Hall v. State
| Decision Date | 09 November 1909 |
| Docket Number | 2,185. |
| Citation | 66 S.E. 390,7 Ga.App. 115 |
| Parties | HALL v. STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Rehearing Denied Dec. 10, 1909.
Syllabus by the Court.
Alleged disqualification of grand jurors proper affectum is not a valid ground for plea in abatement to an indictment.
A motion for continuance primarily addresses itself to the trial judge, and his ruling thereon will not be disturbed unless it is manifest that he has abused his discretion. The record fails to disclose an abuse of discretion in this case.
In a prosecution for burglary, the ownership of the house alleged to have been broken need not be shown by the production of title deeds or other writings. Proof of possession is sufficient evidence of ownership. The possession of an agent or custodian raises a presumption of ownership by his principal.
A carrier has such an interest in the goods which are in its custody for transportation as to support the allegation of its ownership in an indictment for larceny or burglary.
The trial judge may, without violating the principles of section 1032 of the Penal Code of 1895, give his reasons for a ruling on objections to testimony, though these reasons may state somewhat of the facts that have been shown in the case.
It is no objection to evidence which has a direct relevancy to the case on trial that it also tends to show a distinct and separate crime on the defendant's part.
The words of a charge are not to be considered dislocated from their context, but are to be construed together with all that is said on the subject. Thus viewed, the charge of the court on the subject of flight as a circumstance tending to show guilt was somewhat verbally inaccurate, but not materially erroneous.
The verdict is well supported by the testimony, and no sufficient error is pointed out to justify the grant of a new trial.
It is proper for the court, in advance of action by a grand jury to receive information from the defendant, or from any legitimate source tending to show that certain of the grand jurors would likely be biased.
Defendant in a prosecution for burglary applied for a continuance for an absent witness, by whom he expected to prove that he honestly procured the goods from another person, the witness being present when the goods found in his house were brought to him. There was a countershowing as to defendant's diligence in procuring the testimony, and also that defendant had outlined his ground for defense previously without making any reference to such witness who it also appeared was a fugitive from justice. Held, that the denial of the application was not an abuse of discretion.
Inside a railroad warehouse, alleged to have been burglarized, was a room occupied by an express company, separated by walls and a door from the rest of the warehouse. It was shown that the burglar broke through the door and took certain goods from the express office, which articles were found in the possession of defendant and his alleged confederates. Held, that the evidence of the larceny of the goods in the express office was not objectionable as tending to prove another offense.
In a prosecution for burglary, an instruction that, if defendant fled, that would be a circumstance of guilt that the jury might consider with other facts on the issue of guilt, unless his flight had been explained satisfactorily to the jury and they should find that he fled for some other reason than the consciousness of guilt, was not error.
Error from Superior Court, Jeff Davis County; T. A. Parker, Judge.
Frank Hall was convicted of burglary, and he brings error. Affirmed.
P. L Smith and W. W. Bennett, for plaintiff in error.
J. H Thomas, Sol. Gen., and Jno. W. Bennett, for the State.
POWELL J. (after stating the facts as above).
1. Whether a defendant can raise by plea in abatement the point that one or more of the grand jurors were disqualified by reason of relationship to some party interested, or for other grounds proper affectum, is a subject on which the courts are not in harmony. The weight of authority is to the effect that no such ground of abatement exists. Upon the specific question as to whether relationship to the prosecutor disqualifies a grand juror, see the note to the case of State v. Russell, as reported in 28 L.R.A. 195, 202. In this state the earliest adjudication of the Supreme Court is an unqualified ruling to the effect that causes which would tend to disqualify a grand juror proper affectum do not furnish sufficient ground for a plea in abatement to the indictment. Betts v. State, 66 Ga. 509, 515. The reasons given by the court in that case seem to be valid and convincing. It is true that there are several subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court in which there are to be found intimations that the defendant might raise the point by plea in abatement, if he could prove that he had had no notice that his case was to be investigated by the grand jury and had had no opportunity to present his objections or challenge before the indictment was returned, but in none of these cases is there any direct ruling on the proposition. Of course, challenges proper affectum would go against grand jurors impaneled as a special jury to try an issue before the court; for, in that event they stand in the same relation as petit jurors. See Justices v. Griffin, etc., Plank Road Co., 15 Ga. 39. There is, however, a vast difference between the functions of grand juries and those of trial juries. In no true sense does the grand jury try cases in which they prefer indictments. The object of the grand inquest is, and has been from earliest times, to inform the court as to what persons are suspected of crime, to the end that they may be tried. Those who have committed, or who are accused of having committed, offenses have no right to a hearing before the grand jury, or to dictate as to how the inquest shall be made, or what range the inquiry shall take. In investigating crimes the grand jurors are performing a function for the benefit of the state, and, theoretically at least, not for the benefit of the accused. It would seem that the main reason why the court should remove partial grand jurors from the panel before the inquiry begins is the inexpediency of putting the public to the trouble and expense of trying an alleged defendant, unless those who are impartial are willing to accuse him on the testimony which the prosecution or state's counsel is able to produce against him; and, further, there is incidentally the other reason that an injustice is done to the individual citizen when he is subjected to accusation of crime by those who would be more than normally willing to exalt bare unsupported suspicion into a reasonable ground for indictment and trial. For this reason, it is proper that the court should in advance of the grand jury's action receive information from the defendant from an amicus curiæ or from any other legitimate source tending to show that certain of the grand jurors would likely be biased, and that he should purge the panel so as to make it impartial. But when the grand jury has acted, when the formal charge has been made and published, when the trouble and expense for the preparation for trial has been incurred, when the defendant has been arraigned and asked, "Are you guilty or not guilty?" when the injury that would result from the unjust accusation, if it is unjust, has been consummated, and there can be no vindication of the defendant except upon looking to the merits of the transaction--there is but a small...
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