Hallmon v. Stanislaus Cnty. Human Res. Dept.
| Decision Date | 21 April 2022 |
| Docket Number | 1:19-cv-01623-DAD-EPG |
| Parties | BRITANIE HALLMON, Plaintiff, v. STANISLAUS COUNTY HUMAN RESOURCE DEPT., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT STANISLAUS COUNTY'S MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. NO. 25)
This matter is before the court on defendant Stanislaus County's[1] motion to dismiss plaintiff's first amended complaint filed on June 4, 2021. (Doc. No. 25.) Pursuant to General Order No. 617 addressing the public health emergency posed by the COVID-19 pandemic defendant's motion was taken under submission on the papers. (Doc. No. 26.)
For the reasons explained below, the court will grant defendant Stanislaus County's motion to dismiss.[2]
Plaintiff Britanie Hallmon, proceeding pro se, filed her complaint initiating this action on August 23, 2019 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California. (Doc. No. 1.) Therein, plaintiff alleged that defendant had committed employment discrimination against her in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by failing to promote her and by terminating her employment. (Id.) Plaintiff sought equitable relief under 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g). (Id.)
After plaintiff's case was transferred to this district court on November 14, 2019 (Doc. Nos. 8, 9), the matter was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for screening of plaintiff's complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 636(b)(1)(B) and under Local Rule 302 because plaintiff was proceeding in this action pro se and in forma pauperis. (See Doc. Nos. 1, 2, 10, 12.) On May 18, 2020, after having screened plaintiff's complaint, the assigned magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations recommending that all of plaintiff's claims be dismissed except for her Title VII employment discrimination claim brought against defendant Stanislaus County. (Doc. No. 14.) On June 8, 2020, the undersigned adopted those findings and recommendations and directed that named defendants Tamra Thomas, Mari Tamimi, Shelly Anntonucci, and Joan Sahard be terminated from this action. (Doc. No. 18.)
On October 2, 2020, defendant Stanislaus County filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint (Doc. No. 19), but plaintiff did not respond to that motion. The court granted defendant Stanislaus County's motion to dismiss with leave to amend on April 29, 2021 providing plaintiff with twenty-one (21) days within which to file her first amended complaint. (Doc. No. 23.) Twenty-two (22) days later, on May 21, 2021, plaintiff filed her first amended complaint, which included an explanation that her filing was one day late because she thought 21 days referred to court days and did not include weekend days. (Doc. No. 24 at 15.)
In the operative first amended complaint, plaintiff alleges as follows. Plaintiff began employment with Stanislaus County as a caseworker on December 12, 2016. (Doc. No. 24 at 8.) Immediately upon beginning her employment, plaintiff noticed that her supervisor and other staff members treated her differently than the other caseworkers in her training unit. (Id.) For example, plaintiff did not receive the proper amount of training in comparison to that received by the other new hires, as she was given only four months of training compared to their six. (Id.) Nor did plaintiff receive the same level of guidance or counseling as the others in her training group. (Id.) Plaintiff also requested additional training to “catch up” with her peers, but plaintiff's request was denied multiple times. (Id.) When plaintiff requested help from her supervisor in interpreting “various guidelines, ” she alleges that her supervisor did not help her while others in her training group made similar requests to supervisors and did receive the requested help. (Id.)
Plaintiff also advances somewhat contradictory allegations. For instance, plaintiff alleges that she was never informed by a supervisor that her performance was substandard or that she needed to make any improvement in her work, but at the same time, plaintiff alleges that she was penalized for making unspecified mistakes that other members of her training group were not being penalized for. (Id.) In this regard plaintiff alleges that due to “obvious” mistreatment and the disparity in treatment between that which she received and others in her training unit received plaintiff had the “department union representative” review her work and performance, and this unnamed union representative informed plaintiff that her work was “being nitpicked.” (Id.) However, plaintiff does not allege in her first amended complaint what work of hers was being nitpicked or what mistakes she was alleged to have committed or how she was penalized and whether these mistakes or penalties affected her employment with defendant in anyway. In fact, plaintiff alleges that she was ultimately discharged by defendant[3] notwithstanding the fact that she was satisfying the requirements of her position based on monthly performance reviews from her supervisor, including that she was “meeting the grading criteria of the county of a 75% or higher.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff further alleges, again, somewhat contradictorily, that her termination was improper because defendant allegedly did not follow its own policy of issuing a written performance review, but plaintiff also alleges that her own satisfactory performance could be “shown on a copy of [her] quality assurance review.” (Id.) Plaintiff does not explain this lack of congruence between her satisfactory performance based on monthly performance reviews and her alleged lack of training or guidance, unfair penalizing, and “nitpicking.”
Lastly, plaintiff alleges that: (i) she is African American and members of her training group that she claims were treated differently than her and to which she compares herself were Caucasian; and (ii) she satisfies all the education requirements and “skills and abilities” for her position as a case worker, which are summarized from the job description that is attached to the first amended complaint. (Id. at 9, 12.) On the form complaint portion of plaintiff's first amended complaint, she checked boxes indicating that she is alleging discriminatory conduct on the part of defendant including termination of employment, failure to be promoted, and unequal terms and conditions of her employment. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff also checked the box on the form complaint portion of her first amended complaint stating that the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) issued her a Notice of Right to Sue letter, but plaintiff failed to specify the date she received that letter and did not attach it to the operative first amended complaint.[4] (Id. at 5.)
On June 4, 2021, defendant Stanislaus County filed the pending motion to dismiss based on three grounds: (i) plaintiff failed to comply with a court order by filing her first amended complaint one day late;[5] (ii) plaintiff failed to sufficiently plead exhaustion of administrative remedies by not reattaching the necessary exhibits to her first amended complaint; and (iii) plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead a cause of action under Title VII based on race. (Doc. No. 25 at 2.) As with defendant's first motion to dismiss, plaintiff again has not filed any response to the pending motion. On June 29, 2021, defendant filed a reply brief reiterating the three bases for dismissal raised in its pending motion and arguing that plaintiff's failure to comply with the local rules of this court which require the responding party to file an opposition or non-opposition to any motion also warrants dismissal. (Doc. No. 27.)
The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the legal sufficiency of the complaint. N. Star Int'l v. Ariz. Corp. Comm 'n, 720 F.2d 578, 581 (9th Cir. 1983). “Dismissal can be based on the lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.” Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A claim for relief must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P 8(a)(2). Though Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff is required to allege “enough facts to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” BellAtl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the court accepts as true the allegations in the complaint and construes the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Love v. United States, 915 F.2d 1242, 1245 (9th Cir. 1989). It is inappropriate to assume that the plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983).
“Dismissal without leave to amend is proper if it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by amendment.” Kendall v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 518 F.3d 1042, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). To the extent the pleadings can be cured by the allegation of additional facts, courts will generally grant leave to amend. Cook, Perkiss andLiehe, Inc. v. N. Cal Collection Serv. Inc., 911 F.2d 242, 247 (9th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted); see also Bly-Magee v. California, 236 F.3d 1014, 1019 (9th Cir. 2001) (“We...
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