Hallowell v. State
| Decision Date | 01 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1275, Sept. Term, 2016,1275, Sept. Term, 2016 |
| Parties | Sean Prince HALLOWELL v. STATE of Maryland |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Argued by: Allison P. Brasseaux (Paul B. DeWolfe, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Argued by: Virginia S. Hovermill (Brian E. Frosh, Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: Wright, Shaw Geter, James R. Eyler, Senior Judge, Specially Assigned, JJ.
Eyler, James R., J.Sean Prince Hallowell, appellant, was charged with second-degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. The State proceeded under both a specific- intent theory as well as a felony-murder theory, and the jury was instructed, in accordance with Maryland law at the time of his trial, Roary v. State , 385 Md. 217, 867 A.2d 1095 (2005), and without objection, that first-degree assault (an uncharged offense in this case) was a valid predicate felony for second-degree felony murder. The jury, sitting in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County, convicted appellant of both offenses, and he noted a timely appeal. During the pendency of that appeal, the Court of Appeals overruled Roary , holding "that first-degree assault that results in the victim's death merges with the homicide and therefore cannot serve as an underlying felony" for second-degree felony murder. State v. Jones , 451 Md. 680, 708, 155 A.3d 492 (2017). Appellant raises the following issues, which we have reordered for clarity1 :
For the reasons that follow, we shall reverse the judgments and remand for further proceedings.
Taken in a light most favorable to the State, the evidence adduced at trial established the following:
During the evening of February 7, 2013, appellant, Charles "Chucky" Thompson, Terrance "TJ" Stoney, and Gary "Big Man" Bishop gathered together at a friend's house2 to consume drugs and alcohol. Some of the partygoers were drinking alcoholic beverages, some were smoking "weed," and others were "drawing cocaine."
As the party drew to a close, appellant, Thompson, Stoney, and Bishop left in separate cars. Appellant was the first to leave, followed by Thompson, who was driving a bluish grey Chevrolet Malibu, and then Bishop and Stoney, who left together in Bishop's white Lexus. All of them ultimately reconvened outside of the home, in Forestville, Maryland, where appellant lived with his mother and sister as well as Gary Bishop.
After appellant had left the party but before the others did, he called Bishop and asked him to retrieve a bag of cocaine that he had left in Thompson's car. Bishop asked Thompson to produce the cocaine, and Thompson gave Bishop a bag containing just "crumbs." Bishop informed appellant, who replied that he had given Thompson "a full bag" and that he would "be back." Appellant never returned to the party.
When Bishop and Stoney arrived outside of appellant's home, they were met by another friend, identified in the record only as "Daronte," who drove a gray Chevrolet Monte Carlo. Daronte was accompanied by another man, whom Bishop identified as Daronte's "cousin" or "little brother" and whom Stoney identified as "Marcus." As Daronte and Marcus sat in the Monte Carlo, Stoney stood outside the driver's side door, smoking marijuana with Daronte, while the trio watched a music video that Daronte was playing in his car. Bishop was also nearby, although Stoney was "not sure" where he was. At that time, Bishop's car was parked behind Daronte's Monte Carlo, with space between the two vehicles sufficient for another car.
Thompson was the next to arrive, pulling up in his bluish grey Malibu and parking in the space between Daronte's Monte Carlo and Bishop's Lexus. Shortly thereafter, appellant arrived, in a "black" car driven by an unidentified woman. Appellant exited the vehicle, walked over to Thompson's vehicle, and "pulled [him] out [of] the car." Thompson then approached Bishop and asked him whether he had "[said] anything to his cousin about his cocaine." Before he could say anything else, appellant "grabbed" Thompson, "pulled [him] toward his chest," and "[s]hot him in the head" with a handgun.
Appellant picked up Thompson, carried him to his Malibu, placed him in the back seat, climbed in the front seat, and drove away. Shortly thereafter, Officer Mosell Jones, Jr., of the Prince George's County Police Department, received a 911 call, informing him that there had been a report of shots fired in "the 2500 or 2600 block of Timbercrest Drive," near appellant's home. When he arrived, Officer Jones encountered Bishop and Stoney, who gave conflicting accounts of whether there had been a shooting and from what direction, if any, the gunshots had been fired.
"[J]ust after midnight" on February 8, 2013, Richard Peterson, a volunteer firefighter stationed at the nearby Ritchie Volunteer Fire Department,3 was awakened by a ringing doorbell. Upon answering the doorbell, Peterson encountered a "black male," matching the description of appellant, "saying that there was somebody who needed our help," but he "wouldn't elaborate on what exactly was wrong." Peterson walked over to the fire truck, grabbed a flashlight and jacket and, accompanied by another firefighter, walked to the parking lot alongside the fire station. By that time, appellant, according to Peterson, was already across the street at a nearby 7–Eleven, having "made incredibly good time making his way down that way." Peterson and the other firefighters then discovered a Chevrolet Malibu, in the middle of the driveway, with its engine running and its headlights on, and all of its doors closed. Upon further examination, they found the victim, Thompson, slumped in the rear, "suffering from a gunshot wound
to the left temple." Thompson still "had a pulse but ... was not breathing spontaneously" when firefighters first discovered him slumped in the back seat of his car. The emergency responders administered cardio-pulmonary resuscitation
("CPR") to him, but he did not respond and died shortly thereafter.
When appellant approached the door of the fire station, he inadvertently dropped his wallet on the ground, and it was recovered about an hour later by Steve Wilson, a volunteer firefighter who was reporting to the station to begin his shift. Wilson notified the police, who identified appellant as a suspect in the murder.
On April 9, 2013, a grand jury returned a two-count indictment, charging appellant with murder in the first degree and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. A jury trial ensued, and on September 12, 2014, the jury acquitted appellant of murder in the first degree but failed to reach a verdict on the lesser included offense of murder in the second degree as well as the handgun charge. A mistrial was declared, and after three continuances, appellant was tried again, in April 2016. Following a three-day trial, the jury convicted him of murder in the second degree and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Upon receiving a sentence of thirty years' imprisonment for second-degree murder and a consecutive sentence of twenty years' imprisonment for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, appellant noted this timely appeal.
Additional facts will be noted as pertinent to discussion of the issues.
Appellant argues that his conviction for second-degree murder must be reversed because the circuit court erroneously instructed the jury that first-degree assault could serve as the underlying felony for second-degree felony murder, and it cannot be determined from the jury's general verdict whether it found that he had committed second-degree specific-intent murder or second-degree felony-murder. He then pivots to the conclusion that, because we must reverse his conviction for second-degree murder, the only crime of violence for which he was convicted, we must also reverse his conviction for the use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence.
Appellant argues that the objection made by his trial counsel, prior to the trial court's instructions to the jury, adequately preserved this claim for appeal. In the alternative, he argues that we should address his claim for plain error because it is grounded upon a conviction for what he terms a "non-existent crime."
Appellant further argues that the court erred in giving a flight instruction, which, he maintains, was not generated under the facts of this case. Moreover, he asserts, because that purportedly unwarranted flight instruction "permitted the jury to infer guilt merely from the fact that" he left the scene, and the State's case otherwise rested "primarily" upon the testimony of two unreliable witnesses, that alleged instructional error was not harmless.
Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss on the ground of a speedy trial violation. According to appellant, the delay of eighteen months and twenty-two days in commencing his retrial was chargeable to the State, he "frequently and forcefully" asserted his speedy trial rights, and the lengthy pretrial incarceration to which he had been subjected caused him prejudice; the sum total of which, he contends, should have resulted in dismissal.
Finally, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting a computer aided dispatch ("CAD") report because that report contained inadmissible hearsay. To the extent that the court below ruled that the CAD report was offered for a non-hearsay purpose, appellant argues that its probative value was substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice.
The State concedes that appellant's second-degree...
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