Hall v. United States
| Decision Date | 13 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 3:20-cv-00646,3:20-cv-00646 |
| Parties | MONTEZ HALL v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
MEMORANDUM
Before the court is Montez Hall's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence in Accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Doc. No. 1), seeking to set aside his June 2012 conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). Although Hall previously litigated a motion under § 2255, the Sixth Circuit has authorized the filing of this second § 2255 motion in light of Davis. See In re Hall, No. 19-6223 (6th Cir. June 29, 2020).
For the reasons set forth herein, the motion will be denied.
Hall was one of twelve individuals charged on January 5, 2012 in a twenty-eight count Second Superseding Indictment. United States v. Newsome, No. 3:10-cr-00163 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 5, 2012) (Crim. Doc. Nos. 1147).1 The charges pertaining specifically to Hall included conspiracy to participate in racketeering activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (Count One); murder in aid of racketeering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1) (Count Six); using and carrying a firearmduring and in relation to, and possessing a firearm in furtherance of, a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Seven); murder resulting from using or carrying firearms during and in relation to crimes of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) (Count Eight); conspiracy to use or carry firearms during and in relation to crimes of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(o) (Count Twenty-Seven); and conspiracy to distribute narcotics, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count Twenty-Eight). (Crim. Doc. Nos. 1147, 1147-9, at 2.)
On February 5, 2012, Hall entered into a binding Plea Agreement with the United States and, in conjunction therewith, submitted to the court a Petition to Enter a Plea of Guilty to Counts One and Seven in exchange for the government's dismissal of the four remaining counts against him. (See Crim. Doc. No. 1394, at 1-5, 7-14.) There was no agreement on the sentence he would receive. The court accepted the plea and binding Plea Agreement by order entered February 6, 2012. (Id. at 6.) Only the conviction on Count Seven is at issue here. That count, as set forth in the Second Superseding Indictment, charged as follows:
(Id. at 40.) Section 1959 is referred to as the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity statute, or "VICAR."
The Plea Agreement described the VICAR murder charged in Count Six and recited that Hall participated in the murder, a fact he admitted at the plea hearing, even though the Plea Agreement called for the dismissal of Count Six. (See Plea Agreement, Crim. Doc. No. 1394, at 12; Plea Hr'g Tr., Crim. Doc. No. 2187, at 10-11, 16-18.) More specifically, he admitted that on July 19, 2008 he and his two co-defendants, while riding in a vehicle driven by a fourth individual, shot and killed Alexandra Franklin. (Crim. Doc. No. 1394, at 12; Doc. No. 2187, at 11.) Hall acknowledged that, because he discharged a firearm during and in relation to this crime of violence, the guideline sentence for a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), as charged in Count Seven, was 120 months, consecutive to any other prison term imposed. (Crim. Doc. No. 1394, at 14.) Hall expressly waived the right to "appeal any issue bearing on the determination of whether he is guilty of the crime(s) to which he is agreeing to plead guilty" and, in addition, "knowingly waive[d] the right to challenge the sentence imposed in any collateral attack, including, but not limited to, a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255." (Id. at 17.) The government likewise waived the right to "appeal any sentence within or above the guideline range associated with the Recommended Offense Level when combined with the defendant's criminal history category." (Id. at 18.)
On May 31, 2012, the court sentenced Hall to 360 months of incarceration—240 months on Count One (a downward variance from the advisory guideline range of 360 months to life) and a consecutive 120 months on Count Seven—all to run consecutively to a separately imposed state sentence. Judgment was entered on June 6, 2012. (Crim. Doc. No. 1767.)3
The court denied as untimely Hall's first § 2255 motion, which raised claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and violations of his right to due process. In January 2020, Hall filed in the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit a corrected motion for authorization to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, based on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019). On June 29, 2020, the Sixth Circuit granted the motion. In re Hall, No. 19-6223 (6th Cir. June 29, 2020). The Sixth Circuit declined to consider whether Hall's waiver of the right to file a § 2255 motion, contained in the Plea Agreement, barred such authorization and expressly left the issue of waiver to be decided by the district court. See id. at 3.
Hall filed the instant Motion to Vacate, through counsel, on July 24, 2020, asking that his § 924(c) conviction be vacated. He argues that the predicate offense—which he identifies as murder in violation of Tennessee law—is not a "crime of violence," because § 924(c)'s residual clause is unconstitutionally vague, as the Supreme Court held in Davis, and because the statute's "force clause" requires violent force, which first degree murder, as defined by the Tennessee courts, does not satisfy.
The government opposes the Motion to Vacate on the grounds that: (1) Hall knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to collaterally attack his sentence when he entered into the PleaAgreement; (2) Hall's claim is procedurally defaulted, and the default is not excused by a showing of either prejudice or actual innocence; (3) VICAR murder, in violation of § 1959(a)(1), is the predicate offense, and it categorically qualifies as a crime of violence; and (4) alternatively, first degree murder under Tennessee law is also a crime of violence for purposes of § 924(c).
Section 2255 provides a statutory mechanism for challenging the imposition of a federal conviction or sentence:
A prisoner in custody under sentence of a court established by Act of Congress claiming the right to be released upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack, may move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.
28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). To obtain relief under § 2255, a movant "'must demonstrate the existence of an error of constitutional magnitude which had a substantial and injurious effect or influence on the guilty plea or the jury's verdict.'" Humphress v. United States, 398 F.3d 855, 858 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 736 (6th Cir. 2003)). Non-constitutional errors are outside the scope of § 2255 relief, except under rare circumstances. United States v. Cofield, 233 F.3d 405, 407 (6th Cir. 2000). In § 2255 proceedings, it is the movant's burden to show his entitlement to relief. Potter v. United States, 887 F.3d 785, 787-88 (6th Cir. 2018). Generally, claims that a movant failed to raise at trial or on direct review are procedurally defaulted. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). Under the doctrine of procedural default, a defendant who fails to raise an issue on direct appeal may not raise that issue in a § 2255 motion unless he can establish cause and prejudice to excuse his failure or establish actual innocence. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998).
A motion under § 2255 is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, running from the latest of four possible triggering events, including "the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final" and "the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), (3).
If a factual dispute arises in a § 2255 proceeding, the court is to hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the dispute. Ray v. United States, 721 F.3d 758, 761 (6th Cir. 2013). However, "there is no reason to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve a purely legal issue." Bryan v. United States, 721 F.2d 572, 577 (6th Cir. 1983). Here, the movant's § 2255 motion only presents legal issues, rather than factual ones. Thus, having reviewed the pleadings, briefs,...
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