Ham v. State

Decision Date18 February 1929
Docket Number176
PartiesHAM v. STATE
CourtArkansas Supreme Court

Appeal from Clark Circuit Court; J. H. McCollum, Judge; affirmed.

Case affirmed.

D F. McElhanon, for appellant.

Hal L. Norwood, Attorney General, and Robert F Smith, Assistant, for appellee.

OPINION

MEHAFFY, J.

The appellant was indicted in Clark County, charged with the crime of murder in the first degree. It is alleged that he committed the crime by shooting and killing L. B. Harrison on the 25th day of July, 1928.

A motion for continuance was filed by the defendant, and overruled, and exceptions saved. Defendant then filed a motion to quash the special panel of the petit jury, which motion was also overruled, and exceptions saved. The case was tried on September 15, 1928, and appellant was convicted of murder in the second degree, and his punishment fixed at seven years in the penitentiary. Motion for new trial was filed, overruled, and appellant prosecutes this appeal to reverse the judgment of the circuit court.

The appellant and Harrison were at a filling station on the Arkadelphia and Gurdon road, on the day of the killing, and they, together with Gerald Bishop, got in a car and drove down the road a short way; they went to an old slaughter-pen, and got some whiskey. After they had been together for some time, Harrison, the deceased, got in his car and left for Gurdon. Both the appellant and the deceased had been drinking. About four o'clock in the afternoon the appellant and Gerald Bishop went down the road in a car in the direction that Harrison had gone. Bishop, who was with Ham, and Ham both testified that they were going to Ike Halsell's to get a saddle for Ham, and they found Harrison's car in a ditch, and offered to help him get it out, but he was drinking, and began cursing. He got out his gun, and made Bishop leave.

Bishop testified that defendant had two guns, one in his right hip pocket and the other in his shirt bosom. After Bishop left, Ham went in his car down the road, and in about thirty minutes came back and said his car was stuck. They got Harrison's car out, and went down to where Ham's car was, to pull it out. Bishop got in Ham's car and drove it up past Harrison's car and up the road a little way. Harrison made them, according to their testimony, drink more whiskey, and threatened Bishop, and Bishop walked back up the road about 75 yards, and heard some words, and then heard four shots fired. He started in the direction where Ham and Harrison were, and met Ham coming out in his car. He got in the car with him and asked him where Harrison was, and Ham said: "You don't know." They went on, finally reaching Arkadelphia, and in doing so they went around about ten or twelve miles.

The appellant did not tell anybody about the killing until after he was arrested. The appellant testified that he killed the deceased in self-defense; that deceased had a gun, and that he killed him because he had to do it. That he had gone down to Halsell's to get a saddle; the Bishop boy went with him, and they offered to get Harrison's car out of the ditch, and that Harrison was doing a good deal of cursing, and said they were going after liquor. Deceased had his gun out, and, when Bishop walked away up the road around the curve, Harrison called him a name, and said he wasn't looking for anybody, and that Ham promised not to bring Bishop down there, and that he was going to shoot appellant. He pulled his gun, and appellant backed off; then deceased still threatened to shoot him, and the appellant could not get to his car, and was afraid he was going to hurt some one, but that, when deceased saw that appellant was fixing to get in his car, he prepared to shoot. Appellant knocked his gun out of his hand, and picked it up, expecting to leave, but, as he rose with the gun, deceased was pulling another gun from his shirt bosom; had pulled it far enough out so appellant could see the handle, and then he shot him with the gun he picked up. He did not know what he did with the gun afterwards. Deceased was shot four times.

Numbers of witnesses testified, but there is some conflict in the testimony, and it would serve no purpose to set it out in detail.

Appellant's first contention is that the court erred in overruling his motion to quash the special panel of the petit jury. The special jurors were not selected by jury commissioners, but the court directed the sheriff to summon them, which the sheriff did.

Appellant's attorney said: "It is agreed by the State that the following named jurors, to-wit, * * *, were not selected by the bystanders, but selected by the sheriff," whereupon the court said: "Now, didn't you agree that that jury be summoned?" Appellant's attorney said: "No sir, I just suggested that we have extra men, but I wanted them selected." The court: "I know, but you did agree that the court could direct the sheriff to summon men to be here?" Whereupon the attorney for the appellant said: "I rather suggested to Mr. Carrigan that we have special men here, but I wanted them selected according to what I thought was the law." Appellant's attorney said: "Let the record show that at this present term of the court, at the time this case was passed over until this 14th day of September, 1928, the attorney for the defendant suggested that a special panel be had the day of trial." And the court then said: "And that the court ordered the sheriff to summon a special panel of thirty men, and the State agrees that this special panel were summoned by the sheriff in pursuance of that order of the court, the special panel of jurors not to be resorted to until the regular panel were exhausted in the selection of the jury in the case." Appellant's attorney said: "And the defendant excepts to the special panel for the reason that they were not selected by the jury commission, as provided by §§ 6352 and 6354 of Crawford & Moses' Digest." He further said: "After the regular panel had been exhausted, when the special panel summoned by the sheriff were called for the purpose of being impaneled as jurors, the defendant at the time objected and excepted to the special venire."

They objected to the selection of the jury from the special venire for the reason that they have not been selected as provided by the above named sections.

The court thereupon overruled the motion to quash panel summoned by the sheriff.

This case, as the record shows, was tried at an adjourned term of the court. The court had convened in Clark County on the 23d day of July, and the defendant was not tried until the 14th day of September. Before the court adjourned, the attorney for the appellant admitted that, while he did not agree that the jury be summoned, he suggested that they have extra men, but he wanted them selected according to what he thought the law was. It does not appear from the record that he suggested at that time that he wanted them selected in any particular manner.

The appellant was arrested, and on the 25th day of July the court set the case for Thursday of the second week, which would be August 2. On the 2d day of August the appellant filed his motion for a continuance, and the court thereupon set the case for hearing on the 14th day of September, 1928. The case was therefore postponed until the adjourned term at the request of the appellant. It is true that he wanted it continued until the next term of court, but the question of postponement or continuance was in the sound discretion of the court, and it would appear that from the 2d of August until the 14th of September would give appellant ample time to prepare for the trial.

While the statute provides for the selection of jury commissioners and the selection of jurors by them, the statute provides that the circuit court shall select jury commissioners possessing the qualifications prescribed for petit jurymen etc. And then the section referred to by appellant provides the manner by which the jury commissioners shall perform their duty. Section 6377 provides that if, for any cause, any of said jurors shall, at any time, be released from serving for the balance of the term, others shall be summoned and sworn, so that there shall be at all times a panel of twenty-four regular jurors. Section 6378 provides: "If a jury for the trial of any case cannot be obtained out of said panel of regular petit jurors, bystanders shall be summoned, as the court may direct, to complete such jury, and the oath mentioned in § 6375, adapted to that particular cause, shall be administered to said bystanders, and the record shall contain the names of said bystanders, together with the statement...

To continue reading

Request your trial
5 cases
  • Glover v. State, 5479
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • June 29, 1970
    ...his verdict on the evidence introduced in the case and instructions of the court. Hardin v. State, 66 Ark. 53, 48 S.W. 904; Ham v. State, 179 Ark. 20, 13 S.W.2d 805; West v. State, 150 Ark. 555, 234 S.W. 997; Niven v. State, 190 Ark. 514, 80 S.W.2d 644. There it was pointed out that the ven......
  • Rush v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • May 18, 1964
  • Ham v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • February 18, 1929
  • Cabe v. State
    • United States
    • Arkansas Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1930
    ...the testimony which would be adduced, under the law as pronounced by the court. Under the rule reiterated in the case of Ham v. State, 179 Ark. 20, 13 S.W.2d 805, both were qualified, notwithstanding they had formed based upon rumor. The disqualification of C. R. Croft is also urged because......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT