Hall v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc.

• Citation: 146 F.Supp.3d 1187
• Decision Date: 12 November 2015
• Docket Number: CASE NO. CV 15-05609 MMM (PJWx)
• Parties: Todd Hall and Dan Rivera, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, and Does 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

146 F.Supp.3d 1187

Todd Hall and Dan Rivera, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.Live Nation Worldwide, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, and Does 1 to 10, inclusive, Defendants.

CASE NO. CV 15-05609 MMM (PJWx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed November 12, 2015

D. Alan Harris, Christina Marie Nordsten, Harris and Ruble, Glendale, CA, David Covington Garrett, Harris and Ruble, Los Angeles, CA, for Plaintiffs.

Chris A. Jalian, Elena R. Baca, George W. Abele, Paul Hastings LLP, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO REMAND

MARGARET M. MORROW

, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

On June 23, 2015, Todd Hall and Dan Rivera (collectively “plaintiffs”) filed this action individually and on behalf of similarly situated individuals in Los Angeles Superior Court against Live Nation Worldwide, Inc (“Live Nation”).¹ Live Nation removed the action to this court on July 24, 2015, invoking the court's federal question jurisdiction. Live Nation asserted that several of plaintiffs' state law claims were preempted by Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”), 29 U.S.C. § 185

.²

On July 31, 2015 Live Nation filed a motion to dismiss plaintiffs' first and third causes of action.³ Plaintiffs oppose this motion.⁴ On August 24, 2015, plaintiffs filed a motion to remand the case to state court,⁵ which Live Nation opposes.⁶

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On October 24, 2013, the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees—Local 33 (“IATSE”) allegedly entered into a collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) with Live Nation Hollywood (the “2013 CBA”).⁷ The 2013 CBA governs the employment of “stagehands represented by [IATSE] in connection with concerts and events, ... presented at the Hollywood Palladium” between October 1, 2013 and September 30, 2014.⁸ The 2013 CBA provides that it “will apply only to work performed from October 1, 2012 to September 20, 2014, and does not set [a] precedent for future events at this venue, nor grant the Union or any affiliated entity any rights (except as set forth herein) at this venue now or in the future.”⁹

Plaintiffs allege that they were hired by Live Nation on January 11, 2015 to work as stagehands on a television production of the “20th Annual Critics' Choice Movie Awards,” which was broadcast live from the Hollywood Palladium on January 15, 2015 (the “Production”).¹⁰ The Production aired live on A&E Network on January 15, 2015.¹¹ Plaintiffs were allegedly discharged from the Production that same date.¹² As of the date the complaint was filed, Rivera had allegedly not received any compensation for his work on the Production.¹³ Hall purportedly received final compensation on February 9, 2015.¹⁴ Plaintiffs assert that those who worked on the Production were not paid final compensation for work performed as required by the California Labor Code.¹⁵

Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that IATSE and Live Nation did not enter into a new contract governing live events that covered the Production between September 20, 2014 and January 15, 2015.¹⁶ As a result, they assert, there was no collective bargaining agreement that allowed Live Nation to withhold a stagehand's wages in violation of the California Labor Code.¹⁷

Plaintiffs' first and third claims for relief, which seek penalty wages, unpaid minimum wages, and overtime compensation under California Labor Code §§ 203

, 510, and 1194 respectively, are asserted on behalf of a class of all individuals who were employed by Live Nation in connection with the Critics' Choice awards show on January 15, 2015 (the “Critics' Choice Class”).¹⁸ Their second claim for relief, which alleges failure to provide accurate wage statements under California Labor Code §§ 226 and 1174, is asserted on behalf of a class of individuals who were employed by Live Nation from one year prior to the commencement of this action until the date a class certification motion is filed (“the 226 Class”).¹⁹ Plaintiffs also plead claims for unfair competition in violation of California Business & Professions Code §§ 17200 et seq. ; civil penalties under California Labor Code § 2698 ; and failure to provide employment records upon request under California Labor Code §§ 226 and 1198.5.

In its notice of removal, Live Nation alleges that although the prior collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) expired on September 30, 2014, Live Nation and IATSE entered into a new CBA on June 22, 2015, which explicitly covers work performed between October 1, 2014 to September 30, 2016.²⁰ Live Nation also alleges that after the expiration of the earlier CBA on September 30, 2014, the parties to that agreement continued to honor its terms while negotiating a new CBA.²¹

II. DISCUSSION

A. Requests for Judicial Notice

Live Nation asks the court to take judicial notice of two documents related to its motion:²² the 2015 CBA, and a Certificate of Merger between Live Nation NYC Concerns, Inc., LN Hollywood, Inc., and Live Nation Worldwide, Inc.²³

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court generally looks only to the face of the complaint and documents attached thereto. Van Buskirk v. Cable News Network, Inc ., 284 F.3d 977, 980 (9th Cir.2002)

; Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., Inc. , 896 F.2d 1542, 1555 n. 19 (9th Cir.1990). A court normally must convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment if it “considers evidence outside the pleadings. ... A court may, however, consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment.” United States v. Ritchie , 342 F.3d 903, 907–08 (9th Cir.2003).

Under Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence

, courts frequently take judicial notice of public filings. See Velazquez v. GMAC Mortg. Corp. , 605 F.Supp.2d 1049, 1057–58 (C.D.Cal.2008) (taking judicial notice of documents recorded by the Los Angeles County Recorder's Office, including deeds of trust); see also Krug v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , No. 11–CV–5190 YGR, 2012 WL 1980860, *2 (N.D.Cal. June 1, 2012) (public records are judicially noticeable under Rule 201 ); Grant v. Aurora Loan Servs., Inc. , 736 F.Supp.2d 1257, 1264 (C.D.Cal.2010) (noting that a “[party] provided a reference number for the document, showing that it was in fact recorded; this demonstrates that it is a public record”); Fimbres v. Chapel Mortg. Corp ., No. 09–CV–0886–IEG (POR), 2009 WL 4163332, *3 (S.D.Cal. Nov. 20, 2009) (taking judicial notice of a deed of trust, notice of default, notice of trustee's sale, assignment of deed of trust, and substitution of trustee as each was a public record); Angulo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. , No. 1:09–V–877–AWI–SMS, 2009 WL 3427179, *3 n. 3 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 26, 2009) (“The Deed of Trust and Notice of Default are matters of public record. As such, this court may consider these foreclosure documents”). For this reason, the court takes judicial notice of the Certificate of Merger, which is dated and time stamped and was filed with the Delaware Secretary of State, Division of Corporations on May 23, 2009.²⁴

Further, because the motions to dismiss and remand raise the issue of complete preemption, and “[b]ecause complete preemption often applies to complaints drawn to evade federal jurisdiction, [the] court may look beyond the face of the complaint to determine whether the claims alleged as state law causes of action in fact are necessarily federal claims.” Parrino v. FFIP, Inc. , 146 F.3d 699, 704 (9th Cir.1998)

, superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chemical Co. , 443 F.3d 676, 681 (9th Cir.2006)

. This is true even when the issue is raised by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Id. (“Because removal was based on complete preemption in this case, the district court properly considered the Master Group Application”). See also Peterson v. Spaich Farms, Inc. , No. CIV–S–98–2274DFLPAN, 1999 WL 793942, *1 (E.D.Cal. Sept. 29, 1999) (“Complete preemption has thus been described variously as an ‘independent corollary’ to the well-pleaded complaint rule, and an ‘exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule,’ ” quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams , 482 U.S. 386, 393, 107 S.Ct. 2425, 96 L.Ed.2d 318 (1987) ; Associated Builders & Contractors v. Local 302, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers , 109 F.3d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir.1997) ). Because the 2015 CBA forms the basis for Live Nation's argument that certain of plaintiffs' claims are completely preempted by the LMRA, the court can consider it in deciding the motions.²⁵

The court therefore grants Live Nation's request for judicial notice.²⁶

B. Whether Plaintiffs' First and Third Causes of Action Must Be Dismissed

1. Legal Standards Governing Motions to Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal theory,” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept. , 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir.1988)

. The court must accept all factual allegations pleaded in the complaint as true, and construe them and draw all reasonable inferences from them in favor of the nonmoving party.

Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. , 80 F.3d 336, 337–38 (9th Cir.1996)

; Mier v. Owens , 57 F.3d 747, 750 (9th Cir.1995).

The court need not, however, accept as true unreasonable inferences or conclusory legal allegations cast in the form of factual allegations. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 540 U.S. 544, 555, 124 S.Ct. 1200, 157 L.Ed.2d 1060 (2004)

(“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘enti...