Hall v. Superintendent
| Decision Date | 29 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:09–CV–506 JD. |
| Citation | 834 F.Supp.2d 848 |
| Parties | Virgil HALL, III, Petitioner, v. SUPERINTENDENT, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Joseph M. Cleary, Hammerle & Cleary, Indianapolis, IN, for Petitioner.
James B. Martin, Indiana Attorney General's Office, Indianapolis, IN, for Respondent.
More than a decade ago, a jury found Virgil Hall, III, guilty of neglecting and murdering his three-year-old step-son, Peyton Fetterhoff. The Grant Circuit Court sentenced him to 65 years under cause number 27C01–0006–CF–35. Having completed his direct and post-conviction appeals, he has now filed this habeas corpus petition raising six grounds for relief. Five of the six grounds were adjudicated on the merits by the state courts.1
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
The Court of Appeals of Indiana has reviewed this case three times and each time the Indiana Supreme Court denied transfer. In Hall v. State, 760 N.E.2d 688 (Ind.Ct.App.2002) (hereinafter Hall I ), the court denied his appeal from the denial of his motion to correct error. ECF 12–5. In Hall v. State, 796 N.E.2d 388 (Ind.Ct.App.2003) (hereinafter Hall II ), the court denied his direct appeal. ECF 12–9. In Hall v. State, 27A04–0812–PC–740, 2009 WL 2486383, 2009 Ind.App. Unpub. LEXIS 1054 (Ind.Ct.App. August 14, 2009) (hereinafter Hall III ), the court denied his appeal from the denial of his post-conviction relief petition. ECF 12–12. Relevant facts and applicable legal standards are provided as necessary in each section below.
“Hall alleged in his Petition that he was denied an impartial jury due to extrinsic prejudicial information that was conveyed to his jury.” Traverse at 12, ECF 24. He argues that the limitations of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) are inapplicable because the state court did not adjudicate this claim on the merits. Though he acknowledges that the state court did discuss and deny this claim, he argues that because the decision was based on Indiana law and did not mention the Sixth Amendment, his federal claim was not adjudicated. This is incorrect. “When a federal claim has been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ––––, ––––, 131 S.Ct. 770, 784–85, 178 L.Ed.2d 624, 639 (2011). Here, there is no indication that this federal claim was denied for a state-law procedural reason. Though the state court did not cite to federal law, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that “a state court need not cite or even be aware of our cases under § 2254(d).” Id., 131 S.Ct. at 784, 178 L.Ed.2d at 638. Therefore habeas relief can only be granted on this claim if Hall is able to meet one of the exceptions of § 2254(d).
In adjudicating this claim, the state court found “that extrinsic communications concerning a contested matter reached Hall's jury during deliberations.” Hall II, 796 N.E.2d at 396. Specifically, the court found that
during trial juror David Daniels (“Daniels”) told alternate juror Gary Hopkins (“Hopkins”) that Daniels' stepson was incarcerated with Hall and believed Hall to be innocent. At a later stage of trial, Daniels' stepson and the other inmates changed their opinion and, by this time, believed Hall to be guilty. Although the inmates' subsequent opinions were not communicated directly to Daniels, they were relayed to Daniels' wife, and Daniels overheard his wife giving this information to another family member. Daniels conveyed this information to the remainder of the jury during deliberations.
Id. at 393–394 (citations omitted).
Daniels told Hopkins that his stepson was incarcerated with Hall and believed Hall to be innocent. Hopkins' affidavit also indicates that, during deliberations, Daniels informed the remainder of the jury that his wife had a subsequent conversation with his stepson and his stepson had changed his previous opinion and now believed Hall to be guilty.
The respondent argues that “[t]here is nothing in the record to support the Court of Appeals' finding that the jury was told that any particular inmates had at some point ‘changed their belief’ about Hall's guilt or innocence.” Return at 22–23, ECF 13. Though it is unclear whether the State of Indiana may collaterally attack the findings of its own courts during a federal habeas corpus proceeding, it is clear that “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Here, the affidavit of Juror C. David Daniels stated that “Tracy [Barber] said to me he was in jail with Virgil Hall, III and Tracy thought he was innocent.” Appellant's Appendix at 30. It also stated, “That on another occasion during the trial, I overheard my wife ... say, Tracy [Barber] had told her the inmates thought Virgil Hall, III was guilty.” Id. Finally, it says, “[t]hat I told ... the jury this information.” Id. Tracy Barber's affidavit states that during one phone call to his mother, “I told her I thought Virgil Hall, III was innocent ....” Id. at 25. During a later phone call, he, “told her others in the jail had changed their minds about Virgil's innocence and I told her I thought he was guilty.” Id. Though these statements do not explicitly say that the jury was told that Tracy Barber, or any other inmate, changed his mind, nothing in the record contradicts that possibility. The specific wording of what Daniels said to the other jurors is ambiguous and the State court “had an independent right to draw inferences from the record.” Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 592 (7th Cir.2000). Though the respondent also points out several inconsistencies with the affidavits, none of them undermine the relevant finding that the jury heard that Hall's fellow inmates thought he was innocent, but later changed their minds and thought he was guilty. Thus, the respondent has presented no basis to believe that this finding was “an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented ....” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2).
Having found “juror misconduct involving an out-of-court communication with an unauthorized person,” Hall II at 394, the Court of Appeals of Indiana explained “that the State should bear the burden of proving that Hall was not prejudiced by the extrinsic communications,” id., but that it was constrained by the Indiana Supreme Court opinion in Griffin v. State, 754 N.E.2d 899 (Ind.2001). “[B]ecause mandatory precedent clearly places the burden of proving prejudice on the defendant, we require Hall to prove he was prejudiced by the misconduct.” Id. at 396.
Hall argues that placing the burden on him to prove prejudice violated Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) which held:
In a criminal case, any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is, for obvious reasons, deemed presumptively prejudicial, if not made in pursuance of known rules of the court and the instructions and directions of the court made during the trial, with full knowledge of the parties. The presumption is not conclusive, but the burden rests heavily upon the Government to establish, after notice to and hearing of the defendant, that such contact with the juror was harmless to the defendant.
347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450.
The respondent argues that Hall cannot obtain habeas corpus relief based on Remmer because it is not clearly established law. “Section 2254(d)(1)'s ‘clearly established’ phrase ‘refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme Court's] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.’ ” Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)). “In other words, ‘clearly established Federal law’ under § 2254(d)(1) is the governing legal principle or principles set forth by the Supreme Court at the time the state court renders its decision.” Id. (citing Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002)). The respondent argues that Remmer's allocation of the burden of proof is not clearly established because the Supreme Court's subsequent “intrusion jurisprudence” seems to have abrogated that portion of its holding. Further, respondent argues that the lack of a clearly established rule is demonstrated by a circuit split on the issue.
The court has carefully considered respondent's argument and the case law on which it relies. It is true that later Supreme Court statements contradicted Remmer's placement of the burden of proof. See Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 215, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) ; United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (...
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