Halsey v. Minnesota-South Carolina Land & Timber Co.

• Decision Date: 06 October 1931
• Docket Number: 13252.
• Citation: 160 S.E. 843,162 S.C. 281
• Parties: HALSEY v. MINNESOTA-SOUTH CAROLINA LAND & TIMBER CO. et al.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

160 S.E. 843

162 S.C. 281

HALSEY v. MINNESOTA-SOUTH CAROLINA LAND & TIMBER CO. et al.

No. 13252.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

October 6, 1931

Appeal from Common Pleas Circuit Court of Charleston County; M. M Mann, Judge.

Action by Alfred O. Halsey against the Minnesota-South Carolina Land & Timber Company and another. From a judgment against him, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded for new trial.

Mitchell & Horlbeck, H. L. Erckmann, and J. C. Long, all of Charleston, for appellant.

Legare Walker, of Summerville, Lide & McCandlish, of Marion, and Thos. P. Stoney, and J. D. E. Meyer, both of Charleston, for respondents.

COTHRAN J.

This is an action for damages in the sum of $79,490 ($64,490 actual damages and $15,000 punitive damages), sustained by the plaintiff by reason of certain false representations as to the amount of timber on certain tracts in Orangeburg county. The plaintiff alleges that in December, 1923, the defendants represented to him that there were 19,000,000 feet of timber upon the two tracts, and that the agreed price was based on this representation, which was falsely and fraudulently made that it developed that there were only 12,652,194 feet of timber, including culls and defective wood, about 10,000,000 feet of first-class merchantable timber.

The plaintiff offered evidence to sustain the allegations of his complaint and that the cutting was done in a proper manner the defendants offered evidence tending to show that the quantity of represented timber was there when sold, but that it had been wasted and carelessly cut; the plaintiff offered evidence to disprove this, but was not allowed to do so; the plaintiff put up no testimony in reply, and, upon motion of the defendants, his honor directed a verdict in their favor.

The presiding judge was technically right in holding that after the plaintiff had gone into evidence tending to show that the timber was properly cut, and was followed by evidence on the part of the defendants to the contrary, the plaintiff having gone into the subject should not be allowed to offer evidence in reply; but, in directing a verdict for the defendants, he appears to have assumed the truth of the evidence offered by the defendants that the timber had been improperly cut.

We think that the manner in which the timber was cut was an important issue in the case which should have been submitted to the jury, and that it was error on the...