Small v. McCrystal

• Decision Date: 19 February 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–1933.,12–1933.
• Parties: Clint SMALL; Derrick Pomranky; Adam Lee; Michele Heck; Jason Hopkins; Amber Gamboa; Nicholas Palmer; Jonathon Flanders; Tracy Mertz, Plaintiffs–Appellees v. James McCRYSTAL; Todd Trobaugh; County of Woodbury, Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

708 F.3d 997

Clint SMALL; Derrick Pomranky; Adam Lee; Michele Heck; Jason Hopkins; Amber Gamboa; Nicholas Palmer; Jonathon Flanders; Tracy Mertz, Plaintiffs–Appellees

v.James McCRYSTAL; Todd Trobaugh; County of Woodbury, Defendants–Appellants.

No. 12–1933.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: Nov. 13, 2012.

Filed: Feb. 19, 2013.

Linda A. Jensen–Hall, argued, Waterloo, IA, for appellant Todd Trobaugh.

Douglas L. Phillips, argued, Sioux City, IA, Timothy Charles Boller, on the brief, Waterloo, IA, for appellants James McCrystal and County of Woodbury.

Jay Elliott Denne, argued, Stanley E. Munger, on the brief, Sioux City, IA, for appellees.

Before MURPHY, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges.

BENTON, Circuit Judge.

On October 5, 2008, deputies of Woodbury County, Iowa, responded to a disturbance.They arrested one plaintiff at the scene; arrest warrants were issued for others within weeks. The plaintiffs sued the deputies and County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Iowa law. The deputies and County moved for summary judgment, which the district court ¹ denied in part. The deputies and County appeal. Having jurisdiction of the § 1983 claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, this court affirms.

I.

This court states the facts most favorably to the plaintiffs, discounting the deputies' contrary evidence. See Nelson v. Corr. Med. Servs., 583 F.3d 522, 525 (8th Cir.2009) (en banc). On October 4, 2008, friends of a motorcycle-accident victim held a benefit at a golf course. Late in the evening, a fight broke out. A volunteer called 911. Deputies James McCrystal and Todd Trobaugh went to the golf course to respond to a “large disturbance.” They arrived around 1:30 in the morning. They found no fistfights. The 30 to 50 people there were not acting violently.

McCrystal entered the clubhouse and told the bartender to stop serving alcohol. An intoxicated Clinton Michael Small was inside. They did not exchange words. McCrystal exited the building. Small followed minutes later, walking toward his camper in the parking lot. Without warning, McCrystal ran and tackled Small from behind. Small landed on his stomach and face; his face began to bleed. McCrystal handcuffed him. Small was taken to the hospital in an ambulance. The other plaintiffs expressed displeasure, but did not physically threaten the deputies.

The County charged Small, Derrick Cleve Pomranky, Adam James Lee, Jason Eugene Hopkins, Amber Lea Gamboa, Nicholas Adam Palmer, and Jonathan Paul Flanders with disorderly conduct, unlawful assembly, and failure to disperse. Small was also charged with interference with official acts, and Michele Kay Heck and Tracy Ann Mertz were charged with assault on a peace officer. None of these plaintiffs was convicted. Prosecutors dismissed charges against some, while others were acquitted.

The plaintiffs sued the County, Trobaugh, and McCrystal under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Iowa law. McCrystal and the County appeal the denial of summary judgment as to claims that McCrystal unlawfully arrested and used excessive force on Small. All three defendants appeal the denial of summary judgment as to the claims that the deputies induced prosecution of the plaintiffs in violation of the First Amendment, unlawfully arrested the plaintiffs other than Small (the “Warrant Plaintiffs”), entered into a civil conspiracy to violate the First and Fourth Amendment, and violated Iowa law.

II.

Because a denial of summary judgment is not a final decision, this court ordinarily lacks jurisdiction to immediately review it. McCaster v. Clausen, 684 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir.2012). This court may, however, immediately review a denial of qualified immunity under the collateral order doctrine. Id., citing Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 311–12, 115 S.Ct. 2151, 132 L.Ed.2d 238 (1995). Jurisdiction extends to the “purely legal” issue of whether the facts, taken most favorably to the plaintiffs, support a finding that the deputies violated their clearly established constitutional rights. Id. at 745–46.

This court reviews de novo a denial of summary judgment on grounds of qualified immunity. Nelson, 583 F.3d at 527. “Summary judgment is proper if, after viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, no genuine issues of material fact exist and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rau v. Roberts, 640 F.3d 324, 327 (8th Cir.2011), quoting Hayek v. City of St. Paul, 488 F.3d 1049, 1054 (8th Cir.2007).

Qualified immunity protects government officials “from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). This court examines (1) whether the facts alleged or shown, construed most favorably to the plaintiffs, establish a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether that constitutional right was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct, such that a reasonable official would have known that the acts were unlawful. McCaster, 684 F.3d at 746.

A.

Small claims that McCrystal violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause. “It is clearly established that a warrantless arrest, unsupported by probable cause, violates the Fourth Amendment.” Baribeau v. City of Minneapolis, 596 F.3d 465, 478 (8th Cir.2010). “[O]fficers are entitled to qualified immunity if they arrest a suspect under the mistaken belief that they have probable cause to do so, provided that the mistake is objectively reasonable.” Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir.2010); see also Walker v. City of Pine Bluff, 414 F.3d 989, 992 (8th Cir.2005). “Probable cause exists if the totality of facts based on reasonably trustworthy information would justify a prudent person in believing the individual arrested had committed an offense.” Copeland, 613 F.3d at 879 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted).

Small was charged with unlawful assembly.

An unlawful assembly is three or more persons assembled together, with them or any of them acting in a violent manner, and with intent that they or any of them will commit a public offense. A person who willingly joins in or remains a part of an unlawful assembly, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that it is such, commits a simple misdemeanor.

Iowa Code § 723.2. Viewing the facts most favorably to Small: Neither he nor any other person gathered at the time of his arrest was “acting in a violent manner.” Several witnesses in the resulting criminal trials testified that those gathered were dispersing, while others testified that they only verbally expressed displeasure at McCrystal's acts. Nor did Small “join[ ] in or remain” a part of any group; he was walking away when arrested. Assuming these facts, a reasonable officer would not have believed he had probable cause to arrest Small for unlawful assembly.

Small was charged with failure to disperse.

A peace officer may order the participants in a riot or unlawful assembly or persons in the immediate vicinity of a riot or unlawful assembly to disperse. Any person within hearing distance of such command, who refuses to obey, commits a simple misdemeanor.

§ 723.3. Viewing the facts most favorably to Small: As discussed, there was no unlawful assembly. For the same reasons, there was no riot. See§ 723.1 (“A riot is three or more persons assembled together in a violent manner, to the disturbance of others, and with any use of unlawful force or violence by them or any of them against another person, or causing property damage.”). Nor was Small ordered to disperse. Several witnesses testified that McCrystal said nothing to Small before arresting him. Assuming these facts, a reasonable officer would not have believed he had probable cause to arrest Small for failure to disperse.

Small was charged with disorderly conduct. A person commits this simple misdemeanor when he or she

1. Engages in fighting or violent behavior in any public place or in or near any lawful assembly of persons ... [,]

2. Makes loud or raucous noise in the vicinity of any residence or public building which causes unreasonable distress to the occupants thereof[, or]

3. Directs abusive epithets or makes any threatening gesture which the person knows or reasonably should know is likely to provoke a violent reaction by another.

§ 723.4. Viewing the facts most favorably to Small: He did not engage in any fighting or violent behavior. He did not make a loud or raucous noise or direct any abusive epithets; while some witnesses heard him shout an obscenity in general derogation of the County law enforcement, others heard nothing. He was walking away. Any gesture he made was not threatening. Assuming these facts, a reasonable officer would not have believed he had probable cause to arrest Small for disorderly conduct.

Small was charged with interference with official acts.

1. A person who knowingly resists or obstructs anyone known by the person to be a peace officer ... in the performance of any act which is within the scope of the lawful duty or authority of that officer ... or who knowingly resists or obstructs the service or execution by any authorized person of any civil or criminal process or order of any court, commits a simple misdemeanor....

....

3. The terms “resist” and “obstruct,” as used in this section, do not include verbal harassment unless the verbal harassment is accompanied by a present ability and apparent intention to execute a verbal threat physically.

§ 719.1. “One may ‘resist’ an officer under the Iowa statute without using physical force.” Lawyer v. City of Council Bluffs, 361 F.3d 1099, 1107 (8th Cir.2004) (citing State v. Donner, 243 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Iowa 1976); State v. Brecunier, 564 N.W.2d 365 (Iowa 1997)). “[T]he term ‘obstruct’ is considered broader than ‘resist,’ and ‘includes...