Mazza v. Mazza

• Decision Date: 01 November 2022
• Docket Number: AC 44984
• Citation: 216 Conn.App. 285,285 A.3d 90
• Parties: Wendy M. MAZZA v. Samuel T. MAZZA, Jr.
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals

216 Conn.App. 285

285 A.3d 90

Wendy M. MAZZA

v.Samuel T. MAZZA, Jr.

AC 44984

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 9, 2022

Officially released November 1, 2022

Alexander Copp, Danbury, with whom was Neil R. Marcus, Danbury, for the appellant (defendant).

Kathy Boufford, Newtown, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Elgo, Suarez and DiPentima, Js.

ELGO, J.

The defendant, Samuel T. Mazza, Jr., appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the postjudgment motion for contempt filed by the plaintiff, Wendy M. Mazza. On appeal, the defendant claims that the court improperly (1) granted the plaintiff's motion for contempt and (2) ordered alternative relief concerning the defendant's real property. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following undisputed facts and procedural history are relevant to this appeal. The parties married in August, 2003. In December, 2003, the defendant suffered an injury when a concrete tank fell onto his legs while he was performing work for his employer, M & M Precast Corporation, causing him to suffer a permanent loss of motion to his right leg and back. The defendant's injury spawned a workers’ compensation proceeding, and the defendant thereafter received workers’ compensation payments throughout the parties’ marriage.

On February 11, 2015, the court dissolved the marriage of the parties. The court incorporated into the judgment of dissolution the parties’ separation agreement (agreement), which was executed on the same date. The agreement is a standard form JD-FM-172 (Rev. 7-10) that the self-represented parties completed by writing their agreed terms in the designated sections. The agreement resolved all of their then outstanding issues, including custody, visitation, child support, health insurance coverage, childcare costs, and postmajority education support with respect to their four minor children. In § 13 of the agreement, titled "Other," the parties agreed that the "plaintiff will receive 50 [percent] of all awards from [the] defendant's workers’ compensation suit paid prior to [their] children's college graduation." The court held a hearing at which it canvassed the parties regarding their entire agreement, specifically including § 13, after which the court found that the entire agreement was fair and equitable. The defendant subsequently received a workers’ compensation payment for $10,000, of which he remitted 50 percent to the plaintiff.¹

On March 8, 2019, the defendant entered into a "Stipulation for Agreement and Award" (stipulation) that resolved his workers’ compensation proceeding. Pursuant to the stipulation, the defendant's employer agreed to pay $250,000 to the defendant as a "full, final and complete settlement, adjustment, accord and satisfaction of all claims which [the defendant] might otherwise have against [his employer] ... and is to be made and accepted in lieu of all other compensation payments ...." The stipulation further provides that the parties’ "purpose and intent ... [was] to resolve every and all claims for all injuries and conditions during, and related to, the [defendant's] employment with [his] employer under the Workers’ Compensation Act [(act), General Statutes § 31-275 et seq. ]." Within the next few months, the defendant received a check for approximately $200,000 pursuant to the stipulation, which accounted for a deduction of $50,000 for attorney's fees and costs.² On his receipt of this $200,000 workers’ compensation payment, the defendant did not remit 50 percent to the plaintiff. Instead, the defendant used the $200,000 workers’ compensation payment to purchase and to renovate a residence in Kent (Kent property), to pay taxes and rent, to purchase a camper, to give his mother a monetary gift, and to pay the plaintiff outstanding alimony and child support. Both parties subsequently retained counsel in the present case.

On December 23, 2020, the plaintiff filed a motion for contempt. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant wilfully violated § 13 of the agreement because he failed to remit to her 50 percent of the $200,000 workers’ compensation payment. As for relief, the plaintiff's motion for contempt sought 50 percent of the defendant's $200,000 workers’ compensation payment, attorney's fees incurred in the prosecution of the motion for contempt, and "any further or alternate relief the court deems fair and equitable."

On August 19 and September 14, 2021, the court held an evidentiary hearing on the plaintiff's motion for contempt. Both the plaintiff and the defendant testified at the hearing regarding their formation and understanding of the agreement. Each party submitted a memorandum of law in which they advanced disparate interpretations of § 13 of the agreement and its application to the $200,000 workers’ compensation payment. The defendant argued that the phrase "all awards from [the] defendant's workers’ compensation suit" did not include his $200,000 workers’ compensation payment because (1) he did not completely understand the terms of the agreement when he signed it, (2) the $200,000 workers’ compensation payment was much larger than he anticipated when he signed the agreement, (3) the parties never contemplated that the plaintiff would be entitled to a workers’ compensation payment attributable to his future medical expenses, (4) the time for him to provide the funds to the plaintiff had not yet expired, and (5) there is a legal distinction in the act between an "award" and an "approved stipulation." The plaintiff conversely argued that the agreement unambiguously provides that she was entitled to 50 percent of "all" of the workers’ compensation awards that the defendant received, which clearly included the $200,000 workers’ compensation payment that the defendant received pursuant to his workers’ compensation stipulation.

On September 15, 2021, the court issued an order granting the plaintiff's motion for contempt. The court rejected each of the defendant's arguments and held that "the plaintiff has carried her burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has wilfully failed to obey a clear court order without justification or excuse." The court reasoned that it "does not find the language of the agreement ambiguous; there is a clear court order that the ‘plaintiff will receive 50 [percent] of all awards from [the] defendant's workers’ compensation suit paid prior to [their] children's graduation.’ " The court further held that "[t]he defendant received [the $200,000 workers’ compensation payment] in March, 2019, but paid no portion to the plaintiff. There is no question ... that the defendant did not consider a legal distinction between settlements and awards when he received the [$200,000 workers’ compensation payment] and chose not to pay them to the plaintiff."

Consequently, the court issued a three part order of relief. First, the court ordered "the defendant to pay $101,300 to the plaintiff on or before October 15, 2021," and that the defendant shall "reimburse the plaintiff for a portion of her attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting this action in the amount of $7500." Second, the court ordered by way of "alternative" relief that the defendant convey by warranty deed to the plaintiff all of his right, title, and interest to his Kent property on or before October 15, 2021, and that the defendant was not to transfer, mortgage, or in any way diminish the value of the Kent property prior to his full compliance with the court's contempt order. Third, the court ordered that "the plaintiff may secure these orders by immediate judgment lien in accordance with Chapter 906 of the General Statutes." This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for contempt. Specifically, the defendant argues that the court incorrectly determined that the phrase in the agreement that "all awards from [the] defendant's workers’ compensation suit" clearly and unambiguously included his $200,000 workers’ compensation payment. The defendant also argues that the court abused its discretion by determining that he wilfully violated the agreement.³ We disagree.

We first set forth the standard of review and legal principles relevant to our resolution of the defendant's first claim. Our standard of review is mixed. We employ plenary review to the question of whether the court properly determined that the agreement incorporated into the judgment of dissolution was unambiguous. See Birkhold v. Birkhold , 343 Conn. 786, 811, 276 A.3d 414 (2022). We employ the abuse of discretion standard to review the question of whether the court properly determined that the defendant wilfully failed to comply with the agreement. Id.

"It is the burden of the party seeking an order of contempt to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both a clear and unambiguous directive to the alleged contemnor and the alleged contemnor's wilful noncompliance with that directive." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. "Contempt is a disobedience to the rules and orders of a court which has power to punish for such an offense. ... Our review of a trial court's judgment of civil contempt involves a two part inquiry. [W]e first consider the threshold question of whether the underlying order constituted a court order that was sufficiently clear and unambiguous so as to support a judgment of contempt. ... Second, if we conclude that the underlying court order was sufficiently clear and unambiguous, we must then determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in issuing, or refusing to issue, a judgment of contempt, which includes a review of the trial court's determination of whether the violation was wilful or excused by a good faith dispute or misunderstanding." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hall v. Hall , 335 Conn. 377, 391–92, 238 A.3d 687 (2020).

With respect to the first...