Hallman v. State, CR
| Decision Date | 31 March 1986 |
| Docket Number | No. CR,CR |
| Citation | 288 Ark. 448,706 S.W.2d 381 |
| Parties | Michael HALLMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. 85-153-A. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
J.F. Atkinson, Jr., Fort Smith, for appellant.
Steve Clark, Atty. Gen. by Theodore Holder, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, Michael Hallman, is one of three men jointly charged with first degree murder in the death of Ivey Jones. In a joint trial, Randy Hallman and Arthur Dale Taylor were found guilty of first degree murder, while appellant was found guilty of second degree murder. They appeal separately and, in separate arguments, assign unrelated points of error. Accordingly, we hand down concurrent, but separate opinions. In this case, we affirm the conviction for second degree murder.
On January 16, 1984, two hunters found the partially decomposed body of Ivey Jones in a remote section of Crawford County. The medical examiner estimated the date of death as December 8 or 9, 1983, and found the causes of death to be a blow to the head with a blunt object and stab wounds through the back.
On February 3, 1984, Arthur Dale Taylor, one of the three defendants, gave a statement implicating himself and two others in the murder. On February 7, 1984, the appellant gave an inculpatory statement. The statements were edited and admitted into evidence at trial. See Gammel v. State, 259 Ark. 96, 531 S.W.2d 474 (1976).
Arthur Dale Taylor's two edited statements are combined and summarized as follows: On the evening of December 8, nobody knew what we were doing except the three of us. We were in my 1972 Dodge Coronet. I was driving. I was told to tell Ivey Jones that a relative was coming from California. I stopped the car at Ivey Jones' apartment. One of the others got out of the back seat and knocked on her apartment door and told Ivey Jones that her family was back and we were supposed to take her to the house. My understanding of the reason she was picked up was for her money. She got in the front right seat. The other two boys were in the back seat. One of the boys took a screwdriver and started hitting her in the head. I stopped the car. One of the boys pulled Ivey Jones out of the car and hit her on the head with a lug wrench. He then stabbed her with a knife. We got her out of the car and put her on the car trunk. We drove a short distance down the road and then dragged her into some bushes. We then went to my house trailer where I burned up my shirt because it had some blood on it and burned her shoes and purse. Somebody at my house asked me about the blood on my shirt.
The statements constitute proof that Arthur Dale Taylor and two other males planned to obtain money from Ivey Jones. In furtherance of that plan they drove to her apartment where she was enticed into the car. She was then murdered. That proof alone does not implicate appellant.
However, appellant gave two incriminating statements which are summarized as follows: I was with two male friends on the night of the murder. About three weeks before the murder my two friends were talking about robbing Ivey Jones. At that time, the plan was for me and a friend to spend the night at Ivey Jones' house and leave either the door unlocked or the window up. On the night in question the three of us were driving around and thinking about robbing or burglarizing some place. They decided to break into Wal Mart Discount Store, but changed their minds. We then drove to the victim's house. I did not know the reason we went to the victim's house. I left the car, went to the victim's apartment, and got her to join us in the car. Ivey Jones sat in the front right seat. One of the other two men then hit Ivey Jones on the head with a foot long screwdriver. I did not know that the other two intended to attack Ivey Jones. The victim was told they were at a hospital, and she either got out of the car or was lifted out when the other two men stabbed her with a knife and hit her on the head with a lug wrench. She was then placed on the hood or trunk of the car and taken to the place where her body was later found. The three of us then went to a trailer belonging to one of the men. I made some coffee and went outdoors to find that a fire had been built. The victim's hat and purse were burned along with a bloody shirt of one of the other men. I did not tell anyone about the murder because I was afraid I could get the electric chair for it.
Regina McGrew testified that on the evening of December 8, 1983, the appellant, Arthur Dale Taylor, and Randy Hallman drove to Arthur Dale Taylor's house trailer in a blue Dodge automobile. Appellant went inside, got three cups of coffee and took them outside. They were drinking coffee and Arthur Dale Taylor took off his bloody shirt, poured gasoline on it, and set it on fire.
Appellant's principal point of appeal is that Arthur Dale Taylor was an accomplice and his statement was not sufficiently corroborated for a finding of guilt. The argument is without merit. The test for determining the sufficiency of corroborating evidence is whether, after totally eliminating the testimony of the accomplice, the other evidence independently establishes the crime and tends to connect the accused with its commission. Henderson v. State, 279 Ark. 435, 652 S.W.2d 16 (1983). It is not necessary that the corroborating evidence, standing alone, be sufficient to sustain the conviction. Orsini v. State, 281 Ark. 348, 665 S.W.2d 245, cert. denied. 469 U.S. 847, 105 S.Ct. 162, 83 L.Ed.2d 98. (1984).
In appellant's case, the testimony of the medical examiner corroborated the fact that someone killed Ivey Jones on December 8 or 9, 1983, by striking her on the head with a blunt object and stabbing her in the back. The testimony of Regina McGrew corroborated that appellant was in the presence of the accomplice and Randy Hallman on the evening of December 8, 1983. In addition, her testimony established that Taylor burned his blood-stained shirt while the appellant stood by. Most importantly, appellant's statements corroborated that he knew there had been a...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Berry v. State
...is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of that discretion. Hallman v. State, 288 Ark. 448, 706 S.W.2d 381 (1986). Decisions of this court have permitted broad admission of photographs of murder victims. The fact that photographs are inflam......
-
Morris v. State
...describe the objects portrayed, or if they better enable the jury to understand the testimony. Gardner v. State; Hallman v. State, 288 Ark. 448, 706 S.W.2d 381 (1986); Fairchild v. Twenty-six photographs were admitted into evidence and, of those, only four depicted the victims. Only two of ......
-
Walker v. State
...transfer cases and, further, that proof need not be introduced by the prosecutor against the juvenile on each factor. Hallman v. State, 288 Ark. 448, 706 S.W.2d 381 (1986); Ashing v. State, 288 Ark. 75, 702 S.W.2d 20 Further error is assigned by appellant to the trial court's failure to mak......
-
Burnett v. State, CR
...their probative value. That decision lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. Berry v. State, supra; Hallman v. State, 288 Ark. 448, 706 S.W.2d 381 (1986). The trial court carefully weeded out the duplicative pictures, and we find no abuse of discretion in the ones 5. Prosecutor......