Hall v. State
| Decision Date | 01 September 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 197,197 |
| Citation | 705 A.2d 50,119 Md.App. 377 |
| Parties | Dorita M. HALL v. STATE of Maryland. , |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Arthur A. Delano, Jr., Assistant Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for Appellant.
Annabelle L. Lisic, Assistant Attorney General, Baltimore (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Attorney General, Baltimore, and Andrew L. Sonner, (Former) State's Attorney for Montgomery County of Rockville, on the brief), for Appellee.
Argued before MURPHY, C.J., BYRNES, J., and THEODORE G. BLOOM, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned.
THEODORE G. BLOOM, Judge (retired), Specially Assigned.
Appellant, Dorita M. Hall, was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County (Ryan, J., presiding) of possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana. The court imposed concurrent prison sentences of four years and one year, plus a fine; suspended those sentences; and placed appellant on probation for twelve months. In this appeal from those judgments, Ms. Hall asserts:
1. The court erred in admitting irrelevant evidence.
2. The evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions.
Corporal Tammy Koniski of the Rockville City Police Department testified that she was part of a team or task force assigned to investigate drug activity at 747 Monroe Street, Apartment 202. The task force used a special informant to make a controlled buy at that address. Corporal Koniski also related that she received information that Patricia Hall and Donnie Hall, appellant's mother and stepfather, had moved to 706 Crab Avenue. After using a special informant to make a controlled buy at the new address, the officer obtained a search warrant. Donnie Hall, Anthony Baker, and Darryl Martin were present at the time of the execution of the warrant. Three scanners were found in "bedroom one." A rock of crack cocaine was found in a dresser drawer in the same bedroom. Personal papers and mail addressed to the appellant were found on top of the dresser. Razors, glassine baggies, and several bags of marijuana were found in "bedroom three." A marijuana roach, a lighter and a pipe were found on the dining room table. An unconventional pipe was found under the living room couch. Appellant testified that "bedroom one" was her bedroom.
Appellant testified that she lived at 706 Crab Avenue, the subject premises of the warrant. She said that she had gone to the mall and did not return until "12:45 a.m.," and was met by an officer who told her that the police had arrested Donnie Hall because he had been selling drugs out of her house. Appellant claimed that Donnie Hall did not live at that address, although he and her mother stayed in "bedroom three" when they visited on weekends. Appellant was also arrested. At trial she denied allowing drugs in her house, and offered an explanation as to why she had the pagers and scanners.
Appellant first contends, "The court erred admitting irrelevant evidence." Relying on Zemo v. State, 101 Md.App. 303 310-11, 646 A.2d 1050 (1994), appellant argues that the course of the police investigation should not have been related to the jury unless it was relevant to the proof of her alleged offenses. Specifically, she cites as error evidence of prior drug activity at 747 Monroe Street and 706 Crab Avenue. She asserts that the reasons why the police executed a search warrant at 706 Crab Avenue were irrelevant. She says that the only issue was whether she possessed the drugs on the date in question.
Appellant's reliance on Zemo is appropriate. In that case, we had endeavored to "de-mythologize" the "Old Wives' Tale" that it is somehow necessary for the State to lay out for the jury the detailed course of a criminal investigation. As Judge Moylan, writing for this Court in Zemo, explained, unless such evidence has a direct bearing on the guilt or innocence of the defendant, the jury has no need to know the course of the police investigation. "That an event occurs in the course of a criminal investigation does not, ipso facto, establish its relevance." Id., 101 Md.App. at 310, 646 A.2d 1050.
In this case, none of the testimony concerning the police investigations at 747 Monroe Street and 706 Crab Avenue, the information that led them to each of those addressees, the information contained in the application for a search warrant for 706 Crab Avenue, or the warrant issued thereon had any direct bearing on the guilt or innocence of appellant. Indeed, she was not the focus of the police investigations or the information that led to them; her mother and step-father were the ones the police suspected of dealing in controlled dangerous substances. The evidence of appellant's guilt was obtained as a result of a search of her home pursuant to a warrant. The details of the investigation leading to the issuance of that warrant were completely irrelevant. Whether there was probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant was no concern of the jury. The court erred in admitting the evidence complained of on this appeal.
The fact that the court erred, however, does not entitle appellant to an automatic reversal of her convictions. Most of the trial court's errors in admitting the irrelevant evidence complained of were not preserved for appellate review, and those errors that were adequately preserved were harmless beyond any reasonable doubt.
At the beginning of her testimony, Corporal Koniski stated that she was then currently assigned to the Municipal Drug Task Force, which she described as a "street level type unit that concentrates on crack houses and street life dealing out on the street, basically the dealer." The unit operates primarily within the municipality, which includes the cities of Rockville and Gaithersburg. When the prosecuting attorney then asked the witness if she was with the drug task force in April 1995, defense counsel objected. That objection was overruled. The next question was, "Did there come a point in time when you investigated or were part of a team that investigated 747 Monroe Street?" The witness replied, "Yes, I was," and defense counsel said, "A continuing objection." The court responded, "Sure." The direct examination of Cpl. Koniski then continued as follows:
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:
Q. Officer, would you outline what was the basis of that objection [sic] at that address?
A. At 747 we received a complaint from an anonymous source that stated that there was a lot of traffic, short term traffic going in and out of the residence. It was 747 Monroe Street, Apartment 202.
Also a sergeant from the Lincoln Park Task Force, he was uniformed, he had received a complaint also stating that there was drug activity at this residence.
Q. What city and town is that in?
A. Rockville, Montgomery County.
Q. Did you do anything as the basis of that investigation?
(Whereupon, a Bench Conference followed.)
DEFENSE COUNSEL: Your Honor, the officer has testified earlier as to two sources of information that are described as confidential or anonymous. During the course of discovery I made a request, which should be in the Court's file, and basically I asked the State supply me with an identification by name of each and every confidential informant (inaudible).
The State has failed to identify them, and that was the problem at the suppression hearing. There was hearsay coming in. I have no way to cross-examine and adequately prepare the cross-examination regarding these witnesses. Respectfully, Your Honor, I would request for a mistrial.
PROSECUTING ATTORNEY: Your Honor, I thought this issue was dealt with at the suppression hearing. Counsel had an opportunity to bring it up at that point before we even came up with a jury. The issue came up as to whether the officer had to identify those people.
Your Honor ruled that the officers did not to protect the special informants. Your Honor, we ask that that ruling is still in effect and that the Court should continue it.
THE COURT: I am going to overrule it.
(Whereupon, the Bench Conference was concluded.)
BY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY:
Q. Officer, on the basis of that complaint [sic], what did your unit do?
Q. When you say SI what are you talking about?
A. The special informants.
Q. Would you explain to the jurors what is a special buy from the beginning to the end.
A. A controlled buy.
Q. If you were there, officer.
A. I was present. Basically what happens is the special informant, that person is physically searched to make sure they don't have any contraband or U.S. currency on them.
Q. Did that happen in your presence, officer?
A. Yes, it did.
Q. Then what happened?
A. Then they are given an amount of U.S. currency that is drawn from the Montgomery County Police Drug Fund, and at this point they go to the residence. We watch them walk to the residence constantly. They actually go to the residence and exit and then they come back with the buy.
Q. What did you do when the SI came back to you?
A. When the SI came back to me he handed over an amount of controlled dangerous substance, and then the SI is then searched again to make sure he doesn't have any other money or any other CDS on him. At that time the SI was found not to have any additional CDS on him.
Q. Officer, when you say CDS what do you mean?
A. A controlled dangerous substance.
Q. What do you mean by that?
A. Anything...
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