Hallman v. Hallman

Decision Date25 May 2001
PartiesJerry HALLMAN v. Dawn HALLMAN.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Douglas L. Key and Foster D. Key of Key, Greer, Frawley, Key & Harrison, Pelham, for appellant.

Charles W. Gorham and Donna Eich Brooks of Gorham & Waldrep, P.C., Birmingham, for appellee.

THOMPSON, Judge.

Jerry Hallman (the "husband") and Dawn Hallman (the "wife") were divorced on March 23, 1999, by an order of the trial court. The divorce judgment incorporated a settlement agreement reached by the parties.

On August 26, 1999, the wife filed a petition for a rule nisi, alleging, among other things, that the husband had failed to pay joint debts for which he was responsible under the divorce judgment. The husband filed a petition to modify the divorce judgment, seeking to reduce his child-support obligation because one of the parties' children had reached the age of majority.

The trial court conducted an ore tenus hearing on June 21, 2000. On August 14, 2000, the trial court entered a judgment modifying the husband's child-support obligation and ordering him to pay all debts of the marriage incurred before June 9, 1997. The husband filed a postjudgment motion, arguing that the wife had failed to disclose, at the time the parties entered into the settlement agreement that was later incorporated into the divorce judgment, many of the debts incurred during the marriage. In his postjudgment motion, the husband argued that the trial court's August 14, 2000, judgment was "unjust, inappropriate, and inequitable." The trial court denied the husband's postjudgment motion; the husband appealed.

The record indicates that the parties have substantial consumer debt. One exhibit submitted by the wife indicates that at the time of their separation, the parties, either jointly or in their individual names, had outstanding balances on over 30 different credit-card accounts. Most of the credit cards had been obtained in the wife's name. Since shortly after the parties' divorce, each party has disputed his or her liability for certain debts incurred during the marriage. The wife testified that she would mail bills for various creditcard debts to the husband, and that he would mail those bills back to her. The wife testified that one creditor had obtained a judgment against her and had garnished her wages.

The wife testified that the amounts charged to the various credit-card accounts were for the family's clothing, household needs, and vacations; she was unable to present monthly billing statements reflecting those charges in support of her testimony. The wife also testified that the parties had incurred charges on, or obtained cash advances from, their credit cards to finance the husband's business; the husband denied having done so.

The wife testified that, at the time of the parties' divorce, she thought their total consumer debt was between $42,000 and $58,000. The wife testified that during the parties' marriage, she paid the family's monthly bills. The husband denied looking at the monthly bills. Therefore, he testified, he had no knowledge of the amount of the parties' debts, or to whom those debts were owed. However, the wife testified that before their divorce, she and the husband had attempted to compute their total debt, using various monthly billing statements that arrived in the mail.

The wife admitted that during discovery in the parties' divorce action the husband had requested that she provide him a list of all of the debts of the marriage. The wife also admitted that the list she provided the husband was not complete and that it did not contain several debts. The wife testified that she thought she had given the husband a complete list. However, she admitted that she did not tell the husband that one creditor had obtained a judgment against her; she also admitted that she did not include that debt on the list she provided to the husband during discovery.

The husband testified that the vast majority of the credit cards were obtained in the wife's name and that he did not co-sign for those cards. He testified that he did not ask the wife to make purchases for him using the credit cards, and he denied obtaining cash advances in order to finance his business. The husband testified that at the time he signed the parties' settlement agreement, he was unaware of the debts the wife had failed to list in her discovery responses. The husband admitted that the wife has experienced difficulty with her memory since an accident in which she had suffered a head injury; that accident occurred approximately 10 years before the hearing in this proceeding.

The parties' settlement agreement stated, in relevant part, "[t]he [husband] to pay all debts before June 9, 1997. After that date, each party to pay their debts and hold the other harmless." Each party signed that settlement agreement.

The divorce judgment, based on the parties' settlement agreement, states, in relevant part:

"20. That the Husband shall pay all credit debts of the marriage dated before June 9, 1997, and agrees to indemnify and hold the Wife harmless for and shall pay those debts in his/her respective name not otherwise specifically referenced herein and shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless therefor."

On appeal, the husband argues that the trial court impermissibly broadened the divorce judgment. However, we conclude that the trial court interpreted a provision contained within its own judgment. In its August 14, 2000, judgment, the trial court found that paragraph 20 of the divorce judgment was "clear," and that it meant that "[t]he husband is to pay all credit debts incurred before June 9, 1997. Thereafter, each party is to be responsible for the debts in his/her respective name."

A trial court has the inherent power to interpret, implement, or enforce its own judgment. Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc., 646 So.2d 1343 (Ala.1994); Grayson v. Grayson, 628 So.2d 918 (Ala. Civ.App.1993). Generally, a trial court may not modify a property division...

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  • Waddell v. Waddell
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 24 Septiembre 2004
    ...appellate review of whatever interpretation the trial court may place on that term at that time. See, e.g., Hallman v. Hallman, 802 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Ala.Civ. App.2001) ("A trial court has the inherent power to interpret, implement, or enforce its own judgment."). At worst, it might be argu......
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    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 30 Junio 2005
    ...hold that a trial court has the inherent authority to interpret, implement, or enforce its own judgments. E.g., Hallman v. Hallman, 802 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Ala.Civ.App.2001). In Filer v. Filer, 502 So.2d 698, 700-01 (Ala.1987), the trial court was held to have the inherent authority to interp......
  • Whaley v. Whaley
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • 17 Noviembre 2017
    ...that the plain language of the judgment gives the husband protection from potential double liability. See, e.g., Hallman v. Hallman, 802 So.2d 1095, 1098 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001) ("The words of a judgment are to be given their plain and ordinary meanings, and the intentions of the parties are ......
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    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
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    ...interpret, implement, or enforce its own judgments, see Helms v. Helms' Kennels, Inc., 646 So.2d 1343 (Ala.1994); and Hallman v. Hallman, 802 So.2d 1095 (Ala.Civ. App.2001), I believe it is unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues addressed in the main Because the duty of a trial cour......
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