Hall v. Wainwright

• Decision Date: 16 May 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-3563,83-3563
• Citation: 733 F.2d 766
• Parties: Freddie Lee HALL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Florida Dept. of Offender Rehabilitation; Richard Dugger, Superintendent of Florida State Prison at Starke, Florida; and Jim Smith, Attorney General of the State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Page 766

733 F.2d 766

Freddie Lee HALL, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Secretary, Florida Dept. of Offender Rehabilitation; Richard Dugger, Superintendent of Florida State Prison at Starke, Florida; and Jim Smith, Attorney General of the State of Florida, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 83-3563.

United States Court of Appeals Eleventh Circuit.

May 16, 1984.

Edward S. Stafman, Tallahassee, Fla., for petitioner-appellant.

Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, Fla., for respondents-appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before HILL and HATCHETT, Circuit Judges, and ALLGOOD ^*, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

The appellant, Freddie Lee Hall, appeals the district court's denial of his application for federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C.A. Sec. 2254 (West 1977). ¹ We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

Facts

On February 21, 1978, Freddie Lee Hall and M.C. Ruffin, decided to steal an automobile for use in robbing a convenience store. They proceeded to Leesburg, Florida, looking for an automobile, and saw Karol Lea Hurst standing beside her automobile in a parking lot outside a convenience store. Hall approached Hurst, forced her into her automobile, and they drove off. Ruffin followed in his automobile. After being driven to a remote area, Hurst was raped, beaten, and murdered by a gunshot to the head from Hall's revolver.

Hall and Ruffin proceeded to another convenience store, but after purchasing a few items decided not to commit the robbery. While leaving the store, they encountered a policeman and a fight ensued. Ruffin and Hall fled the scene after murdering the policeman with his own revolver. After a chase, law enforcement officers apprehended Hall and Ruffin. Hall confessed. His confession provided the essential evidence linking him to the Hurst murder. In the confession, Hall stated that Ruffin raped and killed Karol Lea Hurst and that he (Hall) did not kill or rape Hurst. Nevertheless, the jury convicted Hall of first degree murder as a principal to the crime, and the trial court sentenced him to death. ²

The Supreme Court of Florida upheld Hall's conviction and sentence. ³ Subsequently, Hall filed a state habeas corpus petition pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. The state trial court denied Hall's motion, and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. ⁴

Thereafter, Hall petitioned the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied the writ without an evidentiary hearing.

Hall raises nine issues on appeal: (1) Hall argues that his trial was rendered fundamentally unfair in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution of the United States by the admission of evidence of collateral offenses, which became a feature of the trial rather than an incident thereto; (2) he contends the prosecution presented insufficient evidence to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) he argues that the death sentence is improper because the trial court did not require a finding that he had the intent to kill; (4) Hall argues that certain prosecutorial comments during the guilt and sentencing phases of the trial violated his constitutional rights; (5) he contends that the state court's utilization of a previous conviction of first degree murder (which was eventually reduced to second degree murder) for an aggravating circumstance violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments; (6) he claims the trial court failed to weigh mitigating circumstances; (7) Hall contends his absence from the courtroom at various stages of the trial violated his due process rights and his right to confrontation under the sixth and fourteenth amendments; (8) Hall argues the trial court erred in denying him an evidentiary hearing on his ineffective assistance of counsel claims; (9) Hall contends the federal district court erred by holding he had failed to exhaust his state remedies with respect to nineteen claims.

(1) Whether Hall's Trial Was Rendered Fundamentally Unfair in Violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments by the Admission of Evidence of Collateral Offenses.

Hall contends the admission of evidence relating to the death of the police officer Federal courts possess limited authority to review state evidentiary rulings in a habeas corpus action by a state prisoner. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 113-14, 88 S.Ct. 258, 260-61, 19 L.Ed.2d 319 (1967); Nordskog v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 69, 72 (5th Cir.1977). Moreover, "the general rule is that a federal court will not review a trial court's actions with respect to the admission of evidence." Nettles v. Wainwright, 677 F.2d 410, 414 (5th Cir.1982) (citing Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 228, 62 S.Ct. 280, 286, 86 L.Ed. 166 (1941)). Before any relief concerning a state evidentiary ruling may be granted, "the violation must rise to the level of a denial of 'fundamental fairness.' " Shaw v. Boney, 695 F.2d 528, 530 (11th Cir.1983); Dickson v. Wainwright, 683 F.2d 348, 350 (11th Cir.1982); Bryson v. Alabama, 634 F.2d 862, 864-65 (5th Cir.1981).

                killed in the struggle outside the convenience store, rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.  During Hall's trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from various witnesses declaring they had seen Hall and Ruffin encounter the police officer outside the convenience store immediately preceding his death.  The prosecution also introduced the bullets and revolver used to murder the officer.  Hall argues this evidence rendered his trial fundamentally unfair.  The state argues that this evidence was properly admitted to show a common scheme or motive of Hall and Ruffin.  The Supreme Court of Florida agreed with the state.  It held that the collateral crime evidence was "admissible to prove identity (the Hurst murder weapon was found under the police officer's body) and to show the general context in which the criminal action occurred."    Hall v. State, 403 So.2d 1321, 1324 (1981).  The district court agreed with the state supreme court's ruling
                

In the context of this trial, the admission of evidence relating to the police officer's murder failed to render Hall's trial fundamentally unfair. The evidence related to the identity of Hall as a suspect in the Hurst murder. The evidence also pertained to Hall and Ruffin's common scheme and motive to commit certain crimes that day. Since the evidence was neither a critical nor a highly significant factor in the presecution's case, we cannot say that its admission rendered Hall's trial fundamentally unfair. Shaw, 695 F.2d at 531.

(2) Whether Hall Was Convicted and Sentenced to Death Without Sufficient Evidence to Prove His Guilt Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Hall contends that insufficient evidence existed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he murdered Hurst. He claims, therefore, that his conviction and death sentence deny him due process and subject him to cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The state argues that sufficient evidence existed to convict Hall of first degree murder.

In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), the Supreme Court articulated the standard for federal courts reviewing a state court conviction where the defendant contends that evidence is insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court stated that the relevant question is whether, "after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319, 99 S.Ct. at 2789. See also Duncan v. Stynchombe, 704 F.2d 1213, 1214-15 (11th Cir.1983).

To convict Hall of first degree murder, the state had to prove either that he had a "premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed," Fla.Stat. Sec. 782.04(1)(a)(1) (West Supp.1983), or that he was a principal in the first degree to the murder. Fla.Stat. Sec. 777.011. ⁵ If the jury In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we find that the evidence establishes that Hall either had a premeditated design to kill Hurst or aided and abetted in her murder. Hall abducted Hurst and drove her to the site where she was killed with his revolver. Her personal belongings were found in the automobile in which Hall attempted to escape. A rational trier of fact could have found that Hall either intended to kill Hurst or aided and abetted in her murder. Hall's conviction and death sentence does not violate the standard enunciated in Jackson v. Virginia.

found that Hall had a premeditated design to kill Hurst or aided and abetted Ruffin in the killing of Hurst, it was authorized to find Hall guilty of first degree murder and recommend a sentence of death.

(3) Whether Hall's Death Sentence is Unconstitutional Because the State has Failed to Prove Hall Had the Intent to Kill

Citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), Hall contends his sentence of death is unconstitutional because no proof existed that he killed or intended to kill. In Enmund, the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment prohibits imposition of the death penalty on an individual who neither took life, attempted to take life, intended to take life, or intended to utilize lethal force. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797, 102 S.Ct. at 3376, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1151. While we do not dispute Hall's contention that Enmund stands for the proposition that an accused may not be sentenced to death absent proof that he killed, attempted to kill, intended to kill, or intended to use lethal force, we find that evidence existed to support Hall's death sentence.

In determining whether a death sentence is unconstitutionally imposed, we must look to the individual culpability of the accused. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 799-01, 102 S.Ct. at 3377-78, 73 L.Ed.2d at 1153-54; ...