Hallum v. Hallum
| Decision Date | 02 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | NO. 01-09-00095-CV,01-09-00095-CV |
| Parties | LINDA LUCILE HALLUM, Appellant v. LLOYD THOMAS HALLUM, Appellee |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
On Appeal from the 312th Judicial District Court
Harris County, Texas
Appellant, Linda Lucile Hallum, appeals from the trial court's judgment ordering a final decree of divorce from appellee, Lloyd Thomas Hallum. In four issues, Linda contends that the trial court erred in quashing appellant's subpoena, in characterizing certain properties as Lloyd's separate property, and in dividingthe property of the marital estate. We hold that the trial court properly quashed appellant's subpoena and properly characterized the properties in question as Lloyd's separate property. We also hold that, in the absence of findings of fact, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the estate. Accordingly, we affirm.
Linda and Lloyd married on March 1, 1970, and separated on October 12, 2004. Nine days after separating, Linda filed her original petition for divorce from Lloyd. The 312th Judicial District Court held two bench trials in the divorce proceeding. The first trial took place in June 2007, and the second took place in May 2008.
On August 20, 2003, while Linda and Lloyd were still together, Jack Burns executed three deeds purporting to convey to Lloyd certain undivided, fractional interests in real property located in the Houston Heights subdivision (herein the "Heights Properties"). At the time of the first trial, the total appraisal value of the fractional interests was approximately $440,000. Each deed states:
[The grantors,] in consideration of the execution of the trust hereinabove mentioned, and in further consideration of the sum of Ten Dollars ($10.00) to them in hand paid by the said LLOYD T. HALLUM, and other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, have sold, granted, and conveyed, and by these presents do hereby sell, grant and convey unto the said LLOYD T. HALLUM, all of the undivided...
Nowhere in the three deeds does it expressly state that the conveyance was a gift or that the stated consideration was to be paid out of Lloyd's separate property.
In June 2007, the trial court conducted the first trial, determining that the Heights Properties were Lloyd's separate property. During that trial, the following was adduced. Lloyd became Mr. Burns' stepson when Mr. Burns married Lloyd's mother. After Lloyd's mother died, Mr. Burns continued to be a father figure to Lloyd. In April 2004, Mr. Burns was in the hospital dying when he delivered the three deeds to Lloyd. Lloyd testified that Mr. Burns was aware Lloyd and Linda had marital trouble and that Mr. Burns did not intend Linda to have any interest in the Heights Properties.
Lasca Burns, who was Mr. Burns's wife at the time of the conveyance, testified that Mr. Burns loved Lloyd "very, very much" and that he first introduced Lloyd to her "as his son." Mrs. Burns testified that she was present when Mr. Burns instructed his lawyer to prepare the deeds and that Mr. Burns said to his lawyer, "I want my son Lloyd Hallum to have these lots as separate property." According to Mrs. Burns, Mr. Burns prepared and filed an IRS gift tax return for the Heights Properties. Although she had never seen the gift tax return, she claimed that her then-husband signed it and gave it to her to mail. When asked if she brought the form, she testified that she could not find a copy of it. Before trial, Linda had served upon Mrs. Burns a subpoena duces tecum requesting her to bringto court a copy of the purported IRS gift tax return showing that gift taxes were paid on the transfer of the Heights Properties. Mrs. Burns filed a motion to quash the subpoena, which was granted by the trial court.
Before trial, the court entered three temporary spousal support orders and, at a subsequent hearing, ordered a fourth support obligation. The first order directed Lloyd to pay $3,500 per month from November 15, 2004, through June 2006, totaling $68,250 over nineteen months and two weeks. The second order directed Lloyd to pay $5,984 per month from July 1, 2006, through December 2006, totaling $35,904 over six months. The third order directed Lloyd to pay $3,942 per month from January 1, 2007, through March 2007, totaling $11,826 over three months. Although there was no fourth written order, at a subsequent hearing, the temporary support obligation was again modified, directing Lloyd to pay $2,425 per month starting on April 1, 2007.
In May 2008, the trial court conducted the second trial to determine all other issues. The court announced its findings in June 2008, which were reduced to writing when the court signed the Final Divorce Decree in November 2008. In February 2009, the trial court denied Linda's motion for new trial and signed the amended divorce decree. The trial court found that Linda had the use and benefit of $385,000 in community assets since the separation and that Lloyd had made allsupport payments that he was ordered to pay through the trial court's temporary orders.
In her first, third, and fourth issues, Linda contends that the trial court abused its discretion in dividing the property of the martial estate because the evidence was insufficient to support its findings.
An appellate court must reverse and remand the entire estate for a new division of property if the trial court committed reversible error that materially affects the trial court's "just and right" division of the marital estate. See Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. 1985). An appellate court will reverse a trial court's "just and right" division only if the complaining party shows that the trial court clearly abused its discretion. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981); Hailey v. Hailey, 176 S.W.3d 374, 380 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). A trial court abuses its discretion if acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, without reference to any guiding rules and principles, or without sufficient supporting evidence. Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985); Raymond v. Raymond, 190 S.W.3d 77, 83 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Hailey, 176 S.W.3d at 380. An appellate court presumes that the trial courtproperly exercised its discretion. Murff, 615 S.W.2d at 699.
Under the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the order and indulges every presumption in favor of the trial court's order. See Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839-40 (Tex. 1992); Holley v. Holley, 864 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). An appellate court draws every reasonable inference supported by the record in favor of the trial court's judgment. Gainous v. Gainous, 219 S.W.3d 97, 103 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. denied). In an appeal from a bench trial, an appellate court reviews de novo a trial court's conclusions of law and will uphold them on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. BMC Software Belgium v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); Hailey, 176 S.W.3d at 383. In the absence of findings of fact or conclusions of law, an appellate court must presume that the trial court made all the findings necessary to support its judgment. Boyd v. Boyd, 131 S.W.3d 605, 611 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, no pet.) (citing Pharo v. Chambers County, 922 S.W.2d 945, 948 (Tex. 1996)).
When the appellate record includes the reporter's record, the trial court's factual findings, whether express or implied, are not conclusive and may be challenged for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting them. See Middleton v. Kawasaki Steel Corp., 687 S.W.2d 42, 44 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1985), writ refused n.r.e., 699 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. 1985); Tucker v. Tucker, 908 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied). Legal and factual insufficiency are not independent grounds of error but rather are relevant factors in an appellate court's assessment of whether the trial court abused its discretion. Zeifman v. Michels, 212 S.W.3d 582, 587 (Tex. App.—Austin 2006, pet. denied). That is, to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial court's decision, an appellate court engages in a two-pronged inquiry, determining whether (1) the district court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion, and (2) the district court erred in its application of that discretion. Id. at 588.
To determine whether there is legally sufficient evidence to support a finding, an appellate court considers only the evidence and inferences that support the finding and disregards all evidence and inferences that support the contrary. Sherman v. First Nat'l Bank, 760 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. 1988); Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 80. If there is any evidence to support the finding, an appellate court must uphold the finding. Sherman, 760 S.W.2d at 242; Raymond, 190 S.W.3d at 80. Evidence is legally insufficient (1) when there is a complete absence of a vital fact; (2) when rules of law or evidence preclude according weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) when the evidence offered to prove avital fact is no more than a scintilla; or (4) when the evidence conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810, 815-16 (Tex. 2005). In determining the legal sufficiency of the evidence, an appellate court must consider evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable fact finder could and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable fact finder could not. Id. at 827. An...
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