Hall v. State

• Decision Date: 01 May 1911
• Citation: 137 S.W. 500,124 Tenn. 235
• Parties: HALL v. STATE.
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

137 S.W. 500

124 Tenn. 235

HALL v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Tennessee.

May 1, 1911

Appeal from Criminal Court, Montgomery County; C. W. Tyler, Judge.

Harry C. Hall was convicted of crime, and he appeals. Affirmed.

Collis Tate, for appellant.

Attorney General Cates and Austin Peay, for the State.

SHIELDS C.J.

The facts in this case are not disputed. The defendant was indicted under chapter 263 of the Acts of 1903. The act is a stock law, and is applicable to those counties having a population, by the census of 1900, of not less than 35,000 nor more than 36,250, or having a like population of any subsequent census. Montgomery county, by reason of its population under the census of 1900, fell within the act, and it applied to that county. It was, in fact, the only county to which the act applied according to the census of 1900.

This case was tried in the criminal court of Montgomery county on an agreed statement of facts. If the application of the act to Montgomery county is not affected by the subsequent census of 1910, the defendant is guilty, and the case should be affirmed.

It is insisted for the plaintiff in error that, because the census of 1910 shows Montgomery county to have a population of 33,672, the act does not apply to that county.

For the state it is said that the application of the act to the county has not been affected by the last census, and that it continued in force in all countries falling within it when passed, and the sole effect of the subsequent census has been to bring other counties within its operation.

The provisions of the Constitution of this state (art. 1, § 8 and article 11, § 8) and that of the United States, contained in the fourteenth amendment to that instrument, do not prohibit the enactment of laws not general in their application, where the classification is natural and has a reasonable relation to the subject-matter of the legislation.

It is only where the classification is arbitrary and capricious that it is held to be vicious and violative of those constitutional restrictions.

It is now well settled in this state that statutes making a classification of the character of the one in question are not violative of the constitutional provisions to which we have referred, but are valid and constitutional laws. Cook v. State, 90 Tenn. 407, 16 S.W. 471, 13 L. R A. 183; Peterson v. State, 104 Tenn. 127, 56 S.W. 834; Condon v. Maloney, 108 Tenn. 82-98, 65 S.W. 871; Turner v. State, III Tenn. 593-602, 69 S.W. 774; Archibald v. Clark, 112 Tenn. 532, 82 S.W. 310; Murphy v. State, 114 Tenn. 531, 86 S.W. 711.

It will be seen by an examination of this act that it in express terms applies to counties having a certain designated population, not only according to the federal census of 1900, but according to any subsequent federal census, and the principle upon which such acts have been sustained is that the classification is not arbitrarily based upon or applied to a population determined or determinable by any one census, but that it is so arranged that it is possible thereunder to receive into the classification every county in the state. The acts sustained in the cases we have cited were of this character.

If the act had applied only to counties having the named and designated population according to the federal census of 1900, there is no doubt but that it would be capricious and arbitrary, as no other county could at any time come within its provisions. Woodard v. Brien, 14 Lea, 523; Sutton v. State, 96 Tenn. 696, 36 S.W. 697, 33 L. R. A. 589.

We will not determine the proper construction of the act. It is elementary that "the intent of a statute is the law," or, as stated in Sutherland on Statutory Construction, § 363: "The intent is the vital part, the essence, of the law, and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent."

And (sections 368, 380), in ascertaining the intent, the entire statute is to be considered, because "it is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute."

And, further, the same learned author quotes approvingly (section 369): "A statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest object, and if the thing is susceptible of two constructions, one which will carry out, and the other which will defeat such manifest object, it should receive the former construction."

Again (section 267), it is said that in the construction or interpretation of statutes "an argument based on inconvenience is forcible in law, and no less so is one to avoid what is unjust or unreasonable. ***"

"Considerations of what is reasonable, convenient, or causes hardship and injustice, have a potent influence in many cases."

And still again (section 490) it is said: "Statutes will be construed in the most beneficial way which they are, in law, permitted, to prevent absurdity, hardship, or injustice, or to favor public convenience, and to oppose all prejudice to public necessities." Section 488.

That this statute was intended by the General Assembly to apply to Montgomery county must be conceded. It is the only county having the population of the census of 1900 named in the act, and was clearly within its provisions.

The question for determination is whether or not it was the intention of the General Assembly that its application to that county should be fixed and continuous, notwithstanding any changes that might occur in its population as shown by any future census, until it should be repealed by proper legislative act.

We think clearly such was the intention of the Legislature, and that the statute is effective to carry out that intention.

In other words, we are of opinion that the intention of the General Assembly was to enact a law applicable to all counties coming within its provisions when passed, and to remain in force and continue applicable to the class then created until repealed, and to apply to all other counties that might come within such provisions by changes in their population as shown by any future census.

This construction is supported by the rule of public policy that all laws shall be certain in their terms and application, so that they may be known by the people, and that no disturbances may grow out of frequent changes and alterations.

It is also demanded by the interest and...