O'Halloran v. O'Halloran
| Decision Date | 19 March 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 8636,8636 |
| Citation | 580 S.W.2d 870 |
| Parties | Rebecca O'HALLORAN, Appellant, v. Joseph O'HALLORAN, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
J. Kent Newsom, Pelletier, Dickens & Newsom, Dallas, for appellant.
Jerry D. Johnson, Elliott, Meer, Vetter, Denton & Bates, Dallas, for appellee.
On January 23, 1976, appellant and appellee were divorced by decree of the Superior Court of Cobb County, Georgia. Appellant was awarded custody of their child, Patricia Lynn. Appellee was ordered to contribute certain amounts to the child's support, as well as to maintain in force an insurance policy for her benefit. After the divorce, appellee moved to Dallas, Texas. He became delinquent in the support payments, and appellant filed suit in the District Court of Dallas County, pursuant to the provisions of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 1 to enforce the Georgia support order. Appellee answered and filed a counter-claim asking the Texas court to modify the Georgia decree by reducing the support payments and expanding his visitation rights. By proper plea, appellant asserted that the court had no jurisdiction to consider the motion to modify the support payments. The court overruled the plea to the jurisdiction, and after trial on the merits, found appellee to be in contempt for failure to make the payments required by the Georgia support order, but then proceeded to modify the Georgia order by reducing the payments by one-half based upon a demonstrated change of conditions. The appeal is from that order.
The purpose of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act was to provide a simplified, consistent and effective mechanism for the interstate enforcement of support obligations. Conventional judicial proceedings had proved unsatisfactory, largely because the defaulting spouse-obligor was frequently outside the jurisdiction, and the obligee could rarely afford to travel to distant states and litigate the question of support obligations. See Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 768; Fox, The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act XII Family Law Quarterly 114 (1978). URESA was designed to avoid those disadvantages by allowing the obligation of support to be established in the obligee's home state, and then allow that right to be enforced in a foreign state by a simplified procedure without having to bring an independent action in the foreign state. Fox, supra, p. 114.
Two subchapters of the Texas version of URESA provide for the interstate civil enforcement of support obligations. The first is known as the "Initiating State Responding State" civil enforcement procedure which is provided by Secs. 21.21-21.45. That procedure permits a resident of a foreign state to use a court of that state to certify to a Texas court facts showing that a resident of Texas, or one who owns property in Texas, owes an obligation of support to the initiating party. The Texas court then, either with or without conducting a hearing (depending upon whether defenses are raised), determines the duty and the amount of support that is owed, and enforces that obligation either by action against the obligor personally or against his property or both. There is a division of opinion as to whether this procedure allows the responding court to modify an existing support decree of the initiating state. See Fox, supra, p. 130. The majority view is that modification, at least as to future obligations, is permitted if found by the responding state to be justified. See Koehler v. Koehler, 559 S.W.2d 944 (Tenn.1977); Commonwealth v. Byrne, 212 Pa.Super. 566, 243 A.2d 196 (1968); Davidson v. Davidson, 66 Wash.2d 780, 405 P.2d 261 (1965); Moore v. Moore, 252 Iowa 404, 107 N.W.2d 97 (1961); Fox, supra; Annot., 42 A.L.R.2d 768 (later case service). The minority view is represented by cases such as Craft v. Hertz, 182 N.W.2d 293 (N.D.1970). See also Hamilton v. Hamilton, 476 S.W.2d 197 (Ky.1972). The question has not been definitely settled in Texas. Compare, however, Holmes v. Tibbs, 542 S.W.2d 487 (Tex.Civ.App.Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
The second method of civil enforcement under URESA is the registration procedure provided by Secs. 21.61-21.66. Those provisions are as follows:
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