Hall v. Richardson

• Decision Date: 02 June 1920
• Docket Number: (No. 585.)
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: HALL. v. GEISSELL & RICHARDSON.

103 S.E. 392

HALL.

v.GEISSELL & RICHARDSON.

(No. 585.)

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 2, 1920.

Appeal from Superior Court, Swain County; Bryson, Judge.

Action by N. A. Hall against Geissell & Richardson, copartners. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. No error.

The plaintiff, Hall, was a country merchant, and the defendants were operating a large sawmill near his store. In September, 1917, plaintiff entered into an agreement with defendants, through their agent or general superintendent, W. A. McGee, to furnish merchandise to certain employes of the defendants; it being a part of the agreement that only such employes should be furnished as received orders from the company or itsrepresentative, and that the plaintiff should present statements on the 1st of each month, covering the amounts furnished to the employes. The plaintiff, under this agreement, furnished supplies to defendants' employes from September, 1917, up to the 1st day of November, 1918, making statements on the 1st day of the month, the amounts of which were promptly paid by defendants.

On the 1st day of November, 1918, plaintiff prepared his usual statement, amounting to $650.33, and delivered it at defendants' office. A few days later defendants' bookkeeper informed plaintiff that the statement had been misplaced, and requested a duplicate, which was furnished. The defendants made no objection to any item charged on this statement, but refused to pay the same, on the ground that the plaintiff had furnished these supplies without proper orders. There was no denial of the facts by defendants that the parties receiving the supplies were in their employ, and that the supplies were such as the employes required in order to carry on the work of the defendant company. It was not denied that W. A. McGee was the superintendent of the defendants in charge of their lumber operations during the period of time these supplies were furnished; but defendants contended that McGee only had limited authority, his contract being in writing. It was not shown on the trial that the plaintiff, Hall, had any notice of the terms of this contract. The plaintiff testified on the trial that he had furnished the supplies included in this account upon the express order of W. A. McGee, and only furnished supplies to such employes as McGee directed. The jury answered the issues in favor of the plaintiff, and from the judgment on the verdict the defendants appealed.

Frye & Frye, of Bryson City, for appellants.

S. W. Black, of Bryson City, for appellee.

WALKER, J. (after stating the facts as above). There are many exceptions in the record, but a careful analysis of them will show that there are really a very few which need to be considered, because they substantially present all the essential objections taken during the trial, and cover all the matters appealing in the assignments of error. The main question was whether the superintendent, W. A. McGee, had the authority to make the contract with the plaintiff, and, if not, whether the contract was afterwards ratified by the defendants, with full knowledge of the fact that he had exceeded his authority and as to what he had done. These questions were submitted to the jury by the judge, with full and correct instructions, and the jury found either that McGee had the express authority, or that, if he did not have it, and had acted either without it, or in excess of it, the defendants, with knowledge of what had been done by him, had freely ratified it. The court gave clear instructions as to what, in law, would constitute authority in McGee to represent the defendants and make a binding contract with the plaintiff in their behalf, and also explained fully what was required to hold the defendants liable under the contract by their ratification of it.

There was ample evidence to support the charge. Among other things, it was shown that the account ran from September, 1917, to November, 1918, and that at the 1st of each month the bill for the month before was presented and promptly paid, until the final statement for $650.33 was presented and held up. It would be very strange if defendants did not know of these transactions each month, and inquire of McGee why he was paying these bills with such regularity, and under what contract or understanding with the plaintiff., If the defendants were at all watchful of their interests and diligent in the prosecution and management of their business, they would have ascertained why McGee was making these monthly payments, and if he did not have authority from them to thus trade with the plaintiff, and was acting without authority or in excess of his authority, they would certainly have made earlier complaint. The jury had the right to consider this and the other evidence bearing upon the question, and particularly the Callahan mortgage transaction, and the evidence as to what was said by the defendant Richardson. The conclusion of the jury was not against the weight of competent and relevant testimony to show the authority of W. A. McGee, which he professed to have, or ratification, if he did not have it.

The parol evidence objected to by the defendants was competent, as the transaction to which it relates was collateral to the issue in this case. This action is not upon the mortgage or the debt it secured; but the evidence was offered to show by the dealings with respect to the mortgage an admission of liability by the defendants for the debt which is the subject of this action. Greenleaf on Evidence, 275, 279, 366; Pollock v. Wilcox, 68 N. C. 46; Carden v. Mc-Connell, 116 N. C. 875, 21 S. E. 923; Ledford v. Emerson, 138 N. C. 502, 51 S. E. 42, where it was held that the parol evidence rule, as to the contents of a written instrument, applies only to actions between parties to the...