Hamby v. Gentry
| Decision Date | 01 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:12-CV-01296 |
| Parties | WILLIAM DAVIDSON HAMBY, Jr., Plaintiff, v. BETH GENTRY, et al., Defendants, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Tennessee |
TO: The Honorable Kevin Sharp
This matter is on referral to the undersigned for, inter alia, pretrial management of the case, including recommendation for ruling on any dispositive motions (Docket Entry No. 3). Defendant Beth Gentry and Sheriff Daron Hall filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff William Davidson Hamby's claims (Docket Entry No. 13). For the reasons stated below, the undersigned Magistrate Judge recommends that defendants' motion to dismiss be granted in part and denied in part.
On December 13, 2012, Plaintiff William Davidson Hamby, Jr., a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging Defendant Beth Gentry violated his constitutional rights by: (1) placing him in administrative segregation housing, instead of "special needs" housing, (2) subjecting him to "brutal[ly] cold" temperatures, (3) requiring him to be handcuffed during his hour of recreational time, and (4) discriminating against him by allowing other "white inmates the right to return to'special needs' housing" while not allowing the plaintiff to return to "special needs" housing (Docket Entry No. 1, pp.1, 5-6). The plaintiff alleges Sheriff Hall, Ms. Gentry's boss, "approves, accepts, and does not correct the actions of Beth Gentry" (Id. at 6). The complaint was found to be "not facially frivolous" upon initial screening (Docket Entry No. 3, p.2). The plaintiff also filed a "Motion to File Tort Against Defendants," essentially seeking a preliminary injunction to freeze the defendants' assets (Docket Entry No. 16). On February 14, 2013, defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing: (1) Mr. Hamby failed to state a claim and (2) they are entitled to qualified immunity (Docket Entry No. 13). Mr. Hamby filed a response to the motion to dismiss on February 25, 2013 (Docket Entry No. 15).
The following facts, contained in the plaintiff's complaint, are presumed to be true for the purposes of ruling on the defendants' motion to dismiss.
Plaintiff William Davidson Hamby, Jr., is confined at Davidson County's Sheriff's Office (Docket Entry No. 1, p.1). After his prisoner grievance was denied, the plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (See id. at 2). The plaintiff filed this claim against Beth Gentry, the jail's housing classification manager, and her boss, Sheriff Daron Hall (Id. at 2-3). The plaintiff was originally housed in the "special needs" section of the jail because he was a confidential informant (Id. at 5). Then, another inmate stated the plaintiff was "incompatible," so the plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation ("ad-seg"), where he has been since July (Id.). Since then, the inmate who described the plaintiff as "incompatible" has been released (Id.). In his cell in administrative segregation, the plaintiff is subjected to "brutal[ly] cold" temperatures without heat or additional blankets23 hours per day (Id.). The plaintiff is shackled and handcuffed during his hour of recreational time (Id. at 5-6). Gentry "allows white inmates the right to return to 'special needs,'" even if they have received an "incompatible" complaint, while preventing the plaintiff, "an inmate of non-white descent," from returning to special needs (Id. at 6). Sheriff Hall, Ms. Gentry's boss, "approves, accepts, and does not correct the actions of Beth Gentry" (Id. at 6).
The plaintiff filed a motion opposing dismissal, in which he alleges the following additional facts (Docket Entry No. 15).1 The plaintiff told Ms. Gentry that he is gay (Id. at 2). Then, the plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation and was required to wear handcuffs during his recreational hour (Id.). However, "all other Caucasian gays and informants are put in special needs" (Id.). The plaintiff indicates that multiple witnesses are signing an affidavit regarding Ms. Gentry's biased actions (Id.). The plaintiff alleges that his placement in administrative segregation is punitive (Id.). Administrative segregation has no windows, no televisions and is a "frigid 20 degrees" (Id. at 3). The plaintiff claims that his mental health has deteriorated as a result of his confinement in administrative segregation (Id.). As proof, the plaintiff attached medical records regarding a self-reported need for mental health medications and an incident in which the plaintiff cut himself (Docket Entry No. 15-1).
"A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is a test of the plaintiff's cause of action as stated in the complaint, not a challenge to the plaintiff's factual allegations."Golden v. City of Columbus, 404 F.3d 950, 958-59 (6th Cir. 2005). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the plaintiff must allege facts which, if true, are sufficient "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). While "detailed factual allegations" are not required, the plaintiff must provide more than "labels and conclusions" or a "formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action," to meet this burden. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
Upon review of a motion to dismiss, the court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Lambert v. Hartman, 517 F.3d 433, 439 (6th Cir. 2008). The complaint of a plaintiff proceeding pro se must be "liberally construed" and "held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). However, "basic pleading essentials" still must be met. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).
As a preliminary matter, the additional facts alleged by the plaintiff in his responsive pleading are to be considered for the purposes of ruling on the instant motion to dismiss. Because the same leniency inherent in liberally construing the complaint of a pro se plaintiff applies to all filings, the plaintiff's response opposing dismissal is to be construed as anamended complaint. See Richardson v. United States, 193 F.3d 545, 548 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (); Pearson v. Gatto, 933 F.2d 521, 527 (7th Cir. 1991) (); Cooper v. Sheriff, Lubbock County, Texas, 929 F.2d 1078, 1081 (5th Cir. 1991) ().
The plaintiff brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under § 1983, the plaintiff must establish: (1) that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and (2) that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law. American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). The defendants have challenged the sufficiency of the plaintiff's allegations that he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution and have raised the affirmative defense of qualified immunity (Docket Entry No. 13).
A government official performing discretionary functions is protected from civil liability under the qualified immunity doctrine unless, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a reasonable juror could find that: "(1) the defendant violated a constitutional right; and (2) the right was clearly established." Bishop v. Hackel, 636 F.3d 757, 765 (6th Cir. 2011). A constitutional right is clearly established if "[t]he contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). A court may address the two prongs in either order, orotherwise resolve the issue in an appropriate manner. See Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 242 (2009).
"Dismissals on the basis of qualified immunity are generally made pursuant to Fed R. Civ. P. 56 summary judgment motions, not 12(b)(6) sufficiency of pleadings motions." Grose v. Caruso, 284 Fed. Appx. 279, 283 (6th Cir. 2008). Here, further development of the factual record is required to determine whether or not the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated and, if so, whether or not those rights were clearly established. Therefore, dismissal on the basis of qualified immunity is inappropriate at this stage.
Section 1983 does not support claims against a supervisor based upon solely upon a respondeat superior theory of liability. Shehee v. Luttrell, 199 F.3d 295, 300 (6th Cir. 1999). The supervisor must have "either encouraged the specific incident of misconduct or in some other way directly participated in it." Id. (quoting Hays v. Jefferson County, Ky., 668 F.2d 869, 874 (6th Cir. 1982)). "At a minimum a plaintiff must show that the official at least implicitly authorized, approved, or knowingly acquiesced in the unconstitutional conduct of the offending officers." Hays, 668 F.2d at 874. While discussing a § 1983 claim involving a retaliatory transfer, the Sixth Circuit held that to make out respondeat superior liability, "[h]aving the right to control the offending employee is not enough, simply being aware of the...
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