Halstead v. Halstead

Decision Date20 September 1966
Docket NumberNo. 52129,52129
Citation259 Iowa 526,144 N.W.2d 861
PartiesPhillip Walter HALSTEAD, a minor, by Katie Halstead Lee, his natural Guardian and next friend, Appellee, v. Walter HALSTEAD and Martha Halstead, Appellants.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Wayne Kemmerer, Oelwein, for appellants.

Darold J. Jack, Oelwein, for appellee.

RAWLINGS, Justice.

By habeas corpus proceedings plaintiff mother sought custody of her then 12 year old son who had for ten years resided with defendants, his paternal grandparents. From decree by the trial court adverse to defendants they appealed. Each case of this nature must be determined according to the circumstances peculiar to it alone.

Katie Halstead Lee, hereafter sometimes referred to as petitioner, dropped out of school while in the tenth grade. About six months later, at 16, she married James Welford McGowan. A son James was born as issue of that marriage which was terminated in 1951 by a divorce granted the husband. Petitioner was accorded custody of the son James, but since the first few years of his life he has not lived with her.

April 5, 1952, petitioner married James Frank Halstead, son of these respondents. About four months later she gave birth to a daughter, Theresa Gail, hereafter sometimes referred to as Terry.

August 4, 1953, Phillip Walter Halstead the subject child was born, he being hereafter sometimes referred to as Phillip.

April 5, 1958, James Halstead, father of Phillip, obtained a divorce from petitioner. Pursuant to the terms of a stipulation custody of the son was granted the father, the mother being given custody of the daughter.

Then in July 1958, petitioner married Eugene Lee, her present husband, who resided in Texas. He has been previously married and from that union twin daughters were born. The mother was accorded custody of the two girls when that marriage ended in divorce. He is required to pay $90 a month for support of these children. They spend every other week end in the present Lee home.

At time of hearing of the case now before us petitioner was pregnant by her present husband.

Terry and Phillip were first left with respondents, their paternal grandparents in June 1954, but about two or three months later petitioner came and took them away.

Sometime in September 1955, these two children were returned to the home of respondents by petitioner but she immediately left taking Terry and Phillip with her. That same evening she called respondents from Cedar Rapids and asked them to come get the children. They complied.

Then in December 1955, petitioner again removed the two children from respondents' home but the next month returned and once more placed Terry and Phillip with them. There the children remained until after entry of the aforesaid Halstead divorce decree on April 6, 1958. At that time petitioner took Terry leaving Phillip with his grandparents. There he has since remained.

From 1958 to time of trial petitioner and Terry were visitors in the home of respondents four and possibly six times, but only a few days on each occasion. Over a period of ten years Phillip had neither seen nor been with his mother except for these limited visitations. Petitioner has sent him Christmas and birthday gifts. She has also written irregularly, but not as often as promised and this has in turn been disturbing to the boy.

Phillip's father, James, a career Navy man, married Rachel Halstead sometime after obtaining the divorce from petitioner. Apparently no children were born to that union. At time of his death on May 7, 1965, they were living in California. Rachel, a registered nurse, still lives there. The subject custody action was commenced June 22, 1965.

These respondents have unquestionably cared for and guided Phillip through his childhood physical difficulties and emotional problems. Throughout the trying periods of infancy they most satisfactorily provided his educational and religious training. With respondents he has always been happy, neat, adequately clothed, well behaved, a normal active boy, well regarded in the community, likes to fish, goes with the grandfather on fishing trips, belongs to a community Little League baseball team, and the grandfather plays catch with him. His attendance in school and Sunday School has been as near perfect as possible and his grades in school are average or better. He possesses a bicycle, remote control gas powered toy airplane, baseball, bat and glove, a dog, and has his own bedroom.

The testimony of Geraldine Weaver, Sunday School teacher, discloses respondents do not use intoxicating beverages, and no deficiencies on the part of respondents in the performance of their parental duties toward Phillip.

Another independent witness, Arthur J. Fink, public school teacher and principal, testified to the same effect. He also said his observations disclosed no reason to be concerned about the parental adequacy of respondents in the next ten years. Also that Phillip is well adjusted and happy in his surroundings.

At time of trial the grandfather was 64, the grandmother 60. The grandfather was injured in 1963. His monthly income has been $60 from social security and he earns about $50. The government will continue to pay at least $77 a month for Phillip's care because of the father's Korean War service, which, at time of trial, was expected to be increased to about.$99. This alone would produce about $209 each month for respondents.

Prior to his death the home in Oran was owned by Phillip's father but now belongs to his widow. Rachel Halstead, Phillip's stepmother, is ready, willing and financially able to assist in his support by payment of $100 a month to respondents and will place title to the home occupied by them, which she now owns, in her name and Phillip's with right of survivorship.

While petitioner worked the Lees had a combined gross income of about $970 each month, with fixed monthly obligations in the total sum of approximately $333, leaving them about $637 before taxes. However, Mr. Lee alone has had a gross monthly income of about $713, leaving him a net of about $380 before taxes. He does not know the boy too well, thinks they can adjust to each other, but has not had much time for fishing, and has no other recreational equipment of any kind.

Petitioner's sister Mary Harrington, and her husband Clayton, who live near the Lees, said they and the Lees were churchgoing, nondrinking, hardworking people and the general reputation of the Lees as to morals and financial stability was very good.

Petitioner now resides in Nome, Texas, and respondents have at all times here concerned lived in Oran, Iowa.

The Lee home is modern, with three bedrooms, and in very good condition.

The Halstead home has a living room, dining room, kitchen and two bedrooms. It could use some repairs but has been and is serving its purpose very satisfactorily.

Phillip says he would like it better if his sister lived in Oran, he has not seen much of his mother, would hate to go with her and prefers to remain in the home of his grandparents, this being the only home he has ever known.

I. This being a habeas corpus action involving custody of a child, it is reviewable de novo. We give weight to the findings of the trial court but are not bound by them. Childers v. Childres, 257 Iowa 1132, 136 N.W.2d 268, 272, and Carrere v. Prunty, 257 Iowa 525, 133 N.W.2d 692, 695.

II. Our Rule 344(f)(15), R.C.P., provides: 'In child custody cases the first and governing consideration of the courts must be the best interest of the child.' Alingh v. Alingh, Iowa, 144 N.W.2d 134. Over a long period of time this court has repeatedly adhered to that maxim with seldom, if ever, an exception.

Furthermore we have consistently taken the position it is highly desirable the status of a child be fixed as quickly as possible, be thereafter disturbed as little as possible, and then only for the most cogent reasons.

Also, if the person having lawful care of a child at the time its custody is sought to be changed has properly provided and supervised its social, moral and educational needs for a substantial period of time, and the child has become attached to the environment and the people who have made possible the happiness, security and comfort of its early years, a court is not justified in transferring that custody to another except for the most cogent reasons. See Kouris v. Lunn, 257 Iowa 1267, 136 N.W.2d 502, 506; Thein v. Squires, 250 Iowa 1149, 1158, 97 N.W.2d 156; Durst v. Roach, 245 Iowa 342, 346, 62 [259 Iowa 532] N.W.2d 159; Wiggins v. Wiggins, 239 Iowa 1279, 1297, 34 N.W.2d 607; and Jensen v. Sorenson, 211 Iowa 354, 364, 233 N.W. 717.

Moreover these views appear to be in accord with the philosophy of social interests predominant in the twentieth century, and there is no apparent plausible reason to now abandon them. See 39 N.Y.L.Rev. 423, and 57 Harv.L.Rev. 1.

A few of the many other cases which have come before this court where we held in accord with the foregoing principles or the equivalent are as follows: Painter v. Bannister, Iowa, 140 N.W.2d 152; Vanden Heuvel v. Vanden Heuvel, 254 Iowa 1391, 121 N.W.2d 216; Wendel v. Wendel, 252 Iowa 1122, 1125, 109 N.W.2d 432; McKay v. Ruffcorn, 247 Iowa 195, 73 N.W.2d 78; Joiner v. Knieriem, 243 Iowa 470, 52 N.W.2d 21; Pelton v. Halverson, 240 Iowa 184, 35 N.W.2d 759; Herr v. Lazor, 238 Iowa 518, 28 N.W.2d 11; Paulson v. Windelow, 236 Iowa 1011, 20 N.W.2d 470; Ellison v. Platts, 226 Iowa 1211, 286 N.W. 413; Werling v. Heggen, 208 Iowa 908, 225 N.W. 952; Barry v. Reeves, 203 Iowa 1345, 214 N.W. 519; Knochemus v. King, 193 Iowa 1282, 188 N.W. 957; and Drumb v. Keen, 47 Iowa 435.

III. This child oriented best interest concept is neither new, novel nor uncommon in the field of jurisprudence. In fact the courts of many other states employ the same or similar approach when confronted with conflicting child custody claims as exemplified by the following decisions: Armstrong v....

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  • Clausen, In re
    • United States
    • Michigan Supreme Court
    • July 8, 1993
    ...arguments to the effect that even under Iowa law, a best interests hearing was required, citing several cases, Halstead v. Halstead, 259 Iowa 526, 144 N.W.2d 861 (1966); Painter v. Bannister, 258 Iowa 1390, 140 N.W.2d 152 (1966), and statutes, Iowa Code Ann. §§ 600.1, 600.13(1)(c) (Adoption......
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    ...for the child's best interest. Although we are not bound by the findings of the trial court we give them weight. Halstead v. Halstead, 259 Iowa 526, 531, 144 N.W.2d 861, 864. We agree with the trial court that the appellees have established by a preponderance of the evidence that the best i......
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