Hall v. Small

• Decision Date: 23 December 1903
• Citation: 178 Mo. 629,77 S.W. 733
• Parties: HALL v. SMALL.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

77 S.W. 733

178 Mo. 629

HALL v. SMALL.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

December 23, 1903.

DEEDS — RESERVATIONS — CONTEMPORANEOUS PAROL AGREEMENT — PROOF — STATUTE OF FRAUDS — IMPLIED TRUSTS — EJECTMENT — NATURE OF ACTION — DISCHARGE OF JURY — HARMLESS ERROR.

1. Where a deed recited that it was given in consideration that the grantee would care for and support the grantor during her natural life and for $1, and the grantor therein expressly reserved to herself a life estate in the premises, parol evidence was inadmissible to establish a contemporaneous oral agreement by which the grantee's estate was increased to a fee, and that the reservation of the life estate was intended solely as security that the grantee would perform his part of the agreement, such parol agreement being within the statute of frauds.

2. Where a deed reserved a life estate to the grantor, and in an action to eject the grantee during the grantor's life the grantee alleged an express parol agreement that such reservation was to be solely as security for his support of the grantor during her life, such agreement could not be enforced as an implied or resulting trust.

3. Where an answer stated no defense whatever, the court properly excluded evidence offered in support thereof.

4. Where, in ejectment, defendant filed an answer attempting to set up an equitable defense, but not as a cross-bill, and did not ask affirmative relief, it was error for the court to discharge the jury on the ground that the case was one in equity, and not at law.

5. Under Rev. St. 1899, § 865, prohibiting the reversal of judgments on appeal for technical errors not affecting the result, where the judgment is for the right party, where in ejectment the court correctly found for plaintiff, its error in discharging the jury on the ground that the case was one in equity by reason of an attempted equitable defense set up in the answer which in fact was insufficient was harmless.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Clinton County; A. D. Burnes, Judge.

Action by Sally Hall against Claude E. Small. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

E. C. Hall, for appellant. W. S. Herndon, for respondent.

MARSHALL, J.

This is an action in ejectment for 26 acres of land in Clinton county. The petition is in the usual form. The answer is, first, a general denial, and, second, a special plea to the effect that on November 13, 1899, the plaintiff deeded the land to the defendant for a consideration stated in the deed to be "that the grantee care for and support the grantor during her natural life and one dollar"; that there was a prior and contemporaneous agreement between the parties that the defendant was to have the land, and in consideration thereof was to support the plaintiff during her natural life, and that, to secure the faithful performance of his agreement so to do, it was agreed that the deed should contain the following clause: "The grantor herein expressly reserves to herself a life estate in said premises for and during her natural life," and that such clause was put into said deed by the direction of both the plaintiff and defendant for the sole purpose of securing defendant's compliance with said agreement to support the plaintiff; that defendant entered into possession under said deed, made valuable improvements on the land, and has ever since supported the plaintiff, and that she still resides with him, and is enjoying "the fruits of the contract"; and defendant offers to continue to perform the contract, and therefore asks that the trust be declared, and that judgment be entered in his favor. The reply is a general denial, with a special plea that, if any such contract or agreement as is pleaded was made, it is void under sections 3416 and 3418, Rev. St. 1899. The case came on for trial before a jury in the circuit court. The plaintiff proved the rental value of the land, and offered a notice served on defendant on December 22, 1900, to quit on March 1, 1901, and then rested. The defendant then introduced evidence showing that he is the nephew, by marriage, of the...