should be denied or decree set aside if already entered; court may investigate fraudulent collusion in divorce case on motion of either party or ex mero motu before it loses jurisdiction. If, at any time before a court's jurisdiction of a divorce case has terminated, fraudulent collusion of the parties is brought to the attention of the court, it becomes the duty of the court to investigate, and, if such investigation reveals such collusion, it is within the power, and certainly within the duty, of the chancellor to deny the divorce applied for or to set aside the decree if one has already been entered. The court has the power to institute such investigation and to take such action upon motion of either of the parties, or ex mero motu upon any information convincing the court of the fraudulent or collusive character of the action, before the court has lost jurisdiction and control thereof.

Decrees of divorce, which have become final, can only be impeached and set aside by compliance with recognized remedial processes of equity; party seeking to set aside divorce must come into equity with clean hands; equity will not ordinarily set aside judgment or decree obtained by fraud or collusion, in absence of clear showing of coercion, imposition, or fraud on party complaining. But where a collusive divorce decree has become final, and the time within which a motion for a rehearing, or to set aside the decree, or to take an appeal, has expired, different rules apply. Judgments and decrees in divorce proceedings, as in other cases, which have become final, can only be impeached and set aside by due compliance with the established and recognized remedial processes of equity, one of the fundamental principles of which is that a party who comes into equity, asking relief, must come with clean hands, and that equity will not ordinarily interfere at the instance of either party to set aside a judgment or decree obtained by the fraud or collusion of the parties, in the absence of a clear showing of coercion, imposition, or fraud on the party complaining.

Equity will leave parties to fraudulent transactions where they have placed themselves; party may not complain in equity of his wrong or another's wrong whereof he was partaker. It is axiomatic that equity will leave parties to fraudulent transactions where they have placed themselves. The rule is practically universal that a party in a court of equity will not be heard to complain of his own wrong or of another's wrong whereof he was a partaker.

Party participating in fraudulent procurement of judgment or decree cannot ask court for relief against it. Sound public policy requires that the courts should not be trifled with, without severe penalty attaching, and one of those penalties is that a party who has participated in the fraudulent procurement of a judgment or decree cannot be heard to ask of the court, which he or she has imposed upon, any relief whatever as against the same.

Parties procuring divorce by collusion or fraud will be bound thereby; party guilty of collusion in obtaining divorce may not have decree set aside, even though she was to some degree less guilty of collusion than opposite party. Where the parties to a divorce proceeding have procured the decree of divorce as a result of a fraudulent and collusive agreement, they will both be bound by the decree, and neither party participating in the imposition upon the court will be permitted to set aside the decree so obtained, even though the guilt of the party so applying to set aside the decree may be to some degree relatively less than that of the opposite party.

Party misrepresenting residence and securing divorce in state cannot afterward impeach decree for lack of jurisdiction. Where a party comes into this state, and, by misrepresentation as to his or her place of residence, invokes the jurisdiction of a Florida court and obtains a final decree of divorce, such party cannot afterward be heard to impeach such decree for the lack of jurisdiction thus wrongfully invoked. Although the decree may be a nullity, the law refuses to the guilty parties all relief concerning it.

Party practicing fraud and collusion on court in divorce case, after decree has become final, cannot impeach it on bill for fraud or collusion if party was to any appreciable degree culpable and legally responsible; party guilty of collusion in obtaining divorce is not entitled to allowance of alimony and solictor's fees pendente lite in suit to set divorce decree aside. A complainant on whose bill a divorce was rendered, who, after the decree has become final and the court has lost control of the cause, seeks to impeach on bill filed for that purpose such final decree for fraud or collusion in its procurement, will not be rendered the relief prayed, where it appears that such complainant was to any appreciable degree a culpable and legally responsible participant in such fraud and collusion, and the attempt to annul such final decree springs from motives of personal advantage, nor is the complainant in such a suit entitled to the allowance of alimony and solicitor's fees pendente lite.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Palm Beach County; C. E. Chillingworth, judge.

COUNSEL

Fred M. Valz and Austin Miller, both of Jacksonville, for appellant.

Cromwell Gibbons, of Jacksonville, for appellee.

OPINION

BROWN J.

This action was instituted in the circuit court for Palm Beach county, Fla., in November, 1923, by Mary Austin Hall, for the purpose of setting aside a decree of divorce rendered by said court on March 24, 1923, in a suit wherein she was the complainant and the appellant here, Clinton Mudge Hall, was the defendant.

The first pleading filed by Mary Austin Hall, in November, 1923 was a petition to open, review, and vacate the divorce decree rendered more than 6 months previously, and to allow her alimony and solicitor's fees. To this a demurrer was sustained and leave given to file 'an original bill in the nature of a bill of review.' Complainant then filed an application to be allowed to file an 'amended petition or bill of review' upon the ground of newly discovered facts, which leave was granted. She then filed a 'petition or bill of review,' which, in order to form a basis for the decree rendered thereon, was evidently treated by ...