Hall v. Hall
| Decision Date | 15 November 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 12-89,12-89 |
| Citation | 2012 Ark. 429 |
| Parties | TAMMYE HALL APPELLANT v. JUSTIN HALL APPELLEE |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
2012 Ark. 429
TAMMYE HALL APPELLANT
v.
JUSTIN HALL APPELLEE
No. 12-89
SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
Opinion Delivered November 15, 2012
Appellant Tammye Hall moves this court to dismiss appellee/cross-appellant Justin Hall's cross-appeal. Tammye's appeal began in the court of appeals; however, on April 19, 2012, we certified her motion to dismiss the cross-appeal to our court pursuant to Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 1-2(b)(1) (2012) as it raises an issue of first impression. We ultimately issued an order that the motion be taken as a case and gave the parties the opportunity to fully brief the issue in dispute. After review, we grant the motion.
The pertinent facts are these. This case began as a divorce action, and the circuit court ordered Justin to pay Tammye a judgment in the amount of $168,691.84. The court gave him thirty days from the October 18, 2011 order to pay Tammye $68,691.84 and ordered the remaining balance of $100,000 due by January 15, 2012. In compliance with that order, Justin paid Tammye $68,691.84 on November 13, 3011.
Tammye filed a notice of appeal on November 17, 2011, in order to advance an argument that the circuit court erred in refusing to award increased child support and the full
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measure of her attorneys' fees. Justin filed a cross-appeal of the court's judgment. However, Tammye argues that his cross-appeal should be dismissed because Justin has already voluntarily paid approximately forty percent of the total judgment entered against him, which, she contends, constitutes a waiver of the right to appeal the judgment. Justin avers that only a voluntary satisfaction of a judgment in full would equate to a waiver of his right to appeal, not his partial payment. We agree with Tammye and dismiss Justin's cross-appeal.
This is an issue of first impression in our state. We do have case law setting precedent that the voluntary satisfaction of a judgment constitutes a waiver to an appeal of that judgment. See Sherman Waterproofing, Inc. v. Darragh Co., 81 Ark. App. 74, 98 S.W.3d 446 (2003); DeHaven v. T & D Dev., Inc., 50 Ark. App. 193, 901 S.W.2d 30 (1995); Lytle v. Citizens Bank of Batesville, 4 Ark. App. 294, 630 S.W.2d 546 (1982). However, even that issue remains one over which state courts are divided depending on the circumstances of the case—mostly differing authority on whether payment had to have been voluntary for waiver and, if so, what qualifies as voluntary. See Peoples Trust & Sav. Bank v. Sec. Sav. Bank, 815 N.W.2d 744 (Iowa 2012).
Justin does not dispute that his payment was voluntary. Rather, Justin argues that the partial payment did not satisfy the judgment and, therefore, it did not waive his right to...
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