Halmon v. Jones Lang Wootton Usa

• Decision Date: 13 January 2005
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A.02-0046(RMU).,CIV.A.02-0046(RMU).
• Citation: 355 F.Supp.2d 239
• Parties: Angela D. HALMON, Plaintiff, v. JONES LANG WOOTTON USA et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

355 F.Supp.2d 239

Angela D. HALMON, Plaintiff, v. JONES LANG WOOTTON USA et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A.02-0046(RMU).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

January 13, 2005.

Charles Clinton Parsons, Charles C. Parsons & Associates, Chartered, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.

Mary Malloy Dimaio, Law Offices of Maher & Associates, Towson, MD, Edward J. Lopata, Scott Anthony Thomas, Tydings & Rosenberg LLP, Baltimore, MD, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

DENYING INTERSTATE CLEANING CORPORATION'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGEMENT;

DENYING JONES LANG WOOTTON USA's MOTIONS FOR LEAVE TO LATE FILE; AND DISMISSING AS MOOT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO STRIKE

URBINA, District Judge.

I. INTRODUCTION

This matter comes before the court on Interstate Cleaning Corporation's ("ICC") renewed motion for partial summary judgment, Jones Lang Wootton USA's ("JLW") motions for leave to late file, and the plaintiff's motion to strike JLW's proposed late filings. The plaintiff, Angela Halmon, slipped, fell and hurt herself in Union Station and now seeks $20 million in compensatory and punitive damages. She brings suit against JLW, a partnership that manages Union Station, and ICC, a corporation under contract to JLW to provide cleaning services at Union Station, claiming that ICC negligently maintained the premises and that JLW is vicariously liable for ICC's negligence.

On March 30, 2004, this court granted in part JLW's motion for summary judgment but expressly left open the possibility that JLW could be vicariously liable for ICC's alleged negligence. The court also struck ICC's motion for summary judgment as unclear and set a new briefing schedule for all parties regarding ICC's and JLW's liability. Because the plaintiff and ICC adhered to that schedule and JLW did not, the court deems JLW to have conceded that it can be found vicariously liable for ICC's alleged negligence. Because ICC improperly bases its motion for partial summary judgment on the Missouri Property and Casualty Insurance Guaranty Association ("MIGA") Act, MO. STAT. ANN §§ 375.771 et seq., the court denies ICC's motion.

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Background

In May 1999, the plaintiff was visiting the food court on the lower level of Union Station when she slipped and fell on a section of the marble floor that an ICC employee recently mopped. Mem. Op. (Mar. 30, 2004) at 2. As a result of her fall, the plaintiff states that she suffered multiple injuries to her right leg and hip and incurred significant medical bills. Id. At the time of the plaintiff's fall, ICC was under contract to JLW to provide cleaning services at Union Station. Id.

ICC is registered as a Missouri corporation and has its principal place of business in that state. ICC Statement of Material Facts ("ICC Statement") ¶ 4. When the incident occurred, Reliance Insurance Company ("Reliance") insured ICC against claims such as the ones presented in this case. Id. An endorsement in ICC's Reliance policy states that if Reliance becomes insolvent, MIGA will pay "covered" claims against ICC. See id. ¶ 7. On October 3, 2001, a Pennsylvania state court declared Reliance insolvent and entered an Order of Liquidation. Id.

B. Procedural History

The plaintiff filed her complaint in January 2002, following up six weeks later with an amended complaint. In April 2002, both ICC and JLW filed answers. JLW also filed a crossclaim against ICC for indemnification and contribution. In May 2002, ICC filed an answer to JLW's cross-claim. In June 2003, after discovery closed, ICC filed a motion for partial summary judgment on the plaintiff's claim and JLW's cross-claim. In July 2003, JLW filed a motion for summary judgment.

In its March 2004 opinion, this court granted in part JLW's motion for summary judgment, holding that ICC and JLW had a contractee-contractor relationship, but that neither the plaintiff nor JLW provided sufficient information for the court to determine whether the inherent-danger or peculiar-risk doctrines should apply.¹ The court struck ICC's motion for partial summary judgment, holding that ICC failed to provide sufficient information for the court to render a judgment. Furthermore, the court set a revised briefing schedule for both parties. The court ordered that:

The plaintiff may submit a supplemental memorandum of no more than 10 double-spaced pages on the applicability of the inherent-danger and peculiar-risk doctrines, including whether the court may determine the doctrines' application on summary judgment, by April 22, 2004. In response, JLW may file a supplemental memorandum of no more than 10 double-spaced pages by May 20, 2004.

Order (Mar. 30, 2004) at 1. As to ICC, the court ordered that:

ICC may resubmit a motion by April 22, 2004 that clearly explains the basis for applying Missouri law and sets forth arguments citing to supporting legal authority interpreting Missouri law. Any response filed by the plaintiff or JLW likewise must cite to supporting legal authority.

Id.

The plaintiff complied with the above deadlines and submitted a supplemental memorandum on April 21, 2004. ICC also complied with the above deadlines and submitted a motion for summary judgment on April 22, 2004 (to which the plaintiff and ICC filed a timely opposition and reply, respectively). Nearly six months after the April 2004 deadlines, JLW arose from its slumber and moved to late file a response to the plaintiff's supplemental memorandum and an opposition to ICC's motion for partial summary judgment. As justification for its delay, JLW offered what the court cannot help but characterize as the lame excuse that counsel "did not place the due date on her calendar." JLW's Mot. for Leave to File Supp. Mem. ¶ 4; JLW's Mot. for Leave to File Opp'n ¶ 4; cf. Fox v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 389 F.3d 1291, 1294 (D.C.Cir.2004) (noting that reference to email malfunction is no better than "the classic `my dog ate my homework' line" and "plainly unacceptable"). Unhappy with JLW's "dump truck load of [late] documents," the plaintiff promptly moved to strike JLW's late filing. Pl.'s Mot. to Strike at 2. Unhappy with the plaintiff's "poor form," JLW submitted a rather acrimonious opposition to the motion to strike. JLW's Opp'n to Pl.'s Mot. to Strike. Meanwhile, ICC jumped in the fray with its own opposition to JLW's late-filings. ICC Opp'n.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Diamond v. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540 (D.C.Cir.1995). To determine which facts are "material," a court must look to the substantive law on which each claim rests. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A "genuine issue" is one whose resolution could establish an element of a claim or defense and, therefore, affect the outcome of the action. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must draw all justifiable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor and accept the nonmoving party's evidence as true. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505. A nonmoving party, however, must establish more than "the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence" in support of its position. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505. To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show that the nonmoving party "fail[ed] to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. By pointing to the absence of evidence proffered by the nonmoving party, a moving party may succeed on summary judgment. Id.

In addition, the nonmoving party may not rely solely on allegations or conclusory statements. Greene v. Dalton, 164 F.3d 671, 675 (D.C.Cir.1999); Harding v. Gray, 9 F.3d 150, 154 (D.C.Cir.1993). Rather, the nonmoving party must present specific facts that would enable a reasonable jury to find in its favor. Greene, 164 F.3d at 675. If the evidence "is merely colorable or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (internal citations omitted).

B. The Court Denies ICC's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

As indicated above, ICC's insurance policy with Reliance stated that if Reliance became insolvent, MIGA would pay certain claims against ICC. Created to minimize the impact of insolvent insurers on innocent insureds and the public, MIGA is a non-profit unincorporated legal entity the membership of which consists of insurers transacting certain types of insurance business within Missouri. Alvey, Inc. v. Mo. Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 922 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Mo.Ct.App.1996); Williams v. Mo. Prop. & Cas. Guar. Ass'n, 904 S.W.2d 10, 11-12 (Mo.Ct.App.1995); Garrett v. Overland Garage & Parts, Inc., 882 S.W.2d 188, 193 (Mo.Ct.App.1994). Specifically, MIGA protects "policy-holders and beneficiaries [by] pay[ing] benefits and provid[ing] coverage, with limitations, to those whose insurance companies become insolvent." Williams, 904 S.W.2d at 12 (internal citations and quotations omitted).

In its renewed motion for partial summary judgment, ICC argues that the MIGA Act, Mo. Stat. Ann. §§ 375.771 et seq., limits the ability of both the plaintiff and JLW to recover against ICC. ICC Mot. for Partial Summ. J. ("ICC Mot.") at 1. First, ICC claims that the MIGA Act forbids the plaintiff from collecting any damages until she has exhausted her right to recovery under the other insurance policies. Id. at...