Hallman v. Hospital and Welfare Bd. of Hillsborough County

• Decision Date: 26 April 1972
• Docket Number: No. 41075,41075
• Citation: 262 So.2d 669
• Parties: Liston G. HALLMAN and Helen Hallman, his wife, and James L. Freeman, Appellants, v. The HOSPITAL & WELFARE BOARD OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, Florida, a public agency, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 669

262 So.2d 669

Liston G. HALLMAN and Helen Hallman, his wife, and James L. Freeman, Appellants, v. The HOSPITAL & WELFARE BOARD OF HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY, Florida, a public agency, Appellee.

No. 41075.

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 26, 1972.

Malory B. Frier, Tampa, for appellant.

Ralph C. Dell, of Allen, Dell, Frank & Trinkle, Tampa, for appellee.

ADKINS, Justice.

This is an appeal from a final judgment of the Civil Court of Record of Hillsborough County, Florida, which initially and directly construed controlling provisions of the Florida Constitution. We have jurisdiction. Fla.Const. art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A.

This is a suit brought by the Hospital & Welfare Board of Hillsborough County, Florida, against the husband, Liston G. Hallman, the wife, Helen Hallman (appellant herein), and nonappealing guarantor, James L. Freeman. The husband was hospitalized during July and August 1969. The defendant Freeman signed a 'guarantee at time of admission' when the husband was admitted to the Tampa General Hospital. At the time of the discharge of the husband from the hospital, the defenadnt-appellant wife signed a note payable to the plaintiff. The trial judge found that the wife did not receive any money, medical services, hospitalization or medicines from the plaintiff and that she signed the promissory note solely to guarantee payment of the indebtedness owed by her husband for hospitalization, medicines and services furnished to him by the plaintiff.

As a defense, the wife alleged the debt was that of the husband and she had never consented that her separate property be held liable for the payment of her husband's debt with any instrument in writing executed according to the law respecting conveyances by married women as required by Fla.Const. (1885), art. XI, § 1, F.S.A., which, she says, is now statutory law under Fla.Const. (1968), art. XII, § 10, F.S.A.

The trial judge concluded that Fla.Const. (1885), art. XI, § 1, F.S.A., was repealed by Fla.Const., art. X, § 5, F.S.A., and that the defendant wife should be held liable on the promissory note. We agree.

Fla.Const. (1885), art. XI, § 1, F.S.A., read as follows:

'All property, real and personal, of a wife owned by her before marriage, or lawfully acquired afterward by gift, devise, bequest, descent, or purchase, shall be her separate property, and the same shall not be liable for the debts of her husband without her consent given by some instrument in writing executed according to the law respecting conveyances by married women.'

Fla.Stat. (1967) § 708.02, F.S.A., contained the same provisions as the above-quoted portion of the Constitution.

Fla.Const. (1968), art. X, § 5, F.S.A., reads as follows:

'There shall be no distinction between married women and married men in the holding, control, disposition, or encumbering of their property, both real and personal; except that dower or curtesy may be established and regulated by law.'

The defendant wife says that the Court in construing Fla.Const. (1885) held there was no distinction between married women and married men in the holding, control, disposition or encumbering of their respective property, and cites Jette v. Harbison, 158 Fla. 418, 28 So.2d 858 (1947), and Kovens v. Bluestone, 145 So.2d 473 (Fla.1962). She says that any distinctions that did exist were by virtue of statute. Therefore, the wife reasons, there has been no change in the requirement that a married woman's separate property may be liable for the debts of her husband only through her consent by some instrument in writing executed according to the law respecting conveyances by married women and...