Halliwell v. State, 45885
| Decision Date | 03 December 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 45885,45885 |
| Citation | 323 So.2d 557 |
| Parties | Thomas A. HALLIWELL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
James A. Gardner, Public Defender, and Elliott C. Metcalfe, Jr., Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.
Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution we are reviewing the first degree murder conviction and sentence of death imposed upon Appellant by the Circuit Court of Hillsborough County.
The facts are as follows.
On January 17, 1974, the dismembered body of Arnold Tresch was found in Cypress Creek at Thirtieth Street in Tampa, Florida. The upper torso was in a garbage can taken from a store known as 'The Hearth,' the name of the business being marked on the container. (Appellant's diving shop, where the crime occurred, is located next door to 'The Hearth.') The lower torso and the amputated legs were found nearby in Appellant's footlocker which had been left with Appellant's former wife until after the murder. Appellant had gone to her home and had gotten it to use in disposing of the body. After killing Tresch on the morning of January 9, 1974, Appellant confessed that he stored the body until he could find time to dismember it, conceal the pieces, and remove them to Cypress Creek and following day.
In the early morning of January 18, 1974, he was arrested at the scene of the crime by a Hillsborough County detective; his shop was searched with his written permission, the detective finding blood on the floor as well as bloody human flesh on a saw, a machete and a bloody breaker bar which Appellant said later was the death weapon. After being arrested at his shop and receiving and signing his constitutional Miranda 1 warnings he was taken to an interrogation room for over two hours where he was twice given Miranda warnings. He was told by policemen that Sandra Tresch, the widow of his victim, and with whom he was involved in an illicit romantic affair, had confessed that she had killed her husband with a spear gun. Appellant requested a visit with her and then confessed that he alone was the killer, having become so angry over the victim's bragging about having beaten Sandra that he beat him to death, unable to stop the fatal blows once he began. Arnold weighed almost two hundred pounds, and Sandra weighed slightly over one hundred pounds; Appellant, also a large man, was a diving instructor who often worked in diving with Arnold and socialized with him and Sandra.
In attempting to renounce his confession, Appellant claimed the officers tricked him by saying that Sandra had confessed. The record does not show whether she ever actually confessed, but the Assistant State Attorney told the jury in the penalty section of the bifurcated trial that he could not call Sandra as a witness because she was still a suspect in the crime and had been arrested twice but not formally charged. There is no basis to reject his confession because of her purported statements of guilt.
After Appellant was formally charged but later in the morning of January 18th, Officer Edward Brodesser of the Tampa City Police visited Appellant as a personal friend, during which visit the Officer inquired as to Appellant's guilt. In answer to his friend's questions Appellant, by nodding his head affirmatively and with a few words, admitted killing Arnold Tresch because of his love affair with Sandra.
Appellant tried to suppress the confessions made to the detective shortly after the arrest, but since he had received Miranda warnings three times before his first oral confession, we see no sufficient basis to reverse the trial court's refusal to grant the motion to suppress. Appellant also moved to suppress his oral confession to his friend Officer Brodesser on the grounds that he was a personal friend and that as a city policeman he had no jurisdiction in the Hillsborough County investigation. In State v. Oyarzo 2 we held that friendly and courteous treatment of a prisoner after Miranda warnings did not invalidate the warnings nor taint a subsequent confession made with the belief that the defendant was among friends. After being warned of his rights, admissions of guilt made by a defendant to anyone not privileged (such as his attorney) may be used subject to proper legal objections, such as duress or mental incapacity.
Although soon after Appellant's arrest he assumed full liability for the murder and tried to exonerate Sandra, he told a different story at the trial. Appellant testified that he left Arnold Tresch in charge of his diving shop on the morning of the murder while he took his truck to a garage for repairs, returning about two o'clock p.m. Appellant said that, when he entered the shop, Sandra was hysterical and had blood on her hands; that after seeing the dismembered body of her husband in the blood-soaked back room, he had her wash he hands and go home; that he then proceeded to arrange for the ultimate removal of the body to Cypress Creek. Sandra had not visited him during the 102 days he had been in jail, and his ardor for her appeared to have diminished.
Several questions remain unanswered. A bloody jacket with a name unknown to Appellant or the police was found with the body. Sandra, on advice of Appellant, did not report Arnold missing until the day before he was found. Appellant drove Arnold's car and abandoned it at Lakeland, claiming Sandra followed him and returned him to Tampa. Appellant, a professional diver, was very strong and could have removed the body without the bloody dismemberment. It was inferred that perhaps a smaller person had done it because of inability to remove it as one unit.
Appellant also claimed that he did not confess and that he...
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