Halloran v. Bhan
| Decision Date | 20 July 2004 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 121523. Calendar No. 8. |
| Citation | 470 Mich. 572,683 N.W.2d 129 |
| Parties | Eileen HALLORAN, temporary personal representative of the estate of Dennis J. Halloran, Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Raakesh C. BHAN, M.D., and Critical Care Pulmonary Medicine, P.C., Defendants-Appellants, and Battle Creek Health Systems, Defendant. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Blaske and Blaske, P.L.C. (by E. Robert Blaske and Thomas H. Blaske), Battle Creek, MI, for the plaintiff.
Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, P.C. (by Mark A. Bush and Graham K. Crabtree), Lansing, MI, for defendants Raakesh C. Bhan, M.D. and Critical Care Pulmonary Medicine, P.C.
Johnson & Wyngaarden, P.C. (by Robert M. Wyngaarden and Michael L. Van Erp), Okemos, MI, for defendant Battle Creek Health Systems.
Kerr, Russell and Weber, P.L.C. (by Richard D. Weber and Joanne Geha Swanson), Detroit, MI, for amicus curiae the Michigan State Medical Society.
In this interlocutory appeal, we must determine the meaning of the medical malpractice expert witness qualification requirements of M.C.L. § 600.2169(1)(a). Here, plaintiff's proffered standard-of-care witness did not possess the same board certification as defendant doctor, although both had the same subspecialty certificate in their respective fields.
We hold that M.C.L. § 600.2169(1)(a) requires that the proposed expert witness must have the same board certification as the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered. Because plaintiff's expert witness did not share the same board certification as the defendant doctor, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals that held to the contrary and reinstate the circuit court's order granting defendants' motion to strike.
Plaintiff's decedent, Dennis Halloran, was experiencing renal failure and died of cardiac arrest after being treated by defendant physician Raakesh Bhan in the emergency room at defendant Battle Creek Health Systems. Plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action, alleging that defendant physician Bhans negligent treatment of Halloran's renal failure and subsequent cardiac arrest caused the death.1 Bhan is board-certified in internal medicine by the American Board of Internal Medicine (ABIM) and also received a certificate of added qualification in critical care medicine2 from the ABIM. The parties do not dispute that the subspecialty certification is not a "board certification" for the purpose of the statute. It is not disputed that Bhan was practicing critical care at the time of the event in question.
Plaintiff proposed Dr. Thomas Gallagher as her standard-of-care witness. Gallagher is board certified in anesthesiology by the American Board of Anesthesiology (ABA), and has received a certificate of added qualification in critical care medicine from the ABA. Gallagher is not board certified in internal medicine and has not received any training that would make him eligible for certification in internal medicine.
Defendants moved to strike Dr. Gallagher on the ground that he failed to satisfy the requirements of M.C.L. § 600.2169(1)(a) because he was not board certified in internal medicine. The circuit court granted the motion to strike, finding that Gallagher was not qualified to testify as an expert witness regarding the standard of care because he and Dr. Bhan did not share the same board certification.
A split Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that because the subspecialty of critical care was shared by both physicians, plaintiff's trial expert fell within the requirements of the statute.3 This Court granted leave to appeal on March 25, 2003, limited to the issue regarding the proper interpretation of M.C.L. § 600.2169(1)(a).4
This Court reviews de novo issues of statutory interpretation. In re MCI, 460 Mich. 396, 413, 596 N.W.2d 164 (1999).
When facing issues regarding statutory interpretation, this Court must discern and give effect to the Legislatures intent as expressed in the statutory language. DiBenedetto v. West Shore Hosp., 461 Mich. 394, 402, 605 N.W.2d 300 (2000); Massey v. Mandell, 462 Mich. 375, 379-380, 614 N.W.2d 70 (2000). This principle was recently explained in Roberts v. Mecosta Co. Gen. Hosp., 466 Mich. 57, 63, 642 N.W.2d 663 (2002):
An anchoring rule of jurisprudence, and the foremost rule of statutory construction, is that courts are to effect the intent of the Legislature. People v. Wager, 460 Mich. 118, 123, n. 7, 594 N.W.2d 487 (1999). To do so, we begin with an examination of the language of the statute. Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare System, 465 Mich. 53, 60, 631 N.W.2d 686 (2001). If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, then we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning and the statute is enforced as written. People v. Stone, 463 Mich. 558, 562, 621 N.W.2d 702 (2001). A necessary corollary of these principles is that a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself. Omne Financial, Inc. v. Shacks, Inc., 460 Mich. 305, 311, 596 N.W.2d 591 (1999).
M.C.L. § 600.2169(1) provides:
We must now determine whether M.C.L. § 600.2169(1)(a) requires that an expert witness share the same board certification as the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered. We hold that it does.5
The Court of Appeals majority held that it is sufficient under the statute if the expert witness and the defendant doctor share only the same subspecialty, but not the same board certification. We disagree because this argument runs contrary to the plain language of the statute.6 This interpretation is supported by the use of the word "however" to begin the second sentence. Undefined statutory terms must be given their plain and ordinary meanings, and it is proper to consult a dictionary for definitions. Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co., 460 Mich. 243, 248-249, 596 N.W.2d 574 (1999); Koontz v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 466 Mich. 304, 312, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002). Random House Webster's College Dictionary (2d ed) defines "however" as "in spite of that" and "on the other hand." Applying this definition to the statutory language compels the conclusion that the second sentence imposes an additional requirement for expert witness testimony, not an optional one. In other words, "in spite of" the specialty requirement in the first sentence, the witness must also share the same board certification as the party against whom or on whose behalf the testimony is offered.
There is no exception to the requirements of the statute and neither the Court of Appeals nor this Court has any authority to impose one. As we have invariably stated, the argument that enforcing the Legislature's plain language will lead to unwise policy implications is for the Legislature to review and decide, not this Court.7 See Jones v. Dep't of Corrections, 468 Mich. 646, 655, 664 N.W.2d 717 (2003).
It is not disputed that defendant Bhan is board certified in internal medicine, but proposed expert witness Gallagher is not. M.C.L. § 600.2169(1)(a) requires that the expert witness "must be" a specialist who is board certified in the specialty in which the defendant physician is also board certified. Because the proposed witness in this case is not board certified in the same specialty as Bhan, M.C.L. § 600.2169(1)(a) prohibits him from testifying regarding the standard of care.
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the circuit court's order granting defendant's motion to strike. We remand this case to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I dissent from the majority's premature conclusion that plaintiff's standard-of-care expert is not qualified to testify under M.C.L. § 600.2169(1) regarding the appropriate standard of care in this case. Both plaintiff's expert and defendant Bhan specialized in critical care medicine. The majority holds, however, that plaintiff's expert must be, like defendant Bhan, board-certified in internal medicine because the majority states that Bhan was practicing internal medicine at the time of the alleged malpractice. Ante at 131 n. 5.
The nature of the alleged malpractice cannot be confirmed with such certainty from the record, because the trial court never ruled on whether internal medicine was involved. It is not clear that defendant Bhan was practicing internal medicine or critical care at the time of the alleged malpractice. Apparently, even the majority is unable to determine with certainty the nature of the malpractice at issue, because the majority asserts that it is undisputed that defendant was practicing not only internal medicine at the time of the event in question, but also critical care medicine. Ante at 131 n. 5 and 130.
Whether defendant Bhan was practicing critical care or internal medicine or a mix of both is essential to determining whether plaintiff's expert is qualified to testify regarding the appropriate standard of care under M.C.L. §...
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