Hall v. State
| Citation | 49 Ala.App. 381,272 So.2d 590 |
| Decision Date | 23 January 1973 |
| Docket Number | 3 Div. 20 |
| Parties | James H. HALL v. STATE. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Rushton, Stakely, Johnston & Garrett and N. T. Braswell, III, Montgomery, for appellant.
MacDonald Gallion, Atty. Gen. and George W. Hodges, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.
The indictment charged that James H. Hall unlawfully and with malice aforethought killed Floyd Eugene Vann by choking him with his hands. The defendant claimed self defense. A jury found him guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and fixed his punishment at imprisonment in the penitentiary for three years. He was adjudged guilty by the court and sentenced in accordance with the jury verdict.
The homicide occurred in the defendant's locked cell at Kilby Prison. The cell was described as being eight by ten feet with a double bunk bed and a toilet. The walls were concrete and the door was 'barred.'
The evidence tended to show that on April 30, 1969, the deceased was removed from his cell because it was 'flooded' and placed in the defendant's cell. Early the following morning guards who had been summoned by the defendant found the body of the deceased on the floor of the cell. A state toxicologist testified that in his opinion death was caused by strangulation. According to the testimony, the deceased had harassed the defendant throughout the night, several times threatening his life. Early the next morning, according to the defendant's testimony, Vann cursed him and he slapped Vann. When this occurred Vann came toward the defendant with a knife and a struggle ensued. The defendant was choking the deceased with one hand while attempting to knock the knife from the deceased's hand with the other hand. After the defendant succeeded in taking the knife from the deceased, the deceased began to choke the defendant. At some point the deceased lost the struggle and the defendant called for the guards.
Other inmates testified that they heard the deceased threaten the defendant during the night. Some claimed to have seen the struggle through the door and testified that the deceased was armed with a knife.
Further testimony indicated the deceased was often seen with a knife in his possession and that he had on several occasions inflicted wounds upon himself. The defendant was aware of these propensities. A staff conference report from Partlow State School showed the deceased to be retarded and subject to psychotic episodes.
On cross-examination the state toxicologist testified that it was his opinion that the deceased died from external pressure on the neck; that this pressure caused death by asphyxiation; that in disecting the neck he examined the trachea, which is the air tree in the region of the neck, and found no evidence of any fractures; that in many cases strangulation caused massive damage to the trachea but not in all cases; that a person could die of injury to the throat due to shock effect of the pressure causing instantaneous death; and that this type death had to do with the carotid sinus, which is a nerve center in the carotid arteries on each side of the neck.
In charging the jury the trial court explained the definition and elements of first and second degree murder and then continued as follows:
The trial court also charged the jury on three occasions that 'the law says a person is presumed to intend to do that which he does.' There was proper objection to these statements by defense counsel at the conclusion of the oral charge.
The defendant argues in brief that intent is an element which must be proven by the prosecution and that the trial court, by charging as he did, in effect instructed the jury to find that the defendant intended to kill the deceased.
To constitute manslaughter in the first degree there must be either a positive intent to kill or an act of violence from which ordinarily in the usual course of events death or great bodily harm may be the consequence. Reynolds v. State, 24 Ala.App. 249, 134 So. 815; Harrington v. State, 83 Ala. 9, 3 So. 425; Williams v. State, 83 Ala. 16, 3 So. 616; Clayton v. State, 36 Ala.App. 175, 54 So.2d 719.
The trial judge, however, limited his charge on first degree manslaughter to that kind which is intentionally done. The trial judge did not charge the jury that first degree manslaughter could result from an act of violence from which ordinarily in the usual course of events death or great bodily harm may be the consequence. He charged that manslaughter is 'an intentional Murder done without legal justification or execution.' Obviously, he intended to say 'homicide' rather than 'murder' but the record before us indicates the use of the word, 'murder.' Thus, we have a case where the deceased was killed by the hands of the defendant and the jury was instructed by the court that voluntary manslaughter requires a positive intent to kill and that the law presumes a person intends to do that which he does.
Statements similar to the one objected to in this case have been made numerous times in appellate decisions. Usually they begin with the word, 'generally,' and conclude with, 'and that the natural, necessary, and probable consequences of his acts were intended.' Sometimes the concluding phrase, 'unless it is shown to the contrary,' is added. Jacobs v. State, 17 Ala.App. 396, 85 So. 837; Jones v. State, 29 Ala.App. 126, 193 So. 179; Lanier v. State, 31 Ala.App. 242, 15 So.2d 278; Williams v. State, 13 Ala.App. 133, 69 So. 376; Johnson v. State, 32 Ala.App. 217, 24 So.2d 228.
It should be observed however that statements like the above have almost exclusively been used in opinions of appellate decisions. We have not been cited nor has our research revealed a case where such a statement has been approved as a proper charge to the jury. On this point Mr. Justice Coleman's observation in Knight v. State, 273 Ala. 480, 142 So.2d 899, is pertinent:
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Sandstrom v. Montana
...P.2d 1259, 1261-1262 (1977) (en banc); State v. War britton, 211 Kan. 506, 509, 506 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1973); Hall v. State, 49 Ala.App. 381, 385, 272 So.2d 590, 593 (Crim.App.1973). See also United States v. Chiantese, 560 F.2d 1244, 1255 (CA5 1977). And although the Montana Supreme Court he......
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Twyman v. State
...intent "may be presumed from the act of using a deadly weapon unless circumstances negate this presumption. Hall [v. State, 49 Ala.App. 381, 272 So.2d 590 (1973) ]; Shiflett v. State, 262 Ala. 337, 78 So.2d 805 (1955).... Where one assaults another by the use of a deadly weapon, the law wil......
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Salmon v. State, 6 Div. 445
...cause. Moreover, in Sandstrom, the Supreme Court cited an Alabama case which is also dispositive of the issue at hand, Hall v. State, 49 Ala.App. 381, 272 So.2d 590 (1973). In Hall, the objectionable language used by the trial court in its charge to the jury was that the law presumes one in......
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Cheriogotis v. State
...a like charge was harmless where there was overwhelming evidence of the appellant's guilt and of his intent. In Hall v. State, 49 Ala.App. 381, 272 So.2d 590 (Ala.Cr.App.1973), Hall was charged with the malicious murder of his cellmate; however, the jury convicted him of manslaughter. The i......