Halloran v. Spillane's Servicenter, Inc.

Decision Date13 June 1990
Docket NumberNo. 700307,700307
Citation587 A.2d 176,41 Conn.Supp. 484
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
PartiesR. Bartley HALLORAN et al. v. SPILLANE'S SERVICENTER, INC., et al. -New Britain

Alfano, Halloran & Flynn and F. Timothy McNamara, Hartford, for plaintiffs.

Weisman & Hillman, for defendants.

MALONEY, Judge.

The named plaintiff brings this action on behalf of himself and on behalf of the entire class of persons similarly situated. The named defendant, Spillane's Servicenter, Inc., is a corporation engaged in the business of removing and towing motor vehicles that have been parked on private property without permission from the property owner. The defendant Cheryl Spillane is an employee of the defendant corporation. The defendant 1 has stipulated that all the criteria of General Statutes § 52-105 and Practice Book §§ 87 and 88 have been satisfied. The class consists of past, present and future owners of motor vehicles that have been removed and towed from private property by the defendant at the request of the property owners and subsequently retained or stored by the defendants. On the basis of all the evidence, the court finds, in accordance with Practice Book § 88, that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class prevail over any questions affecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.

In his complaint, the named plaintiff seeks injunctions, damages and other relief based on alleged violations of General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). Prior to trial, the parties agreed, with the permission of the court, that the court would hear evidence on issues pertaining to injunctive relief and liability for damages under CUTPA and would make findings and issue appropriate orders. The parties agreed further that if the court finds that the defendants are liable for damages, the amount of these damages would be decided by a jury after a separate hearing.

The following facts are found on the basis of evidence introduced at the trial before this court and by stipulation of the parties. The defendant corporation operates its towing business in the greater Hartford area. Robert Spillane is the president and sole stockholder. He is active in all phases of the company's business, including operating tow trucks, seizing trespassing vehicles, establishing rules and practices for releasing vehicles to their owners, negotiating rates and prices for various services with the department of motor vehicles, and collecting amounts charged for towing and storage services. Cheryl Spillane is employed by the defendant corporation to work in its office. In that capacity, she collects amounts charged and otherwise implements the defendant corporation's business practices. She is the licensed operator of the towing business but there was no evidence that she establishes policies and rules of the corporation as alleged in the complaint; accordingly, the court does not find that she performs those functions.

The defendant corporation's practice in conducting its business as it applies to towing trespassing vehicles from private property is in accord with the practice followed by other companies in the same business throughout the state. The defendant either responds to a specific request from a property owner who discovers an unauthorized vehicle on his property or acts in accordance with a contract with a property owner to monitor the property and to remove any offending vehicles. The defendant then transports the vehicle either by towing it or by carrying it on a flatbed truck to the defendant's lot, where it is placed in a protected area. The defendant then notifies the local police department that it has the vehicle in its possession. The defendant does not attempt to notify the owner or to determine who the owner is. The vehicle remains in the defendant's possession until the defendant releases it to the owner.

Prior to October, 1989, the defendant refused to release vehicles to owners except during its normal business hours of 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m., Monday through Friday, holidays excluded. No exceptions to this practice were permitted. The defendant chose its own normal business hours. The defendant was not required to obtain approval of this schedule from the department of motor vehicles, but was required to obtain approval of the rates it charged for towing, storage, and other services. The defendant obtained this approval by filing with the department a notice listing the various charges, which the department would stamp "approved." The notice also included a statement about the defendant's policy of releasing towed vehicles only during normal business hours, so the department has always been aware of that practice. During October, 1989, the defendant obtained approval from the department of a "release fee" of $22.50. Thereafter, the defendant changed its practice to allow the release of a vehicle to an owner at any time, provided the release fee was paid if the owner demanded the vehicle after normal business hours.

Prior to May, 1990, the defendant would not permit an owner to retrieve any personal property from his or her vehicle while it remained in the defendant's possession. On May 1, 1990, the defendant changed its practice to comply with new department of motor vehicles, regulations requiring it to permit an owner at any time to remove from a vehicle personal property essential to the health or welfare of any person.

As previously indicated, the rates charged by the defendant for the work performed in towing and in storing trespassing vehicles are subject to approval by the department of motor vehicles. The defendant charges separately for hooking onto a vehicle and for towing it, for extra mileage, for unlocking the vehicle if necessary, for disconnecting and for reconnecting the transmission linkage if necessary, for the services of an extra man in the tow truck if necessary, for releasing the vehicle during nonbusiness hours as previously indicated, and for storing the vehicle before releasing it to the owner. Prior to October, 1989, the storage fee was imposed from the time the defendant notified the local police that it had the vehicle in its possession until the time the vehicle was released to the owner. In particular, the fee was imposed on Saturdays, Sundays, holidays, and for after-business hours even if the owner had called or had appeared and had requested release. After October, 1989, the storage fee was imposed only until the time the defendant received a call from the owner requesting release of the vehicle.

At all times, the defendant has followed the practice of refusing to release a vehicle to its owner until the owner has paid the full amount of fees, calculated and charged by the defendant, in cash.

All of the practices described above, with some minor insignificant variations, are followed by most of the companies engaged in towing trespassing vehicles in Connecticut. These practices are standard in the industry in this state. None of the previously described practices violates any state statute or any regulation promulgated by the department of motor vehicles.

Ten witnesses, including the named plaintiff, testified on behalf of the plaintiff class. They were all owners of vehicles that had been parked on private property in various locations in the greater Hartford area without permission of the property owners and that had been towed away and stored by the defendant at the request of the property owners. Both men and women, they represent a variety of occupations, income levels, and racial backgrounds. They are not related or connected to each other in any way, but are simply individuals who share the common experience of having their vehicles seized and held by the defendant. The defendant also produced witnesses, including its president, Robert Spillane, and another employee but not the defendant Cheryl Spillane. She never testified. On the basis of all of the testimony, much of which was in dispute, and on its assessment of the credibility of the various witnesses, the court finds the following additional facts. The defendant's employees rigorously enforced its previously described business practices, without regard to individual hardship or to special circumstances of which they were aware. In so doing, their manner was consistently overbearing, often rude and abusive, and occasionally marked by violence or threats. The following examples are illustrative of this conduct: About 3 o'clock one morning, the plaintiff Jose Rodriguez returned to his vehicle, which was admittedly parked in an unauthorized space in a private parking lot. Before he could leave, Spillane and another employee of the defendant hooked their tow truck to Rodriguez' vehicle. Rodriguez immediately demanded they stop and release the vehicle so that he himself could drive it from the lot. Spillane, however, refused to unhook it unless Rodriguez paid him $44.50 in cash on the spot. An argument ensued, and Rodriguez climbed into the back of the tow truck in an effort to prevent Spillane from driving away with his vehicle in tow. Instead, Spillane did drive off with Rodriguez in the back, towing the vehicle, and proceeded at high speed to his storage lot. Eventually, Rodriguez had to pay a total of $83 for the release of his vehicle.

On a Friday night in August, 1988, the defendant towed three cars from a private parking lot. They belonged to the plaintiff David Gostonon, his wife, and the best man at their wedding, which had taken place earlier that day. Gostonon and his wife were to embark on a weekend honeymoon on Saturday. The best man's car had some needed medication in it. On Saturday, Gostonon telephoned the defendant's office, explained the situation and requested release of the vehicles. His...

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4 cases
  • Richards v. Direct Energy Servs., LLC
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Second Circuit
    • February 4, 2019
    ...practice is standard in the industry ... does not excuse it as a violation of CUTPA." Halloran v. Spillane's Servicenter, Inc. , 41 Conn. Supp. 484, 500, 587 A.2d 176 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1990) (emphasis added). "Common business norms" are to be considered at most as part of a court's determin......
  • Geomc Co. v. Calmare Therapeutics, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
    • August 18, 2017
    ...No. 172-10. 20. In GEOMC's memorandum of law in support of its motion for summary judgment, GEOMC cites Halloran v. Spillane's Servicenter, Inc., 41 Conn. Supp. 484 (Super. Ct. 1990), for the proposition that conversion is a violation of CUTPA. The conversion at issue in that case, however,......
  • Adage Towing & Recovery, Inc. v. City of Tucson
    • United States
    • Arizona Court of Appeals
    • June 20, 1996
    ...... has broad discretion in passing on the interest to be protected and the method to be employed." Halloran v. Spillane's Servicenter, Inc., 41 Conn.Supp. 484, 495, 587 A.2d 176, 182 (1990). See also Younger v. Plunkett, 395 F.Supp. 702, 714-15 (E.D.Pa.1975); Kunde, 41 Ill.App.3d at 228, 3......
  • Bannon v. Wise
    • United States
    • Connecticut Superior Court
    • August 10, 1990
    ... ... Hewlett, a bequest to the New Canaan Inn, Inc. (the Inn), is exempt from succession taxes by virtue of the status of ... ...

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