Hall v. Hall

• Decision Date: 02 December 1891
• Citation: 107 Mo. 101,17 S.W. 811
• Parties: HALL v. HALL.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

17 S.W. 811

107 Mo. 101

HALL v. HALL.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

December 2, 1891.

DELIVERY OF DEED — ADVANCEMENT — RESULTING TRUST.

1. Where a father, in purchasing land, has the deed executed in the name of a son, less than two years of age, the delivery of the deed to the father is sufficient delivery to the son. Moore v. Flynn, (Ill. Sup.) 25 N. E. Rep. 844, distinguished.

2. Where the father, in such case, had but little property besides the money used to purchase the land, and a part of this money was his brother's, and he had before the purchase lived on the land, and he made no provision for his wife or other members of his family, the presumption that the conveyance was intended as an advancement is rebutted.

3. Defendant purchased land with funds belonging to him and a brother, and had the deed executed in the name of his son. Defendant remained in possession of the land. In an action by the son to recover the land, defendant asked the court to charge that the evidence failed to show such a delivery of the deed to or for the benefit of the son as was necessary to vest the title in him. Held that, though an instruction as to a resulting trust should have been given, the instruction asked was properly refused, for if defendant wished to submit the theory that by such conveyance a trust resulted to him the instruction omitted the vital fact of the intent of the purchaser.

Appeal from circuit court, Andrew county; A. W. ANTHONY, Judge.

Ejectment by Jesse Hall against John Hall. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals. Reversed.

H. S. Kelley and J. A. Sanders, for appellant. David & Jos. Rea, for respondent.

MACFARLANE, J.

The petition contains two counts. The first is ejectment to recover about 28 acres of land in Andrew county; the second is in equity, in which plaintiff alleges that defendant is his father, and on the 6th day of January, 1886, plaintiff was an infant, living with him and in his family; that on said day one Beecroft conveyed to plaintiff the land in controversy, by good and sufficient deed, which was delivered to defendant, who took the same into his possession to keep and hold for plaintiff; that afterwards defendant fraudulently, and without the knowledge or consent of plaintiff, erased the name of plaintiff as grantee therein, and inserted his own, and had the deed as so changed recorded; that the deed, as recorded, constituted a cloud upon plaintiff's title. The prayer was that the cloud be removed and plaintiff's title be decreed. The answer was a general denial and a special defense, in which it was set up that defendant paid the full amount of the purchase price for the land, a part of which belonged to his brother, Jesse Hall, who was then absent from the state; that he bought the land for his own use and benefit; that he had lived on it, making it his home, from the date of the purchase to the present time; that at the time of purchasing the land plaintiff was an infant, under two years of age, paid no part of the purchase money, and no deed was made to him or for his benefit. The case was tried to the court without a jury. The evidence shows a state of facts that do not commend plaintiff for his filial regard for his father. It shows that for some years prior to the date of this deed defendant had lived on this small tract of land, presumably as a tenant; that on that day he bought the land from Beecroft, for which he paid him $560, which appears to have been about all his possessions. When the deed was written defendant directed the writer to insert the name of Jesse Hall as grantee therein. This was done, and the deed delivered to defendant, who retained it until about 1870, when he erased the name Jesse, and inserted instead that of John, thus making himself the grantee. A few years thereafter he had the deed recorded. From the date of the deed, in 1866, to the commencement of this suit he occupied and used the land as his homestead, made improvements, and paid the taxes thereon. These facts are substantially undisputed. Defendant testified that prior to 1860 himself and his brother Jesse had worked together, dividing the earnings; that his brother left home in 1860, leaving in his hands some property, the proceeds of which constituted a part of the consideration paid for the land, and on that account he had the deed made to him, in order to secure this money; that, hearing of the previous death of his brother, he changed the deed. The evidence, however, that the deed was deliberately made to the plaintiff, then under two years of age, we think greatly preponderated. The court gave some and refused other declarations of law, but as the defense was equitable the legal questions can be considered without setting out in detail these instructions. The court gave one declaration of law to the effect that if defendant, at the time, intended to make the deed to his brother Jesse Hall, the finding should be for defendant, and refused one asked by defendant to the effect that the evidence failed to show such a delivery of the deed to or for the benefit of plaintiff as was necessary in order to vest the title in him. The court also gave a declaration that if the deed was not made to plaintiff as an advancement he could not recover. The verdict and judgment were for plaintiff, and defendant appealed.

1. It is evident from the finding upon the declarations of law given and refused that the court found these facts: First, that defendant intended his child Jesse as the grantee in the deed; second, that the deed was intended as an advancement to plaintiff; and, third, that there was a sufficient delivery to plaintiff. We think the court fully justified by the evidence in finding that defendant did not intend to have the land conveyed to his brother, and when he directed the insertion of the name of Jesse Hall as grantee he intended a conveyance to his son. This was a finding upon a pure question of fact, which was well supported by the evidence, and that fact must be taken as established, and will receive no further consideration.

2. Defendant insists that under the facts and circumstances in the case no delivery of the deed to plaintiff, or any one for his use, was shown, and consequently the jury should have been directed to return a verdict for defendant as prayed by him. This contention is entitled to a careful consideration in view of the fact that no case is found in the decisions of this court presenting precisely the same state of facts. The general rules of law applicable to the delivery of deeds are well established, and may be briefly restated. To operate as a complete and effectual conveyance of land a delivery of the deed, actual or constructive, by the grantor, and an acceptance by the grantee, or by some one for him, are essential requisites. These are the final and crowning acts in the conveyance, without which all other formalities are ineffectual. The grantor must part with the deed, and all right of dominion over it, intending that it shall operate as a conveyance, and the grantee must accept it. Standiford v. Standiford, 97...