Hamblin v. Marchant

• Decision Date: 12 October 1918
• Docket Number: 21,707
• Citation: 103 Kan. 508,175 P. 678
• Parties: MARY E. HAMBLIN, Appellee, v. EDNA MARCHANT, Appellant, et al
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

175 P. 678

103 Kan. 508

MARY E. HAMBLIN, Appellee, v. EDNA MARCHANT, Appellant, et al

No. 21,707

Supreme Court of Kansas

October 12, 1918

Decided July, 1918.

Appeal from Montgomery district court; CHARLES D. SHUKERS, judge pro tem.

Judgment affirmed.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. DESCENTS AND DISTRIBUTIONS--Wife Killing Husband--Right of Inheritance--Statutes. Section 3856 of the General Statutes of 1915 applies to a woman who kills her husband by shooting him, for which she is afterwards convicted of manslaughter in the third degree.

2. SAME--Widow Inherits Only by Virtue of Statute. A widow takes property from her deceased husband under the statute of descents and distributions, and not otherwise.

3. SAME--Statute Disinheriting Certain Criminals Constitutional. Section 3856 of the General Statutes of 1915 does not violate section 10 or section 12 of the bill of rights, or section 6 of article 6 of the state constitution, or the fourteenth amendment to the constitution of the United States.

Thomas E. Wagstaff, of Independence, for the appellant.

Sullivan Lomax, of Cherryvale, for the appellee.

OPINION

MARSHALL, J.:

The plaintiff commenced this action to quiet title to certain real property in Montgomery county. Judgment was rendered in her favor and against defendant Edna Marchant, who appeals. All the other defendants filed disclaimers.

On July 10, 1915, John A. Marchant owned an undivided one-half interest in the land in controversy. On that day he was shot and killed by defendant Edna Marchant, who was then his wife. They had no children. Edna Marchant was afterward convicted of manslaughter in the third degree for killing her husband.

1. Edna Marchant claims that she is the only heir of John A. Marchant, deceased, and that she is, therefore, the owner of an undivided one-half interest in the real property. She claims that section 3856 of the General Statutes of 1915 does not apply to persons convicted of manslaughter in the third degree. That section reads:

"Any person who shall hereafter be convicted of killing or of conspiring with another to kill, or of procuring to be killed, any other person from whom such person so killing or conspiring to kill or procuring said killing would inherit the property, real, personal, or mixed, or any part thereof, belonging to such deceased person at the time of death, or who would take said property by deed, will or otherwise, at the death of the deceased, shall be denied all right, interest and estate in or to said property or any part thereof, and the same shall descend and be distributed to such other person or persons as may be entitled thereto by the laws of descent and distribution, as if the person so convicted were dead."

In McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 533, 84 P. 112, decided in 1906, this court declared that a husband inherits his intestate wife's property, although he killed her for the purpose of acquiring that property. The 1907 session of the legislature passed the statute quoted, apparently for the purpose of changing the rule of law declared by the court. The language of the statute is broad and includes every person who may take property from a deceased person in either of the ways named in the statute. The statute says any person who shall hereafter be convicted of killing any other person, etc. A conviction for manslaughter is a conviction for killing. John A. Marchant was killed by his wife, who shot him. That act was within the statute.

2. It is contended that Edna Marchant did not inherit nor otherwise take from her husband. Then how does she claim any right to the property? If she has any right, that right comes from our statute of descents and distributions. She acquires no right to her husband's property, except by virtue of that statute. It does not matter...