Hall v. Tollett

• Citation: 128 F.3d 418
• Decision Date: 22 October 1997
• Docket Number: 96-6256,Nos. 96-6253,s. 96-6253
• Parties: Jacqueline M. HALL (96-6253); James Kenneth Cooper (96-6256); William Derrick (96-6257); Scott Griffin (96-6258); Eddie Hedgecoth (96-6259); Cynthia Y. McDaniel (96-6260), Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. Leon TOLLETT, Sheriff of Cumberland County, Tennessee and Leon Tollett, Individually, Defendant-Appellee. through 96-6259 and 96-6260.
• Court: United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)

Page 418

128 F.3d 418

Jacqueline M. HALL (96-6253); James Kenneth Cooper (96-6256); William Derrick (96-6257); Scott Griffin (96-6258); Eddie Hedgecoth (96-6259); Cynthia Y McDaniel (96-6260) Plaintiffs- Appellants, v. Leon TOLLETT, Sheriff of Cumberland County, Tennessee and Leon Tollett, Individually, Defendant-Appellee.

Nos. 96-6253, 96-6256 through 96-6259 and 96-6260.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

Argued Sept. 8, 1997.

Decided Oct. 22, 1997.

Linda J. Hamilton Mowles (argued and briefed), Lewis, King, Krieg, Waldrop & Catron, Knoxville, TN, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Dean B. Farmer (argued and briefed), William T. Chastain (briefed), Hodges, Doughty & Carson, Knoxville, TN, S. Roger York, Crossville, TN, for Defendants-Appellees.

Before: KENNEDY, GUY, and SILER, Circuit Judges.

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiffs Jacqueline Hall, James Cooper, William Derrick, Scott Griffin, Eddie Hedgecoth, and Cynthia McDaniel appeal the District Court's order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant Leon Tollett, the Sheriff of Cumberland County, Tennessee. Each plaintiff sued defendant, both as an individual and in his official capacity, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs alleged that shortly after he was elected sheriff, defendant violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by dismissing them from their jobs as employees of the Cumberland County Sheriff's Department in retaliation for their political support of defendant's campaign opponents. The District Court consolidated the individual cases for purposes of defendant's motions for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for defendant in each case. Plaintiffs filed this timely appeal. For the following reasons we AFFIRM, in part, REVERSE, in part, and REMAND plaintiff Derrick's case to the District Court for consideration of his claims against defendant in his official capacity.

I.

Plaintiffs were employees of the sheriff's department of Cumberland County, Tennessee. During the 1994 campaign for sheriff, defendant ran on a platform promising to reorganize the sheriff's department. He defeated the incumbent, Dale Elmore, in the Democratic primary and defeated the Republican candidate, Avery York, in the general election. On August 31, 1994, defendant told nine of the sheriff's department's sixty-four employees that they would not be needed in his organization. The terminations became effective on September 1, 1994, when defendant took office. Plaintiffs were six of those nine, and each asserts that he or she was fired in retaliation for supporting defendant's campaign opponents.

Defendant Tollett testified at deposition that he assumed that all of incumbent Sheriff Elmore's employees would support Elmore in the primary but that he had no knowledge of which candidate each plaintiff supported in the general election. He also stated at deposition that he thought sheriff's employees could be fired at will, but that he knew they could not be fired simply on the basis of their political affiliation. ¹ He offered alternative reasons for the firing of each of the plaintiffs and denied that he fired any for supporting his political rivals.

The District Court granted defendant's motions for summary judgment in each case. It found that plaintiffs Hall and Hedgecoth, employed respectively as food service supervisor and chief deputy, were employed in positions where termination based on political affiliation is constitutionally permissible. It found that two other plaintiffs, Griffin and McDaniel, had failed to put forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue regarding whether defendant knew of their political affiliation in the general election, thereby entitling defendant to summary judgment. With respect to the final two plaintiffs, deputies Cooper and Derrick, the District Court found that defendant was entitled to summary judgment because, even if these plaintiffs had proffered sufficient evidence to raise a question regarding defendant's knowledge of their political views during the general election, defendant was entitled to qualified immunity because the law at the time of firing did not clearly establish that employees in their position were constitutionally protected from politically motivated firing. The District Court, however, did not provide separate reasons for granting summary judgment against plaintiffs Derrick and Cooper on their claims against defendant in his official capacity. Plaintiffs timely appealed the court's order, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

II.

A. Standards of Review

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo. See, e.g., Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc. v. All-Lock Co., 96 F.3d 174, 178 (6th Cir.1996). A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). Under this test, the moving part may discharge its burden by "pointing out to the district court ... that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must identify specific facts supported by affidavits, or by depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file that show there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Although we must draw all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, Terry Barr Sales Agency, Inc., 96 F.3d at 178 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356-57, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986)), it must present significant and probative evidence in support of its complaint. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510-11, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2512.

Defendant argues that the order granting summary judgment in his favor was appropriate, in part, because he is entitled to qualified immunity. "[W]e first must decide whether the plaintiff has stated a section 1983 claim against the ... defendant[ ] before addressing the qualified immunity question.... If [plaintiff] has stated a claim, then we must examine whether summary judgment is warranted on the grounds of qualified immunity." Black v. Parke, 4 F.3d 442, 445-46 (6th Cir.1993); accord McLaurin v. Morton, 48 F.3d 944 (6th Cir.1995). If a plaintiff has stated a claim under § 1983, we then review the District Court's decision regarding qualified immunity de novo. Caldwell v. Moore, 968 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir.1992). Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, "government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Whether the government official "is protected by qualified immunity turns on 'the objective legal reasonableness' of the action, assessed in the light of the legal rules that were 'clearly established' at the time the action was taken." Caldwell, 968 F.2d at 599 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39).

B. First Amendment Protection

In considering plaintiffs' claims, we look to the line of Supreme Court cases that governs when the patronage dismissal of public employees violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Supreme Court first considered these issues in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). In Elrod, non-civil service employees of the Cook County, Illinois Sheriff's Department, including the chief deputy of the process division of the sheriff's department, a process server, a bailiff, and a security guard, alleged that they had been discharged or threatened with discharge because they were not affiliated with the Democratic Party. After the Northern District of Illinois dismissed their complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id. at 350, 96 S.Ct. at 2678. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion announced the general rule "that the practice of patronage dismissals is unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments." Id. at 373, 96 S.Ct. at 2689.

The Court, however, through Justice Brennan's plurality and Justice Stewart's concurring opinions, also created an exception to this general rule. Under this exception, public employees in certain positions can be terminated on the basis of political affiliation without violating the First Amendment. Justice Brennan wrote that "[l]imiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions is sufficient to achieve" the valid governmental objective of preventing holdover employees from undermining the ability of a new administration to implement its policies. Id. at 367, 96 S.Ct. at 2686-87. He reasoned that "[n]onpolicymaking individuals usually have only limited responsibility and are therefore not in a position to thwart the goals of the in-party." Id. Justice Stewart's concurrence phrased the exception slightly differently:

The single substantive question involved in this case is whether a nonpolicymaking, nonconfidential government employee can be discharged or threatened with discharge from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole ground of his political beliefs. I agree with the plurality that he cannot.

Id. at 375, 96 S.Ct. at 2690 (Stewart, J., concurring).

The...