Hall v. Hall
Decision Date | 13 April 2020 |
Docket Number | SC 20181 |
Citation | 335 Conn. 377,238 A.3d 687 |
Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Parties | Hugh F. HALL v. Deborah HALL |
Barbara M. Schellenberg, with whom was Richard L. Albrecht, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Thomas P. Parrino and Randi R. Nelson filed a brief for the Connecticut Chapter of the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers as amicus curiae.
Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D'Auria, Mullins, Kahn and Ecker, Js.**
The plaintiff appeals1 from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which affirmed the judgment of civil contempt rendered against the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (1) finding the plaintiff in contempt of court on the basis of the wilful violation of a court order, and (2) denying the parties' joint motion to open and vacate the judgment of contempt. We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The Appellate Court set forth the following relevant facts, which are undisputed. "The parties were married on August 10, 1996, and have three children together. On February 3, 2014, the plaintiff commenced a dissolution action. The parties subsequently entered into a pendente lite stipulation on October 27, 2014, which provided in relevant part: ‘The funds currently being held in escrow [by a law firm] in the approximate amount of $533,588 shall be released to the parties for deposit into a joint bank account requiring the signature of both parties prior to any withdrawals ....’ The court, Colin , J. , approved the parties' stipulation and made it a court order. After this order, the parties set up a joint account and transferred the escrow funds into it.
2 Hall v. Hall , 182 Conn. App. 736, 738–39, 191 A.3d 182 (2018).
The plaintiff filed a motion seeking reconsideration of that decision on December 21, 2015. The trial court, after hearing oral argument from the parties, denied the relief requested in that motion on January 4, 2016, without issuing a written decision. After the court rendered judgment on the defendant's motion for contempt; see footnote 2 of this opinion; on January 27, 2016, the parties entered into a separation agreement, which the court, Hon. Stanley Novack , judge trial referee, accepted on that date and incorporated into the judgment of dissolution. Section 10 of the separation agreement provides in relevant part: On January 27, 2016, the plaintiff filed an appeal with the Appellate Court from the trial court's contempt judgment and its January 4, 2016 decision on his motion for reconsideration.
On February 1, 2016, relying on § 10 of the separation agreement, the parties filed a joint motion to open and vacate the judgment of contempt in part. On March 9, 2016, the trial court, Tindill , J. , denied the motion without issuing a written decision. On March 28, 2016, the plaintiff filed an amended appeal with the Appellate Court, challenging the denial of the motion to open and vacate.
On July 15, 2016, the plaintiff filed a motion requesting that the trial court articulate, inter alia, the factual and legal bases for its decision on his motion for reconsideration. The plaintiff's July 15, 2016 motion for articulation also requested an articulation of the factual and legal bases for the court's denial of the parties' joint motion to open and vacate the judgment of contempt. The trial court denied the motion for articulation on July 27, 2016. On October 26, 2016, the Appellate Court granted the plaintiff's motion for review of the trial court's denial of the plaintiff's motion for articulation and ordered the trial court to issue both an articulation of the basis for its decision on the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration and a written memorandum of decision setting forth the factual and legal bases for the denial of the joint motion to open and vacate the contempt judgment. On January 9, 2017, in compliance with the order of the Appellate Court, the trial court issued both a memorandum of decision setting forth the factual and legal bases for its denial of the joint motion to open and vacate and an articulation setting forth the legal and factual bases for its denial of the relief requested in the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration. In the trial court's articulation, the court clarified that its decision granting the defendant's motion for contempt was predicated on its finding that the plaintiff had thrice violated its October 27, 2014 order: when the plaintiff initially deposited the funds in the joint account, which did not comply with the court order, and on two separate occasions when the plaintiff made unilateral withdrawals from that account, $237,643.11 on April 28, 2015, and $70,219.99 on September 22, 2015.
The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. As to the plaintiff's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in finding him in contempt without addressing the plaintiff's claim of reasonable reliance on the advice of counsel, the Appellate Court's review of the record revealed that, although the plaintiff had testified that he had consulted with counsel prior to withdrawing funds from the joint account, he did not testify that he was advised by his counsel to do so. Hall v. Hall , supra, 182 Conn. App. at 748, 191 A.3d 182. In rejecting the plaintiff's second claim, that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to open and vacate the judgment of contempt, the Appellate Court reasoned that, although the basis for that motion was that the judgment would have a deleterious effect on the plaintiff's career, the trial court properly had denied the motion because the plaintiff had not offered any evidence supporting that assertion. Id., at 755–56, 191 A.3d 182. This certified appeal followed.
We first address the plaintiff's claim that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding the plaintiff in contempt on the basis of the wilful violation of a court order. The plaintiff contends that the trial court abused its discretion because it failed to consider his testimony during the hearing on the motion for contempt that, when he violated the October 27, 2014 order, he was relying in good faith on his counsel's advice. The plaintiff further claims that the Appellate Court incorrectly concluded, based on its review of the record, that, during the contempt hearing, the plaintiff had not adequately apprised the trial court of his reliance on this theory. We agree with the Appellate Court's conclusion that the record does not support the plaintiff's claim that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to consider whether the plaintiff's actions were not wilful because he reasonably relied on the advice of counsel. As we explain herein, the plaintiff did not present testimony or evidence during the hearing on the motion for contempt that would have adequately apprised the trial court that he intended to claim that he acted reasonably in reliance on the advice of counsel. Although the plaintiff did make that claim for the first time in his motion for reconsideration, he failed to submit sufficient evidence to substantiate the claim and to warrant reconsideration of the contempt judgment.
The following additional, undisputed facts and procedural history, as set forth by the Appellate Court, are relevant to our resolution of this claim. Id., at 741, 191 A.3d 182.
On April 28, 2015, the plaintiff unilaterally withdrew $237,643.11 from the joint account and moved the money to a savings account solely in his name. The plaintiff testified that he did so because he was concerned that the defendant, who struggled with addiction and had previously "squandered funds" in connection with her substance abuse problems, would "go on another bender" and deplete the money in the joint account. On September 22, 2015, the plaintiff unilaterally withdrew the remaining amount in the joint account, $70,219.99, and placed it into a separate, personal account.
The court heard testimony and received evidence on the motion for contempt on three separate days, over the course of several months. During the hearing, the plaintiff, who is an attorney licensed to practice law in two states and, at the time of these proceedings, was employed as a senior vice president of a bank, testified at various times that he ha...
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