Hall v. State

• Decision Date: 03 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. S91P0865,S91P0865
• Citation: 261 Ga. 778,415 S.E.2d 158
• Parties: HALL v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 158

415 S.E.2d 158

261 Ga. 778

HALL v. The STATE.

No. S91P0865.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Dec. 3, 1991.

Reconsideration Denied Dec. 18, 1991.

Larry L. Duttweiler, Melodie L. Snell, Lawrenceville, Charlotta Norby, Atlanta, for Dennis Hall.

Timothy G. Madison, Dist. Atty., Jefferson, Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, for the State.

C.A. Benjamin Woolf, Atty. State Law Dept., Atlanta, Jeffrey G. Morrow, Asst. Dist. Atty., Winder.

Patsy Morris, Atlanta.

Joseph L. Chambers, Sr., Pros. Attys.' Council, Smyrna.

SMITH, Presiding Justice.

The appellant, Dennis Hall, was convicted by a jury in Barrow County of the murder of his 10-year-old son Adrian, of two counts of cruelty to children, and of discharging a firearm near a public street. He was sentenced to death for the murder. He appeals. We affirm.

1. During his marriage, Hall's alcohol abuse and abusive behavior towards his wife and three children resulted in numerous occasions in which the police were called to restore order to the household. Hall once locked his family out of the house when the outside temperature was below freezing. On another occasion, his wife told police that Hall had struck her in the head with a pistol. He also once threatened to shoot his wife and fired a shot into the air. On none of these occasions, however, did she press charges.

On Sunday, January 7, 1990, Hall began drinking early in the morning and drank throughout the day. As Hall watched television that afternoon, his son Adrian played with a toy remote-controlled tractor. Hall told Adrian to stop, because the toy was interfering with his television reception. When Adrian did not cease playing immediately, Hall went to the boy and struck him in the head. This precipitated an argument between Hall and his wife concerning the necessity for the severity of Hall's punishment. Hall responded by searching for his shotgun. His older daughter took the shotgun outside and hid it in the car. Meanwhile, Adrian got the pistol and took it outside. Hall found the shotgun and loaded it while his wife tried unsuccessfully to take it from him. He approached Adrian, who stood 10 to 15 feet away saying, "Don't shoot me, don't shoot me." Hall shot him in the chest as his wife, two daughters and his next door neighbors looked on. Hall went home, but returned a few minutes later to Adrian's body. Hall kissed his deceased son and told him he loved him. When his neighbor suggested it was "a little too late for that, you've done killed him," Hall responded, "Shit happens," and bragged, "I couldn't learn him nothing by beating him with a belt, so I guess I learned him something this time."

A test administered later that afternoon showed that Hall had a blood alcohol level of .32 grams percent. All who observed Hall that afternoon, however, testified that he was not overly intoxicated, was steady on his feet, and had only slightly slurred speech.

In a post-arrest statement to police, Hall claimed he shot his son in self-defense. Later, he claimed it was an accident.

The evidence supports the conviction for murder. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. In his first enumeration of error, Hall, who is black, raises an issue under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges. Noting that the prosecutor used six of his ten peremptory challenges to strike all six black prospective jurors on the qualified venire, Hall argues he has established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in the selection of his jury. See Batson, supra at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23. The state concedes this much (state's brief at p. 14), but contends it successfully rebutted the prima facie case by articulating race-neutral reasons for striking as it did.

After listening to the prosecutor's explanation of his peremptory challenges, the trial court stated that it was concerned only with the prosecutor's final peremptory strike. The other jurors were struck either because they were well acquainted with the defendant and his family, were closely related to persons who had been in trouble with the law, or had expressed a reluctance to impose a death sentence. See Foster v. State, 258 Ga. 736(2), 374 S.E.2d 188 (1988). The final black juror struck by the prosecutor knew the defendant's mother. Moreover, the prosecutor had prosecuted her cousin. Nevertheless, the prosecutor explained that he had planned to save his last strike for a white prospective juror who had once been arrested on a "bad rap" and had "bad feelings" toward the judicial system. However, on the morning of the jury selection, the last black juror entered the courtroom with the defendant's family and sat immediately behind the defendant's mother. The prosecutor stated that when he learned of this, he decided to exercise his last peremptory strike against the juror.

a. The defendant, noting that no one observed the juror actually talking to the defendant's family, contends the prosecutor's explanation was insufficient to support his final strike. However, as we have explained, the prosecutor's explanation " 'need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause.' " Gamble v. State, 257 Ga. 325, 327, 357 S.E.2d 792 (1987) (quoting from Batson, supra). A reasonable suspicion about a prospective juror's impartiality that falls short of justifying an excusal for cause might well justify the exercise of a peremptory strike. This is such a case. That the prospective juror entered the courtroom with the defendant's family and sat next to them might have been mere coincidence, but there was at least some reasonable likelihood that it was not. We cannot condemn the prosecutor's reluctance to gamble on the significance of this occurrence.

b. Pointing to the trial court's explanation that if the prosecutor could "articulate nonracial reasons for the strikes, he's entitled to exercise" them, the defendant contends the trial court failed independently to evaluate the prosecutor's explanations for his peremptory strikes.

Of course, the trial court may not simply give "rubber stamp" approval to "all nonracial explanations, no matter how whimsical or fanciful." Gamble v. State, supra at 327, 357 S.E.2d 792. The explanations must be sufficiently persuasive to rebut the prima facie case. But we do not read the trial court's extemporaneous remarks so parsimoniously as does the defendant. The record as a whole demonstrates the trial court's understanding of its role under Batson.

c. As we noted in Gamble, supra:

A court charged with the duty of determining whether the prosecutor has rebutted a prima facie case may be less troubled by one relatively weak explanation for striking a black juror when all the remaining explanations are persuasive than where several of the prosecutor's proffered justifications are questionable. Similarly, a weak prima facie case may be rebutted more readily than a strong one. [Id. at 327, 357 S.E.2d 792].

In contrast to the Gamble case, where the defendant was black and the victim was white, here both the defendant and the victim were black. Moreover, unlike the Gamble case where several explanations were suspect, here the trial court was concerned about the sufficiency of only one of the proffered explanations. The trial court in this case was authorized to conclude that the prosecutor had successfully rebutted the prima facie case.

3. There was no error, as the defendant contends, in the pre-trial excusal of four prospective jurors who were college students enrolled in schools outside the county. The trial judge specifically authorized these excusals for "other good cause" under OCGA § 15-12-1(a). (Their service was deferred to a later term. Ibid.) Hendrick v. State, 257 Ga. 17(2), 354 S.E.2d 433 (1987).

There was no improper restriction of the death-qualification voir dire. It is not "permissible to ask a juror to describe the kind of case that, in the juror's opinion, would warrant a death sentence." (Emphasis in original.) Blankenship v. State, 258 Ga. 43, 45(6), 365 S.E.2d 265 (1988).

5. The defendant next contends the trial court should have granted his motion to excuse for cause a prospective juror who admitted having an opinion about the defendant's guilt. The juror, however, testified that he could set aside this opinion, accord the defendant his presumption of innocence and decide the case on the evidence presented at trial. The trial court found that the juror was qualified. This finding is not clearly erroneous. Spivey v. State, 253 Ga. 187, 196-197, 319 S.E.2d 420 (1984); Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 362(2), 283 S.E.2d 238 (1981).

6. Previous difficulties between the defendant and his family were properly admitted to show the defendant's bent of mind towards the victim. Wright v. State, 184 Ga. 62(8), 190 S.E. 663 (1937).

7. In his 6th and 7th enumerations of error, Hall (a) complains of the admission of testimony by two social workers about the possible effects on the defendant's two surviving children who witnessed the murder of their brother by their father, and (b) contends that the evidence is not sufficient to support his conviction on two counts of cruelty to children.

a. The evidence is undisputed that the defendant's two surviving children were present and witnessed their only brother being murdered by their father. The two children, however, do not presently exhibit overt manifestations of having been traumatized by the event. In fact, according to defense testimony, they showed great affection for their father when he appeared at the victim's funeral (in the custody of law enforcement officers).

The first social worker testified that she is a caseworker with the Barrow County Department of Family & Children services. In her sixteen years of service, she has worked with several hundred victims of abuse and trauma, including children who have...