Hall v. Valeska
| Decision Date | 28 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 1:11cv894-WHA (wo) |
| Parties | DENNIS HALL, MARY GLANTON, SAMUEL JACKSON, VICKY ALLEN BROWN, AND FREDDIE B. RUSSAW, individually, and on behalf of all persons similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. DOUGLAS A. VALESKA, and JOHN DOES 1-10, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Alabama |
This cause is before the court on a Motion to Dismiss (Doc. #13), filed by Defendant Douglas A. Valeska.
The Plaintiffs are Dennis Hall, Mary Glanton, Samuel Jackson, Vicky Allen Brown, and Freddie B. Russaw. The Plaintiffs are African-American residents of Henry or Houston Counties who have been called for jury service and who have been excluded from service through the use of peremptory strikes. They seek to represent themselves individually and a class of similarly-situated persons in obtaining a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. They claim that African-Americans are given only token representation as jurors in serious felony cases, principally capital cases, in Houston and Henry Counties.
Defendant Valeska ("Valeska") is the District Attorney of Houston and Henry Counties, Alabama. The Plaintiffs have also named John Does defendants 1-10, who are the Assistant District Attorneys who work under the direction and supervision of Valeska. All of theDefendants are named only in their official capacities.
The Plaintiffs bring a section 1983 equal protection claim based on an alleged practice of discrimination in peremptory challenges (Count One), a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 243 (Count Two), a violation of the state constitution (Count Three), a violation of state law (Count Four), and a claim for attorneys' fees and costs (Count Five).
Valeska has moved to dismiss the Complaint.1 Upon review of the briefs in support of and in opposition to the Motion to Dismiss, the court set the case for oral argument, and subsequently directed the parties to discuss the applicability of O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) and Luckey v. Miller, 976 F.2d 673 (11th Cir. 1992) to this case. (Doc. #23).
Upon consideration of the briefs and oral argument, and for reasons to be discussed, the Motion to Dismiss is due to be GRANTED.
The court accepts the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), and construes the complaint in the plaintiff's favor, Duke v. Cleland, 5 F.3d 1399, 1402 (11th Cir. 1993). In analyzing the sufficiency of pleading, the court is guided by a two-prong approach: one, the court is not bound to accept conclusory statements of the elements of a cause of action and, two, where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to entitlement to relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, _ U.S. _, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949-50 (2009). That is, in reviewing a Complaint, the court must (1) eliminate any allegations in the complaint that aremerely legal conclusions; and (2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, "assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." American Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2010). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Id. (citation omitted). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint need not contain "detailed factual allegations," but instead the complaint must contain "only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570. The factual allegations "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Id. at 555.
The facts alleged in the Complaint are as follows:
The Plaintiffs are African-American residents of Henry or Houston Counties who have been called for jury service and who have been excluded from service through the use of peremptory strikes. The Plaintiffs state that in reported decisions by Alabama state courts, and one federal district court, there have been findings of Batson2 violations in strikes of four of the Plaintiffs. The last of these reported decisions is dated 1998. As to the one Plaintiff for whom the Complaint alleges no reported case of a Batson violation, the Plaintiffs state that that individual Plaintiff was called for jury service in 2004, and all African-American veniremembers were stricken. (Complaint at ¶¶ 11-20). The Plaintiffs allege that although African-Americans constituted 23.3% of Houston County's population in 2008, and 29.3% of Henry County's population in 2008, only 5% of the jurors who served in cases in which the death penalty was imposed from 2006-2010 were African-American. Id. at ¶¶ 63, 64, 67. The Plaintiffs state that from 2006 to 2010, Defendant Valeska and the John Doe Defendants used peremptory strikes in cases prosecuted by them in which the death penalty was imposed to remove 82% of the eligible African-Americans qualified for jury service.
The Plaintiffs allege that "Defendants Valeska and John Does 1-10 have engaged in a pervasive and continuing practice of utilizing peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from jury service altogether or, at a minimum, to greatly reduce and minimize their representation on juries on serious felony cases, principally involving capital offenses, in Houston and Henry Counties." Id. at ¶ 46.
The Plaintiffs identify several practices allegedly used by the Defendants to discriminate against African-American venire members, including targeting African-Americans in questioning and eliciting responses used as race-neutral explanations for challenges, failing to follow up on answers to determine whether a juror would be impaired in impartiality, disparate questioning of African-American and white jurors, allowing similarly situated white jurors to serve, and providing false reasons for challenges that are later contradicted by the record or factual investigation. Id. at ¶ 58.
The Plaintiffs seek a declaration that these practices violate the constitution, a federal statute, and state laws outlined in the counts. The Plaintiffs seek a permanent injunction against "the Defendants, their officers, agents, employees, and successors in office, as well as thoseacting in concert and participating with them," from engaging in the practices outlined. Id. at p.17, ¶ (D). The Plaintiffs also seek the appointment by this court of a monitor to ensure that the Defendants comply with record collections requirements for four years. The data which Plaintiffs would require to be collected includes the racial make up of jury pools in each serious felony case in Houston and Henry Counties; the races of jurors stricken for cause and through peremptory challenges in each serious felony case; the names of all cases in which Batson violations are alleged; and the identity of the attorneys involved in each case in which a Batson violation is alleged in Houston and Henry Counties. The Plaintiffs also ask the court to order that the Plaintiffs have meaningful access to and monitoring of jury selection with notice of empaneling of juries and opportunity "for oversight and intervention if Defendants' discrimination continues;" and request that this court retain jurisdiction until the order is fully implemented. Id. at p. 17, ¶ (D).
Defendant Valeska has moved to dismiss the Complaint on various grounds. The Plaintiffs urge the court not to dismiss the Complaint, but to allow the case to proceed to discovery. The court will begin with the asserted grounds for dismissal as to federal claims, and then the state law claims.
As stated above, the Plaintiffs bring federal claims for violation of equal protection, for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 243, and for attorneys' fees. Defendant Valeska challenges the Plaintiffs' federal claims stating that the Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for whichprospective injunctive or declaratory relief may be granted, or for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 243.3
To establish a right to injunctive relief the plaintiff must show (1) the violation of a right, (2) there is a serious risk of continuing irreparable injury if relief is not granted, and (3) there is no adequate remedy at law. Bolin v. Story, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000).
That African-Americans have a constitutional right not to be excluded from service on a jury through the use of peremptory strikes based solely on their race has been well-settled since the Supreme Court rendered its opinion in Batson. In Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991), the Supreme Court held that a defendant in a criminal case can raise equal protection claims on behalf of jurors excluded on the basis of race even if the defendant and the juror do not share the same race. In reaching that conclusion, the Court explained that individual jurors subjected to exclusion solely on the basis of race have the legal right to bring suit on their own behalf, but that those challenges are rare. Id. at 414. The Court noted that excluded jurors cannot "easily obtain declaratory or injunctive relief when discrimination occurs through an individual prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges." Id. The Court reasoned that, unlike a case of a systemic practice of excluding all African-Americans from juror rolls, as had previously been addressed by the Court, it is "difficult for an individual juror to show a likelihood that discrimination against him at the voir dire stage will recur." Id. at 415 (citing Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983)).
In the instant case, the Plaintiffs, individually, and on behalf of all persons similarlysituated, have attempted to avoid the concerns with...
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