Hall v. Harris

• Decision Date: 31 December 1848
• Citation: 5 Ired.Eq. 303,40 N.C. 303
• Parties: JOHN HALL v. NELSON HARRIS et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

5 Ired.Eq. 303

40 N.C. 303

JOHN HALL

v.NELSON HARRIS et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

December Term, 1848.

When a paper is signed, sealed and handed to a third person, to be delivered to another, upon a condition which is afterwards complied with, the paper becomes a deed by the act of parting with the possession, and takes effect presently, without reference to the precise words used, unless it clearly appear to be the intention that it should not then become a deed, and this intention would be defeated by treating it as a deed from that time.

The cases of Hall v. Harris, 3 Ired. Eq. 189, and State v. Pool, 5 Ired. 105, cited and approved.

Cause removed from the Court of Equity of Montgomery County, at the Spring Term 1848.

The facts in this case are fully stated in a case between the same parties, Hall v. Harris, 3 Ired. Equity 289, and so much of them as is necessary to the understanding of the decision now made is set forth in the opinion of the Court here delivered.

Strange, for the plaintiff .

No counsel for the defendants.

PEARSON, J.

When this case was before this Court at June Term 1844, it was decided, that an execution does not bind equitable interests and rights of redemption from its teste, as in ordinary cases, but from the time of “execution served;” and it was declared that the plaintiff would be entitled to a decree, provided the deed, under which he claimed, took effect before the execution, under which the defendant Harris claimed, was issued. 3 Ired. Eq 289.

We are satisfied, that the view then taken of the case was correct. The rights of the parties depend upon that single question.

The execution issued on the 7th of March 1840. The plaintiff alleges, that the deed took effect on the 2d of March 1840. The facts are, that on the 2nd of March the plaintiff and the defendant Morgan made an agreement, by which the plaintiff was to give Morgan $725, for the land, to be paid, a part in cash, and the balance in notes and specific artieles, as soon as the plaintiff was able, which he expected would be in a few days, and Morgan was to make a deed to the plaintiff, and hand it to Col. Hardy Morgan, to be by him handed to the plaintiff, when he paid the price. Accordingly on that day the plaintiff paid to Morgan a waggon and some leather, which was taken at the price of $57 50 and Morgan signed and sealed the deed, and handed it to Col. Morgan to be handed to the plaintiff, when he paid the balance of the price. The deed was witnessed by Col. Morgan and one Sanders, and is dated on the 2nd of March. Afterwards on the tenth of March, the plaintiff paid to Morgan the balance of the $725, with the exception of $152, for which Morgan acepted his note, and the deed was then handed to the plaintiff by Col. Morgan.

The question upon these facts is, whether the deed takes effect from the 2nd or from the 10th of March? We are of opinion, that it takes effect from the 2nd, at which time, according to the agreement, it was signed, sealed, and delivered to Col Morgan, to be delivered to the plaintiff, when he should pay the price. The effect of the agreement was to give the plaintiff the eqitable estate in the land, and to give Morgan a right to the price. The purpose, for which the deed was delivered to a third person, instead of being delivered directly to the plaintiff, was merely to secure the payment of the price. When that was paid, the plaintiff had a right to the deed. The purpose, for which it was put into the hads of a third person, being accomplished, the plaintiff then held it in the same manner, as he would have held it, if it had been delivered to him in the first instance. This was the intention, and we can see no good reason why the parties should not be allowed to effect their end in this way.

It is true, the plaintiff was not absolutely bound to pay the balance of the price. Perhaps, he had it in his power to avail himself of the statute of frauds, and it would seem from the testimony, that, at one time, he contemplated doing so, on account of some doubt as to the title; but he complied...