Halsa v. Halsa

• Decision Date: 31 July 1843
• Citation: 8 Mo. 303
• Parties: HALSA v. HALSA.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

8 Mo. 303

HALSA

v.HALSA.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

July Term, 1843.

APPEAL FROM THE CHARITON CIRCUIT COURT.

JO. DAVIS, for Appellants. Only two points are presented by the facts in this case: 1. Whether the removal of complainant from Livingston to Chariton county, upon the proposition of his father, that he would give him the land, form a valuable consideration, which, together with the meritorious consideration of blood between father and son, is sufficient in equity to entitle the son to a decree of title, as against his father, upon the assignment of the duplicate. As to this point, see Littell's Select Cases, 22, 30, 77; 2 Story's Equity, 250; Pulvertoft v. Pulvertoft, 18 Vesey, 99; Bunn v. Winthrop, 1 Johns. C. R. 336-7. 2. Whether the assignment of the duplicate to complainant, and his actual possession of and cultivation of the land, in pursuance of such assignment, was sufficient to put Hart and Parks on inquiry as to the ownership on the land at the time they respectively purchased. As to this point, see Bartlett v. Glasscock, 4 Mo. R. 67; Knox v. Thompson, 1 Littell, 350; Barbour v. Whitlock, 4 Monroe, 196; 1 Story on Equity, 389.

In relation to the first point--it is insisted for complainant, that a gift by a father to a son is not treated as other voluntary acts, where no relation exists. Blood is considered as a meritorious consideration in equity. See the cases above referred to in Vesey and in Johns. C. R. But in addition to this, here is a valuable consideration--the removal from Livingston to Chariton county. See Allison v. Congleton, Littell's Select Cases, 30, where the removal of a son-in-law was held a valid consideration. See, also, Pauling v. Speed, in same book, p. 77, where blood was held a sufficient consideration for the assignment of a title-bond for land. See, also, the case in same book, p. 22, of Leforce v. Robinson.

In relation to the second point--there is an abundance of evidence in the record to show that both Hart and Parks had notice of the claim of complainant to the land, at the times they respectively purchased. Finnel proves that Hart told him, that the old man Halsa was about to get five or six acres of the land from Amos for him, Hart, to cultivate; there is also proof that he lived one mile from complainant for several years before he purchased, and that all the while complainant was cultivating this land. Littleton and Finnel both prove that Parks knew of the assignment of the duplicate to Amos by his father.

CLARKE, for Appellee. The points made and relied on by the appellee, to sustain the judgment of the Circuit Court, are: 1st. That the promise made, if at all, by the appellee, was a voluntary promise, without any valuable consideration, to be executed in future, and cannot be enforced. 6 Vesey, 606; 3 Marsh, 445; 5 Monroe, 408. 2nd. That if there was such an assignment made as is alleged in the bill, it was but verbal, and cannot therefore be enforced. 1 Bibb, 203; 4 Bibb, 59; 3 Randolph, 238; 1 Sugden on Vendors, 130, 203, 189, 198, 190, 313-15. 3rd. That, admitting the agreement made by the appellee with the appellant was binding as between them, yet a third party, who purchased without notice of complainant's claim, and the nature of it, cannot be affected by it. 1 Story's Equity, 75, 119, 120, 398, note, and the authorities there cited.

SCOTT, J.

This is a bill in chancery, filed by the appellant, complainant, against the defendants, appellees, in which it is represented that the complainant, in December, 1837, was residing in Livingston county, as now formed, in this State; that at the same time the defendant, Halsa, his father, resided in Chariton county, in the possession of a considerable estate; that the complainant had just married, and was poor, and received about this time a proposal from his father, expressing his willingness to give him a tract of land near his residence if he would return; that he accepted the proposal, and in March, 1835, returned to his father, who, in compliance with his promise, put the complainant in possession of the tract of land, containing eighty acres, now in dispute, and assigned to him a certificate of entry, which was the evidence of the purchase of the land by his father from the United States. This occurred about the middle of April, 1835. The assignment of the certificate is in these words: “I, Joseph Halsa, do sine the within certificate over to Amos Halsa, which is to empower him to lift the deed in his own name. April 18, 1835. JOSEPH HALSA.”

The certificate was delivered to the complainant, and he has retained it ever since; and he has since that time been in possession of the land, part of which has been cultivated by him. It was the belief, both of the complainant and his father, that the assignment of the certificate would enable the complainant to receive a patent for the land in his own name; that he accordingly applied for a patent, but was informed that it would issue in his father's name. He then applied to his father for a deed in January, 1836, but he declined making one; and in January, 1841, conveyed the land to Caleb Hart. It is charged that Hart purchased with notice, and on being informed of the claim of the complainant to the land, he said he would risk it; that he well knew the complainant was in possession of the land, and cultivated part of the same. Hart, in four days after he purchased, conveyed to Peterson Parks. It is charged, that Parks had notice of the claim of the complainant, and was well apprized that he was in possession of the land, and that he cultivated a part of the same. The bill prays that the title to the land may be decreed to the complainant.

Joseph Halsa admits, in his answer, that in 1834, his son, the complainant, was residing in what is now known as Livingston county; that his son had just married and commenced the world, and was poor; he denies that he made a proposition to his son, that if he would return to Chariton he would give him a tract of land; but admits that being desirous to promote his welfare, he informed him that if he would return he would assist him to purchase some land, and assist him in other respects, as much as he could, in justice to his other children. He admits his son returned to Chariton at the time stated in the bill. At his return, he directed his son to settle on the land in controversy, letting him know, at the same time, that if he conducted himself in such a manner as to merit his approbation, he might finally give him the land. Upon this, his son went upon the land, and with his assistance, made a small improvement upon it. He admits he made the assignment of the certificate mentioned in the bill, but denies it was thereby intended to convey him any right. The object in making the assignment was, to enable the son to obtain the patent, who was then about to go to the land-office, it being the opinion of them both, that without some written authority the officer would not deliver the patent to any other person than him who entered the land; that shortly after this he became offended with his son, ordered him from the land, letting him know at the same time he would not convey it to him, and demanded the certificate; that his son demanded a deed, which he refused to give him. His son then left the land, and did not return to it for some time; his son afterwards offered to purchase the land; the respondent refused to sell; that his son never pretended to claim the land under and by virtue of the assignment of the certificate, until a short time since; that his son has acknowledged that he had no claim to the land.

Hart denies that he purchased with notice of the complainant's claim; that he never heard that the complainant claimed the land before he purchased, and at that time he had no notice of the complainant's right, and maintains that he is an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice of any conflicting claims.

Parks does not deny but that he purchased with notice of the claim of the complainant. It was proved, on the hearing, that the defendant, Joseph Halsa, acknowledged to one witness that he had assigned the certificate to his son. By another, it was proved that he had said he had given to his son the land in dispute, and other property, in consideration of his son moving from Livingston and settling in his neighborhood. Another witness testified, that the defendant, Joseph Halsa, told him that he had given, or would give, the land to his son, and for that reason refused to sell it to the witness; that the complainant went upon the land in the year 1835, and improved it by building a cabin and clearing from six to ten acres, which before was wild and without improvement, and during that year raised a crop of tobacco, and built a tobacco barn partly on the land. The complainant raised another crop of tobacco, and the year afterwards removed his cabin from the land, and put it on an adjoining tract. In 1837 complainant hired himself out to labor, and did not cultivate the land, which was done by some of the children of the defendant, Joseph Halsa. In the fall of 1837 the complainant went to Florida, and returned in the winter, and went on the land, where he has since resided. Witness also testified, that both the defendants, Hart and Parks, lived in the neighborhood of the complainant, Hart within one mile, since...