Hall v. Ramsey Cnty.

• Decision Date: 14 September 2015
• Docket Number: No. 14–2985.,14–2985.
• Citation: 801 F.3d 912
• Parties: Marc HALL, Plaintiff–Appellant v. RAMSEY COUNTY; Eric Earl Anderson, individually and in his official capacity; Roy Irving, individually and in his official capacity; Melissa Jimenez, individually and in her official capacity; Jodi Leifeld, individually and in her official capacity, Defendants–Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

801 F.3d 912

Marc HALL, Plaintiff–Appellant

v.RAMSEY COUNTY; Eric Earl Anderson, individually and in his official capacity; Roy Irving, individually and in his official capacity; Melissa Jimenez, individually and in her official capacity; Jodi Leifeld, individually and in her official capacity, Defendants–Appellees.

No. 14–2985.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: May 14, 2015.

Filed: Sept. 14, 2015.

Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc Denied Oct. 20, 2015.

Stephen Charles Fiebiger, argued, Burnsville, MN, for Plaintiff–Appellant.

Carl David Dietz, argued, Saint Paul, MN, for Defendants–Appellees.

Before RILEY, Chief Judge, BRIGHT and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

Opinion

BRIGHT, Circuit Judge.

Marc Hall (Hall) was involuntarily sent to the Ramsey County Detox Center (Detox Center) after driving, while intoxicated, a bicycle into a garage. After his release from the Detox Center, Hall brought a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against four members of the staff at the Detox Center and Ramsey County, Minnesota (collectively, Appellees). Appellees collectively moved for summary judgment of dismissal. The district court¹ granted dismissal of Hall's federal claims on the basis of qualified immunity, finding Hall could not demonstrate any violation of his constitutional rights. Hall appeals. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

On the evening of August 7, 2011, police responded to a call after Hall crashed a bicycle into a garage. At the scene, Hall smelled strongly of alcohol. While declining to pursue charges, the police sent Hall to the Detox Center. Video cameras at the Detox Center captured some of the events that followed.²

Around 5:20 a.m. on August 8, 2011, Hall complained of leg pain to Jodi Leifeld (Leifeld), a registered nurse at the Detox Center. Leifeld observed that Hall could walk, but could not put full weight on his leg. Leifeld did not examine Hall's leg and, instead, told Hall to wait until the Detox Center processed the patients set for discharge.

About ten minutes later, Hall called 911 from the Detox Center pay phone and requested medical treatment. The 911 dispatcher phoned the Detox Center and informed a staff member that Hall had called 911. A Detox Center staff member then told Hall he would be placed in seclusion if he called 911 again. The restriction visibly upset Hall. Hall placed another telephone call. Hall claims the call was to a lawyer. Leifeld believed Hall's second call violated the restriction. In light of this belief, Leifeld determined Hall should be sent to seclusion to maintain order in the facility. Leifeld summoned three aides, Eric Earl Anderson (Anderson), Roy Irving (Irving), and Melissa Jimenez (Jimenez) (collectively, Aides) to place Hall in seclusion. The Aides then led Hall toward the seclusion room. Anderson and Irving escorted Hall by his wrists and forearms. Jimenez walked behind Anderson and Irving.

During the escort, Hall began to be uncooperative and, in response, Anderson and Irving pushed Hall against a wall. Anderson proceeded to twist and yank Hall's arm behind his back. Hall heard a popping sound. Irving pinned Hall against the wall. Once the Aides gained control of Hall, they led him to the seclusion room, where Anderson and Irving performed a take-down placing Hall onto a mat. After the Aides left, Hall fell asleep until approximately 7:30 a.m. Hall was released from seclusion at that time and Hall's injuries were assessed.

Hall was taken to the hospital around 11:30 a.m. A doctor ordered x-rays which showed injuries to Hall's elbow, wrist, and leg. The doctor placed Hall's arm in a sling and immobilized his left leg. Evidence in the record indicates the wrist and elbow injuries could have been caused by the twisting of Hall's arm behind his back.

Hall brought this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Anderson, Irving, Jimenez, Leifeld, and Ramsey County for (1) use of excessive force during the escort to seclusion, (2) denial of procedural due process for Hall's placement in seclusion, and (3) denial of medical care in the delayed treatment of Hall's leg. Hall also brought state-law claims for assault, battery, false imprisonment, and negligence. Appellees moved for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment on Hall's section 1983 claims, finding Hall failed to demonstrate a violation of a constitutional right. Because the district court granted summary judgment on the claims providing original jurisdiction, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. The state-law claims were dismissed without prejudice. This appeal follows.

II. DISCUSSION

“Summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Coates v. Powell, 639 F.3d 471, 475 (8th Cir.2011). We review “de novo a denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity.” Small v. McCrystal, 708 F.3d 997, 1003 (8th Cir.2013). We “accept[ ] as true the facts that the district court specifically found were adequately supported” in addition to the facts that the district court “likely assumed.” Lockridge v. Bd. of Trs., of the Univ. of Ark., 315 F.3d 1005, 1008 (8th Cir.2003) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“In [section] 1983 claims, qualified immunity shields government officials from liability and the burdens of litigation unless their conduct violated a clearly established constitutional or statutory right of which a reasonable official would have known.” Carpenter v. Gage, 686 F.3d 644, 648 (8th Cir.2012). In reviewing the district court's action on a motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, we ask two questions: (1) whether there was a violation of a constitutional right; and (2) whether the right was “clearly established at the time of the” violation. Vaughn v. Ruoff, 253 F.3d 1124, 1128 (8th Cir.2001). “If either question is answered in the negative, the public official is entitled to qualified immunity.” Id. For the reasons stated below, we conclude Appellees' conduct did not violate Hall's constitutional rights and, therefore, we affirm the dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity.

A. Fourteenth Amendment—Excessive Force

Hall argues Appellees violated Hall's constitutional rights by using excessive force during Hall's escort to seclusion. When evaluating an excessive force claim in the involuntary commitment setting, the constitutional right at issue is an individual's “right to substantive due process arising under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Norris v. Engles, 494 F.3d 634, 637 (8th Cir.2007) ; see also Lanman v. Hinson, 529 F.3d 673, 681 (6th Cir.2008) (holding that when an incident is not covered by a specific provision of the Fourth Amendment “the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause applies to [an] excessive force claim”). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “protects individual liberty against certain government actions regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement them.” Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 478 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir.2007) (quoting Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125, 112 S.Ct. 1061, 117 L.Ed.2d 261 (1992) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In the context of substantive due process, an individual must overcome a very heavy burden to show a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. To balance competing interests in a substantive due process analysis, “the question is not simply whether a liberty interest has been infringed but whether the extent or nature of the [infringement] ... is such as to violate due process.” Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 647 (8th Cir.2002) (en banc) (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). To establish a violation, the “plaintiff must demonstrate both that the official's conduct was conscience-shocking, and that the official violated one or more fundamental rights that are deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.” Norris, 494 F.3d at 638 (quoting Slusarchuk v. Hoff, 346 F.3d 1178, 1181–82 (8th Cir.2003) ) (internal quotation marks omitted).

To satisfy the conscience-shocking standard,³ a government official's conduct must be “so egregious, so outrageous, that it may fairly be said to shock the contemporary conscience.” Cnty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 847–48 n. 8, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (1998). “[C]onduct intended to injure [an individual] in some way unjustifiable by any government interest is ... most likely to rise to the conscience-shocking level.” Id. at 849, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043. But when the acts of a government official fall “within the middle range ... something more than negligence but less than intentional conduct”⁴ the “totality of the facts in a given case” must be assessed to determine whether the behavior is conscience shocking. Id. at 849–50, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 140 L.Ed.2d 1043 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Determining whether conduct is conscience shocking “is a question of degree.” Moran, 296 F.3d at 647 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In general, substantive due process is concerned with violations of personal rights ... so severe ... so disproportionate to the need presented, and ... so inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking to the conscience.

Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The issue of whether the Appellees' conduct was conscience shocking is a close one. But ultimately, Hall's resistance to the Aides, shown by the video footage,...