Hall v. State
| Decision Date | 12 May 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. S97A0300,S97A0300 |
| Citation | 268 Ga. 89,485 S.E.2d 755 |
| Parties | , 97 FCDR 1635 HALL v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Warren S. Shulman, Shulman & McBride, Columbus, for Rosalind D. Hall.
Russell Brooks Poole, Asst. Solicitor, Roxann G. Daniel, Solicitor, Columbus, for State.
Appellant Rosalind Hall sought an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's denial of her motion to quash the accusations against her alleging three separate counts of violating the Georgia Reckless Conduct Statute. 1 We granted Hall's application in order to examine the constitutionality of the Statute, as it is applied in this case. We find that the Statute, as applied, both (1) failed to provide persons of ordinary intelligence with notice that it purports to prohibit certain conduct; and (2) lacks definite and explicit standards to guide its enforcement, thereby making it susceptible to arbitrary and selective enforcement by police, prosecutors, and juries. For these reasons, we find that the Statute violates the due process rights guaranteed by our State and Federal Constitutions, and we reverse.
Because this matter is being reviewed following the trial court's denial of appellant Hall's motion to quash the accusations against her, the underlying facts have not yet been fully developed. The State represents to this Court, however, that it expects to support its accusations against Hall with evidence showing that:
Appellant and [her boyfriend] left their home for approximately four (4) hours in the early to late evening, perhaps longer. The three subject children [ages five, three, and one years old] were left at home in the care of ... Appellant's eleven year [and nine month] old son, who did not regularly reside with his mother. Felix Majors III [the three year old child] died of a severe head injury during the period of adult absence. 2 On appeal, Hall does not substantively contest the State's factual allegations.
At the outset, we note that the State does not expect to show that the eleven year and nine month old boy left to supervise the younger children possessed any unusual or dangerous character traits that might have tended to create a substantial risk of harm to the younger children, and no proceedings have been brought against the boy. Nor does the State contend that any foul play or malice contributed to the three year old's death. Rather, the State contends that Hall's act of placing the boy, who was nearly twelve years old, in a supervisory role over three younger children, without more, violated the Reckless Conduct Statute.
The State filed three accusations against Hall, one for each of the three younger children left in the care of her eleven year and nine month old son. The accusations--each virtually identical in form--accused Hall of violating Georgia's Reckless Conduct Statute, OCGA § 16-5-60, by:
endanger[ing] the bodily safety of another person, to-wit, [the child], by leaving him without proper supervision, consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk, which would cause harm or endanger the safety of [the child], and which disregard constitutes a gross deviation from a standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation.
Hall filed a timely motion to quash the accusations, asserting that (1) at the time the children were left alone, the deceased three year old was not in Hall's care and thus she could not be charged with violating a legal duty owed to that child, and (2) OCGA § 16-5-60, as applied to Hall in the accusations, failed to provide her with proper notice of what conduct was prohibited and thus denied Hall due process and equal protection under the law, as guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section I, Paragraph II of the Georgia Constitution. The trial court denied Hall's motion to quash, and issued a certificate of immediate review. We granted Hall an interlocutory appeal in order to review the trial court's ruling, and for the reasons explained below, we reverse.
1. The Georgia Reckless Conduct Statute provides that:
A person who causes bodily harm to or endangers the bodily safety of another person by consciously disregarding a substantial or unjustifiable risk that his act or omission will cause harm or endanger the safety of the other person and the disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation is guilty of a misdemeanor. 3
In Horowitz v. The State, 4 we ruled that the Reckless Conduct Statute was sufficiently definite to give a person of ordinary intelligence notice that, by driving a sports car recklessly through a residential neighborhood at excessive speeds so as to lose control of the car, skid more than sixty feet, and hit a child standing in a front yard, he was engaging in activity that violates the Statute.
The parties disagree as to the impact of Horowitz on this appeal. Hall claims that in Horowitz, we merely ruled that the Reckless Conduct Statute is not susceptible to a facial attack on vagueness grounds, and thus that opinion does not control our decision in this case. The State, on the other hand, urges us to read Horowitz as upholding the Statute against all vagueness challenges. While neither party is entirely correct, we determine that Horowitz is not controlling in this matter. " 'It is well established that vagueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms [such as the challenges raised in this case and in Horowitz ] must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand.' " 5 Thus, our ruling in Horowitz was limited to the facts then appearing, and our decision in this case shall be limited to the application of the Statute "in light of the conduct to which it is applied." 6
2. In this case, the State charges that when Hall placed the younger children in the care of her older son, she left them "without proper supervision," thereby violating the Statute's prohibition against causing harm to another by "consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk [of such] harm or endanger[ing] the safety of another ... in gross deviation from the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation." 7 On appeal, Hall argues that the Statute failed to provide her with fair notice that it prohibits such conduct, and that it therefore violates the Due Process Clauses of our State and Federal Constitutions.
In response to Hall's vagueness as applied challenge, the State argues that because the mental state of "conscious disregard" is a necessary element of the Reckless Conduct Statute, any person with charge of a child, who "consciously disregards" their supervisory responsibilities to that child is on notice that if actual harm, or a substantial risk thereof, follows from their conduct, they may have violated the Statute. In short, the State's position is that anytime one's mental state can be deemed to "consciously disregard" a substantial or unjustifiable risk, she is on notice that she might violate the Statute's prohibitions. According to the State, the requisite fair notice is provided by the individual's own mental state of "conscious disregard." In making this argument, the State urges that the term "proper supervision," as used in the accusations, is irrelevant in determining whether the Statute provided Hall with fair notice of what conduct it proscribes.
We disagree with the State's argument, primarily for two reasons. First, "the principle that due process requires that criminal statutes give sufficient warning to enable [individuals] to conform their conduct to avoid that which is forbidden is one of the great bulwarks of constitutional liberty." 8 This Court and the United States Supreme Court have consistently equated the "sufficient warning" of prohibited conduct required of criminal statutes to the provision of "fair notice" that by engaging in such conduct, one will be held criminally responsible. 9 Of course, every mere uncertainty as to a statute's applicability will not render it void for vagueness. 10 However, it is beyond question that the Due Process Clause requires that the law give a person of ordinary intelligence fair warning that her specific contemplated conduct is forbidden, so that she may conduct herself accordingly. 11 "All persons are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." 12
Bearing these principles in mind, and applying them to the facts of this case, we cannot say that the Reckless Conduct Statute provided Hall with fair notice that she could be held criminally responsible for leaving the three children in the care of her son. Ordinary intelligence does not dictate that a statute forbidding the conscious disregard of a substantial risk necessarily encompasses a prohibition against leaving young children in the care of an older child who is almost twelve years old. In fact, upon examination, it becomes clear that the Statute "forbids no specific or definite act," and fails to "fix ... an ascertainable standard of guilt," 13 thereby indicating that it is impermissibly vague. 14
The State's argument that the required notice of a prohibition against certain conduct is satisfied by the mens rea element of "conscious disregard" set forth in the Statute is entirely unpersuasive. Under the precedent discussed above, the State's argument could only make sense if the Statute was purported to prohibit a mental state of "conscious disregard"--which, of course, it does not. As it is, the Statute failed to provide Hall with fair notice that she could be held criminally responsible for leaving the children in the care of her older son, and therefore it failed to "clearly define" its prohibitions, rendering it unconstitutionally vague.
The dissent takes strong issue with this assessment of the statute. Ho...
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