Haluptzok v. Great Northern Railway Co
| Decision Date | 07 December 1893 |
| Docket Number | 8424 |
| Citation | 57 N.W. 144,55 Minn. 446 |
| Parties | John Haluptzok v. Great Northern Railway Co |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Argued November 28, 1893.
Appeal by defendant, Great Northern Railway Company, from an order of the District Court of Wright County, Thomas Canty, J made April 15, 1893, denying its motion for a new trial.
On the afternoon of July 18, 1892, Alfonzo Haluptzok, eight year old, son of plaintiff, John Haluptzok, was on the platform of the railway depot of defendant in Waverly in Wright County. While there his left foot was seriously injured by being run over by one of the wheels of a baggage truck loaded with freight. The truck was at the time being handled by James O'Connel, a young man learning telegraphy there, under the circumstances stated in the opinion.
The father brought this action in behalf of his son, as provided by 1878 G. S. ch. 66, § 34, and obtained a verdict for $ 300. Defendant moved for a new trial. Being denied, it appeals.
Order affirmed.
W. E Dodge and Wendell & Pidgeon, for appellant.
The only question presented by this record is, whether or not there was any evidence tending to establish the relation of master and servant between the defendant and James O'Connell. Wood, Master and Serv. § 309; Patterson Railway Accidents, § 103; Kimball v. Cushman, 103 Mass. 194; Norris v. Kohler, 41 N.Y. 42; Jewell v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 55 N.H. 84.
Wm. E Culkin and J. T. Alley, for respondent, cited Wood, Master and Serv. § 306; McCoun v. New York C. & H. R. R. Co., 66 Barb. 338; Karsen v. Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co., 29 Minn. 12; Hoffman v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 43 Minn. 334; Wilson v. Northern Pac. R. Co., 43 Minn. 519; Nichols v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 36 Minn. 452; Althorf v. Wolfe, 22 N.Y. 355; Booth v. Mister, 7 Car. & P. 66; Randleson v. Murray, 8 Ad. & E. 109.
The plaintiff brought this action to recover for personal injuries to his infant child, caused by the negligence of the alleged servant of the defendant. 1878 G. S. ch. 66, § 34.
The injuries were inflicted by one O'Connell, and the only question presented by this appeal is whether O'Connell was defendant's servant. The evidence, in which there is no material conflict, is substantially as follows: The defendant maintained a public depot and freight and passenger station at the village of Waverly. The premises were owned and controlled by the defendant, but the Great Northern Express Company and the Western Union Telegaph Company had their offices in the same building, one Westinghouse being the common agent for all three companies. Westinghouse had exclusive charge of all of defendant's business at the station. He testified that he had no authority to employ any assistants, such authority being exclusively vested in the general officers of the company; and, as respects express authority, this testimony is not contradicted. For a year or more before the injury complained of, Westinghouse had permitted a young man named Foutch to use and practice on the instruments in the office, for the purpose of learning telegraphy; and during that time Foutch had been in the habit, as occasion required, of assisting Westinghouse in the performance of his railway duties, such as selling tickets, handling freight, putting out switch lights, etc. He had no contract with the railway company, and received no wages; the work he did evidently being in return for the privilege of the office, and the use of the instruments, in learning telegraphy. There is no evidence that the general officers of the defendant knew of or assented to Foutch's performing this work, except the length of time it had continued, and the absence of any testimony that they ever objected. About ten days before the accident, Westinghouse, with the permission of the Western Union Telegraph Company, gave O'Connell the privilege of the office, and the use of the instruments, for the purpose of learning telegraphy, evidently under substantially the same arrangement by which he had previously given Foutch similar privileges. O'Connell had no contract with the defendant, and received no wages. The time between his coming into the office and the date of the accident was so brief that the evidence is very meager as to his doing railroad work about the station during that time, but there was evidence tending to show that he had on several occasions, with the knowledge and consent of Westinghouse, handled freight. On the day in question, he went to work, with a truck, to move some goods from the station platform into a freight room. Foutch assisted him by piling up the goods in the room while O'Connell carried them in. While thus handling the truck, O'Connell ran it against plaintiff's child, who was walking around the depot, and inflicted the injury complained of. There is no evidence that at or prior to the accident the general officers of the defendant knew that O'Connell was employed about the station. But both Foutch and O'Connell, after the accident, continued at the depot, practicing telegraphy, and assisting Westinghouse, as before, in selling tickets, handling freight, etc., and were still doing so at the date of the trial, which was five months after the accident and over four months after the commencement of this action; and, while there is no direct evidence that this was with the knowledge of the general officers of the defendant, there is no evidence that they did not know of it, and none that they ever objected to it. Such we believe to be a fair and full statement of the effect of the evidence.
Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, a master, however careful in the selection of his servants, is responsible to strangers for their negligence committed in the course of their employment. The doctrine is at best somewhat severe and, if a man is to be held liable for the acts of his servants, he certainly should have the exclusive right to determine who they shall be. Hence, we think, in every well-considered case where a person has been held liable, under the doctrine referred to, for the negligence of another, that other was engaged in his service either by the defendant personally, or by others by his authority, express or implied. There is a class of cases, of which Bush v....
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