Hallin v. Lyngstad

• Decision Date: 25 September 2013
• Docket Number: No. 20120354.,20120354.
• Parties: Joan Marie HALLIN and John P. Hallin and Susan Kay Bradford, Plaintiffs and Appellees v. Jack LYNGSTAD, a/k/a John Lyngstad; Lorraine F. Lyngstad, Robert G. Lyngstad, Jr., and John O. Lyngstad III, as co-trustees of the Robert G. Lyngstad QTIP Trust; Edna Moses, James J. Moses, Jr., a/k/a James Moses, a/k/a Jay Moses, as personal representative of the Estate of Edna J. Moses, a/k/a Edna Moses, deceased; Steve Tillotson; Carol Tillotson; and Ellen Tillotson, a/k/a Reverend Ellen Tillotson, Defendants and Appellants.
• Court: North Dakota Supreme Court

837 N.W.2d 888

2013 ND 168

Joan Marie HALLIN and John P. Hallin and Susan Kay Bradford, Plaintiffs and Appellees

v.Jack LYNGSTAD, a/k/a John Lyngstad; Lorraine F. Lyngstad, Robert G. Lyngstad, Jr., and John O. Lyngstad III, as co-trustees of the Robert G. Lyngstad QTIP Trust; Edna Moses, James J. Moses, Jr., a/k/a James Moses, a/k/a Jay Moses, as personal representative of the Estate of Edna J. Moses, a/k/a Edna Moses, deceased; Steve Tillotson; Carol Tillotson; and Ellen Tillotson, a/k/a Reverend Ellen Tillotson, Defendants and Appellants.

No. 20120354.

Supreme Court of North Dakota.

Sept. 25, 2013.

Kerry J. Carpenter, Bismarck, N.D., for plaintiffs and appellees.

Charlotte J. Skar, Fargo, N.D., for defendants and appellants.

CROTHERS, Justice.

[¶ 1] Defendants/Appellants (“Lyngstads”) appeal from a summary judgment quieting title in the Plaintiffs/Appellees (“Hallins”) to a 2/3 interest of an undivided 3/4 interest in minerals in land in Mountrail County. We conclude the legal effect of a 1960 warranty deed's plain language, excepting and expressly reserving “unto the Grantors” an “undivided 3/4 interest” in the minerals, did not alter the grantors' proportion of ownership existing before execution of the 1960 deed. We affirm.

I

[¶ 2] This appeal arises out of a quiet title action for mineral interests in Mountrail County described as:

“Township 153 North, Range 92 West

Section 14: S1/2SW1/4

Section 23: N1/2NW1/4.”

The parties are the heirs and successors-in-interest to the grantors on the 1960 warranty deed conveying the above property. Lyngstads are successors-in-interest to Emma and John Lyngstad, and Hallins are successors-in-interest to Walter and Esther Brandt. The district court quieted title in the Hallins to a 2/3 interest of an undivided 3/4 interest in minerals in the above land. The parties do not dispute that, before execution of this 1960 deed, Emma Lyngstad owned a 1/3 interest in the surface and the minerals in the property and Walter Brandt owned a 2/3 interest in the surface and the minerals in the property.

[¶ 3] The grantors on the 1960 deed are identified as: “Emma L. Lyngstad and John O. Lyngstad, wife & husband, and Walter J. Brandt & Esther C. Brandt husband & wife.” The 1960 deed also contains the following language after the legal description of the property:

“ Excepting from the premises herein conveyed and expressly reserving unto the Grantors herein an undivided 3/4 interest in and to all of the Oil, gas, and other minerals in and under and that may be produced from the lands herein described, together with the right of ingress and egress at all times for the purpose of mining, drilling, exploring, operating and developing said lands for oil, gas, casinghead gas, casinghead gasoline, and other minerals, and storing, handling, transporting and marketing the same therefrom.”

(Emphasis added.) The parties agree the grantors in the 1960 deed together conveyed 100 percent of the surface of the property and 1/4 of the minerals to the grantee, R.I. Hukkanen. The parties also agree that together they all own 3/4 of the mineral interests in the property, but they dispute the proportion of ownership in the minerals based on competing interpretations of reservation language in the 1960 warranty deed.

[¶ 4] In November 2011, Hallins commenced this action to quiet title to the disputed mineral interests. Hallins claim that they own 2/3 of the 3/4 of the mineral interests, as successors-in-interest to Walter and Esther Brandt, and that Lyngstads own 1/3 of the same 3/4 of the mineral interests, as successors-in-interest to Emma and John Lyngstad. Lyngstads, however, claim they collectively own 1/2 of the 3/4 mineral interest and Hallins collectively own the other 1/2 of the 3/4 minerals interest. Lyngstads moved for summary judgment, and Hallins filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

[¶ 5] In posturing the case for summary judgment, the parties agreed no disputed material facts exist and only a legal issue remained for the district court in construing the 1960 warranty deed. It was undisputed that all the grantors in the 1960 deed are deceased, that there are no known contemporary documents from 1960 reflecting the grantors' intentions, and that none of the plaintiffs or defendants in the action have any personal knowledge of the grantors' intent in 1960. The district court granted Hallins' summary judgment motion and denied Lyngstads' motion, holding no evidence of a separate contract or agreement existed between the grantors. The court quieted title to an undivided 2/3 of the undivided 3/4 mineral interests reserved in the 1960 warranty deed quieted in the Hallins as the heirs, successors, and assigns of Walter Brandt.

II

[¶ 6] Our standard for reviewing a district court's grant of summary judgment is well-established:

“Summary judgment under N.D.R.Civ.P. 56(c) is a procedural device for the prompt and expeditious disposition of a lawsuit without a trial ‘if either litigant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law and if no dispute exists as to either the material facts or the inferences to be drawn from undisputed facts, or if resolving factual disputes will not alter the result.’ ”

Nichols v. Goughnour, 2012 ND 178, ¶ 9, 820 N.W.2d 740 (quotations omitted). “Whether a district court properly granted summary judgment ‘is a question of law that we review de novo on the record.’ ” Id. (quotations omitted).

III

[¶ 7] Lyngstads argue the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of the Hallins and erred in creating an issue by relying on a lack of evidence of an agreement between the grantors. The parties do not contend the 1960 warranty deed is ambiguous, nor do they assert reformation of the deed is necessary. The parties instead argue, based on the undisputed facts, for competing legal interpretation and effect of the 1960 deed's language excepting and reserving the mineral interest to the grantors.

[¶ 8] In Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corp., 2012 ND 180, ¶ 6, 820 N.W.2d 755 (quoting Carkuff v. Balmer, 2011 ND 60, ¶ 8, 795 N.W.2d 303), we reiterated our rules for construing deeds:

“In construing a deed, the primary purpose is ‘to ascertain and effectuate the grantor's intent, and deeds are construed in the same manner as contracts.’ State Bank & Trust of Kenmare v. Brekke, 1999 ND 212, ¶ 12, 602 N.W.2d 681;see Williams Co. v. Hamilton, 427 N.W.2d 822, 823 (N.D.1988). If a deed is unambiguous, this Court determines the parties' intent from the instrument itself. See Brekke, at ¶ 12;Stracka v. Peterson, 377 N.W.2d 580, 582 (N.D.1985). In other words, ‘[t]he language of the deed, if clear and explicit, governs its interpretation; the parties' mutual intentions must be ascertained from the four corners of the deed, if possible.’ North Shore, Inc. v. Wakefield, 530 N.W.2d 297, 300 (N.D.1995); seeN.D.C.C. §§ 9–07–02, 9–07–03, 9–07–04, 47–09–11. Whether or not a contract is ambiguous is a question of law. Brekke, at ¶ 12.”

Thus, our primary purpose in construing a deed “is to ascertain and effectuate the grantor's intent.” Nichols, 2012 ND 178, ¶ 12, 820 N.W.2d 740.

A

[¶ 9] Before execution of the 1960 warranty deed Emma Lyngstad owned 1/3 of the surface and minerals and Walter Brandt owned 2/3 of the surface and minerals. Although Emma and John Lyngstad, as wife and husband, and Walter and Esther Brandt, as husband and wife, were grantors in the 1960 deed, both John Lyngstad and Esther Brandt were not previously in the chain of title. At summary judgment, the parties disputed whether the reservation language in the 1960 deed could convey any interest to John Lyngstad and Esther Brandt.

[¶ 10] Based on Malloy v. Boettcher, 334 N.W.2d 8 (N.D.1983), Hallins argued that, while Walter Brandt's interests may be conveyed to his wife through a reservation, his interests could not be conveyed through a reservation to a non-spouse stranger to title such as John Lyngstad. Lyngstads argue that the reserved mineral interests were, in fact, conveyed to John Lyngstad and Esther Brandt, despite not being original owners of the property sold or reserved in the 1960 deed, and that Walter Brandt's mineral interests could be conveyed to someone other than himself or his spouse through the reservation. For support, Lyngstads cite Malloy and N.D.C.C. § 47–09–17 (“A present interest and the benefit of a condition or covenant respecting property may be taken by any natural person under a grant although not named a party thereto.”).

[¶ 11] In Malloy, the sole issue was whether “in a deed of conveyance, a reservation of a life estate unto a third party, who is a stranger to the title of the property, is effective to convey the life estate to the third party.” 334 N.W.2d at 8. In Malloy, a husband and wife executed a deed in 1978, conveying an interest in land to their daughter and reserving “to [the] parties of the first part a life estate” in the interest. At the time of the deed, the husband was the sole owner of the property and the wife had no interest. Id. After the husband's death, the daughter sued to quiet title, asserting she was the owner of the interest conveyed in the 1978 deed, while the wife asserted she possessed a life estate under the deed's reservation. Id. The Court held the wife possessed a life estate under the reservation clause of the deed. Id. at 10.

[¶ 12] Malloy initially acknowledged this Court previously followed the common law rule “that a reservation or exception in a deed of conveyance cannot operate as a conveyance to a third party who is a stranger to the title or deed.” Malloy, 334 N.W.2d at 8–9 (discussing Stetson v. Nelson, 118 N.W.2d 685, 688 (N.D.1962) (“Thus a reservation or exception purporting to be in favor of a stranger operates in favor of the grantor and prevents the title to the excepted or reserved property from passing to the grantee.”)). However, Malloy then purports to “abandon the common law rule and apply, in its stead, the rule that a...