Hall v. Huff

• Decision Date: 09 December 1997
• Docket Number: No. 06-97-00017-CV,06-97-00017-CV
• Citation: 957 S.W.2d 90
• Parties: Beth Ann HALL, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Arthur Hall, Deceased, Appellant, v. William K. HUFF, M.D., and Good Shepherd Hospital, Inc., D/B/A/ Good Shepherd Medical Center, Appellees.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Page 90

957 S.W.2d 90

Beth Ann HALL, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Arthur Hall, Deceased, Appellant, v. William K. HUFF, M.D., and Good Shepherd Hospital, Inc., D/B/A/ Good Shepherd Medical Center, Appellees.

No. 06-97-00017-CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas,

Texarkana.

Submitted July 15, 1997.

Decided Oct. 10, 1997.

Rehearing Overruled Dec. 9, 1997.

Linda Marshall, Houston, for Hall.

Don W. Kent, Ken W. Good, Cowles & Thompson, Tyler, for Huff.

T. John Ward, Brown McCarrol & Oaks Hartline, Longview, for Good Shepherd.

Before CORNELIUS, C.J., and GRANT and ROSS, JJ.

OPINION

GRANT, Justice.

Beth Ann Hall, on behalf of the estate of her deceased husband, Arthur Hall, appeals an adverse summary judgment granted in her medical malpractice suit against William K. Huff, M.D., and Good Shepherd Hospital, Inc. (GSH). She complains that the trial court erred (1) in granting Huff's motion for summary judgment on her negligent treatment claim because the motion only addressed her wrongful death claim, (2) in granting Huff's motion for summary judgment on the wrongful death claim because genuine issues of material fact existed, and (3) in granting summary judgment for GSH because genuine issues of material fact remained.

On January 11, 1993, Hall sustained an elbow injury and sought treatment from Dr. Huff, a physician who had treated Hall in past years for chronic renal disease. When Hall's condition worsened, Huff admitted Hall on March 5 to Marshall Memorial Hospital (MMH) for suspected pneumonia. Hall was under Huff's care during his nine-day stay at MMH. Within three days of his admittance to the facility, test results showed that Hall had developed signs of acute renal failure. In spite of these results, Huff treated Hall only for pneumonia and the elbow injury. That treatment included drugs that were contraindicated for patients with renal failure. After significant renal problems began to surface, and because MMH did not perform dialysis procedures, Hall was transferred to GSH, where his renal condition improved. On March 23, Dr. Paul Guentert inserted a cardiac catheter in Hall's chest to allow for consistent vein access. Dr. Victor Hrehorovich, Hall's expert witness, testified that Guentert incorrectly inserted the catheter too far, thereby perforating Hall's heart, causing his death days later by cardiac tamponade. Although the nurses' notes on the days following the improper insertion reflected symptoms of cardiac tamponade, the nurses failed to diagnose or treat Hall for it. Additionally, Hrehorovich testified that despite several label warnings printed on the catheter manufacturer's package insert cautioning medical personnel to be alert to cardiac tamponade, neither Guentert nor the attending nurses discovered or treated the cardiac tamponade condition until March 26, the day Hall died.

Hall asserts that Huff was negligent because he failed to properly diagnose and treat her husband's renal failure condition and delayed her husband's transfer to GSH, thereby leaving him in a weakened condition at the time of transfer. She further contends that GSH was negligent because it improperly monitored, staffed, and trained its nursing staff with regard to proper catheter placement and proper assessment, intervention, and diagnosis of cardiac tamponade. She asserts that because the nursing staff did not provide emergency treatment when cardiac tamponade set in, the staff wasted Hall's last chance for recovery in delaying and performing what should have been an unnecessary catheterization procedure. Hall contends that it was the combined negligence of the physicians and nurses mentioned above that led to Hall's injuries and death.

Standard of Review

Summary judgment is appropriate when the summary judgment evidence shows that "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the issues expressly set out in the motion or in any other response." ¹ The question on appeal is not whether the summary judgment proof raises a fact issue, but whether the summary judgment proof establishes as a matter of law that there is no genuine issue of material fact as to one or more of the essential elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. ² When deciding whether a disputed issue of material fact precludes summary judgment, an appellate court takes as true evidence favorable to the nonmovant, indulges every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant, and resolves all doubts in the nonmovant's favor. ³ The usual presumption that the judgment is correct does not apply to summary judgments. ⁴

To prevail on a medical malpractice cause of action, the plaintiff (Hall) must show four elements: (1) a duty by the physician to act according to certain standards; (2) a breach of the applicable standard of care; (3) an injury; and (4) a causal connection between the breach of care and the injury. ⁵ The defendant movant in summary judgment must conclusively disprove one element of the plaintiff's cause of action in order to prevail. ⁶ In the present case, the issue is causation.

Wrongful Death and Survival Statutes

At common law, a plaintiff could not bring a cause of action for wrongful death. ⁷ Also, a cause of action for personal injury could not survive to an heir of a deceased tort victim. ⁸ The legislature abolished these common-law rules when it passed the Wrongful Death Act and Survivorship Statute. Today, these causes of action are permitted solely by virtue of these statutes.

The pertinent sections of the Texas Wrongful Death Act as they apply to the present case state the following:

(a) An action for actual damages arising from an injury that causes an individual's death....

(b) A person is liable for damages arising from an injury that causes an individual's death if the injury was caused by the person's or his agent's or servant's wrongful act, neglect, carelessness, unskillfulness, or default. ⁹

The relevant portions of the Survival Statute provide the following:

(a) A cause of action for personal injury to the health, reputation, or person of an injured person does not abate because of the death of the injured person or because of the death of a person liable for the injury.

(b) A personal injury action survives to and in favor of the heirs, legal representatives, and estate of the injured person. ¹⁰

Hall v. Huff: Survival Statute

Hall contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment rather than a partial summary judgment because, while the motion for summary judgment included the Wrongful Death Act claim, it excluded the Survival Statute claim.

Grounds for summary judgment must be expressly presented with specificity in the summary judgment motion itself. ¹¹ Stating the grounds with specificity defines the issues and gives the nonmovant adequate notice for opposing the motion. The judgment must stand or fall on the grounds specifically and expressly set forth in the motion, not in a supporting brief or accompanying summary judgment evidence. ¹²

Huff's Motion for Summary Judgment was based solely on an "inferential rebuttal issue of new and independent cause" defense. The phrase "new and independent cause" is defined as "an act or omission of a separate and independent agency which destroys the causal connection between the negligent act or omission of the defendant and the injury complained of, and thereby becomes in itself, the immediate cause of such injury." ¹³ In his motion, Huff asserted that Hall's injuries and death were the result of an independent cause, namely the catheter's perforation of the heart, an act performed after Huff's care had ended and after Hall was transferred to another hospital. Although this assertion clearly addresses the proximate causation issue in the Wrongful Death claim, it fails to negate the Survival claim, which would provide for injuries suffered before Hall's transfer to GSH.

In the search for any language mentioning the Survival Statute claim, Huff's motion merely reiterates Hall's allegation that Huff was negligent in treating Hall and providing him with substandard care. Huff's Motion for Summary Judgment is conclusory in nature and does not discuss with any specificity how the new and independent cause of the improper catheter placement destroys Huff's liability for improperly diagnosing, treating, and delaying Hall's referral to GSH, and the injuries ensuing therefrom.

Also, Huff's interpretation of the "new and independent" definition implies that Hall's death is the only injury, not any possible pain and suffering that may have been caused by Huff's alleged negligent acts. Huff's analysis contemplates that an independent force (the catheter perforation), not any action or inaction by Huff, is responsible for all injuries, including those injuries sustained while under Huff's exclusive care. However, under Hall's survival action, the "injury complained of" is the pain and suffering and mental anguish that her husband sustained while under Huff's care before he was transferred to GSH, not any injuries suffered after the catheter pierced his heart, including his death.

Because the grounds for summary judgment must be expressly raised in the motion itself, and here Huff did not raise a ground with sufficient specificity to negate the survival claim, a partial summary judgment was proper. This point of error is sustained.

Hall v. Huff: Wrongful Death

Hall asserts that granting the motion for summary judgment on the Wrongful Death Act claim was error because a genuine issue of material fact exists and because Huff's "inferential rebuttal" defense is insufficient to support summary judgment. Specifically, she contends that before liability can be discharged, Huff must first prove in his "inferential rebuttal" assertion that the new cause was superseding, rather than merely intervening, and he has not provided that proof.

The Texas Wrongful Death Act...