Hamel v. State

• Decision Date: 04 May 1999
• Citation: 321 N.J. Super. 67,728 A.2d 264
• Parties: Cecelia HAMEL and Diane Hamel, an infant, by her Guardian Ad Litem, Cecelia Hamel, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of New Jersey; Attorney General of the State of New Jersey; Borough of Bergenfield; Bergenfield Board of Education; Superintendent, John F. Galish; Roy W. Brown Middle School; Rita Eberhard; Robert Cancro; Robert Petrella; Brad Tirpak; Craig Royston; Philip Lastra; Kevin Thiele; Sean Dillon; David R. Tirpak; Donna M. Tirpak; Craig G. Royston; Deborah A. Royston; John J. Lastra; Catherine Lastra; Joseph A. Dillon; Debra Dillon; Robert Thiele and Jacqueline Thiele, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Superior Court

728 A.2d 264

321 N.J. Super. 67

Cecelia HAMEL and Diane Hamel, an infant, by her Guardian Ad Litem, Cecelia Hamel, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of New Jersey; Attorney General of the State of New Jersey; Borough of Bergenfield; Bergenfield Board of Education; Superintendent, John F. Galish; Roy W. Brown Middle School; Rita Eberhard; Robert Cancro; Robert Petrella; Brad Tirpak; Craig Royston; Philip Lastra; Kevin Thiele; Sean Dillon; David R. Tirpak; Donna M. Tirpak; Craig G. Royston; Deborah A. Royston; John J. Lastra; Catherine Lastra; Joseph A. Dillon; Debra Dillon; Robert Thiele and Jacqueline Thiele, Defendants-Respondents.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Argued March 29, 1999.

Decided May 4, 1999.

Christine M. Stevenson, Roseland, for plaintiffs-appellants (Contant, Scherby & Atkins, Hackensack, attorneys; Ms. Stevenson and Matthew S. Rogers on the brief).

Daniel McNerney, Hackensack, for defendants-respondents Bergenfield Board of Education, Superintendent Galish, Roy W. Brown Middle School; Rita Eberhard, David Petrella and Robert Cancro (Breslin & McNerney, attorneys; Mr. McNerney, on the brief).

The remaining respondents did not file briefs.

Before Judges HAVEY, PAUL G. LEVY and LESEMANN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by HAVEY, P.J.A.D.

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendants Bergenfield Board of Education (Board), Rita Eberhard, Principal of the Roy W. Brown Middle School, Robert Cancro, Vice Principal, David Petrella, a teacher, and individual students and their parents. Plaintiffs claim that the Board and the school official defendants [hereinafter referred to as the Board defendants] were negligent in failing to protect plaintiff Diane Hamel, a student, who sustained psychological injuries from harassment precipitated by fellow students. The trial court granted the Board defendants summary judgment, concluding that they were immune from suit under the Charitable Immunity Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to 11. The court found that the Act applied because the Board was: (1) a nonprofit organization; and (2) devoted exclusively to educational purposes. We granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to appeal and now reverse. We conclude that the Act was not intended to provide immunity to public entities such as local school boards.

During the 1993-1994 school year, plaintiff Diane Hamel was a seventh grade student at the Roy W. Brown Middle School in Bergenfield. Plaintiffs allege that Diane's fellow students habitually teased and physically assaulted her because she was a "good" student and had received several academic awards. The harassment consisted of pushing, shoving and kicking "on a daily basis." Plaintiffs also claim that Diane's classmates threw "trash" at her and "on one occasion a condom was thrown at her."

Plaintiffs assert that they informed Superintendent John F. Galish of the harassment in September and December 1993. In late January or February 1994, plaintiff and her parents met with Principal Rita Eberhard to discuss the harassment. Nevertheless, the harassment continued. Plaintiffs allege that "[o]n or about January, 1994, Diane collapsed in one of her classes" and, due to the extreme emotional distress caused by the alleged abuse, she experienced partial paralysis in her right leg. Plaintiff was hospitalized for one week following this incident. In January 1994, she was treated by a psychiatrist complaining of "severe stomach aches, anxiety, and recurring nightmares." Plaintiff was diagnosed as suffering from permanent post-traumatic stress disorder. Plaintiffs filed the present action seeking damages against the Board defendants based on negligence, tortious conduct and negligent supervision.

The Board defendants were unsuccessful in seeking dismissal of the complaint on the basis that plaintiffs had failed to meet the threshold requirement of "permanent" injury under the New Jersey Tort Claims Act, N.J.S.A. 59:9-2d. Their subsequent summary judgment was granted on the ground that the Board defendants had immunity under the Charitable Immunity Act. The court reasoned:

This Court accepts movants' position that the Bergenfield Board of Education is a nonprofit organization. The Bergenfield Board of Education has never been required to pay state sales or uses tax. Additionally, the Board of Education is exempt from federal income tax and does not generate any profit. These aforementioned factors were all factors the Graber¹ court considered when recognizing [that] Stockton State was entitled to charitable immunity. As to the second prong, it is undeniable the sole purpose of the Bergenfield Board of Education is to provide for the education of the children of Bergenfield.

At the time plaintiffs filed their complaint, the Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7, read as follows:

No nonprofit corporation, society or association organized exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes shall, except as is hereinafter set forth, be liable to respond in damages to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of any agent or servant of such corporation, society or association, where such person is a beneficiary, to whatever degree, of the works of such nonprofit corporation, society or association; provided, however, that such immunity from liability shall not extend to any person who shall suffer damage from the negligence of such corporation, society, or association or of its agents or servants where such person is one unconcerned in and unrelated to and outside of the benefactions of such corporation, society or association; but nothing herein contained shall be deemed to exempt the said agent or servant individually from their liability for any such negligence.²

Decisions applying the Act have generally focused on whether the entity: (1) was formed for nonprofit purposes; (2) is organized exclusively for religious, charitable or educational purposes; and (3) was promoting such objectives and purposes at the time of the injury to plaintiff who was then a beneficiary of the charitable works. Loder v. St. Thomas Greek Orthodox Church, 295 N.J.Super. 297, 301, 685 A.2d 20 (App.Div. 1996); see also Graber, supra, 313 N.J.Super. at 481-82, 713 A.2d 503; Parker v. St. Stephen's Urban Dev. Corp., 243 N.J.Super. 317, 324-25, 579 A.2d 360 (App.Div.1990); Pelaez v. Rugby Labs., Inc., 264 N.J.Super. 450, 454, 624 A.2d 1053 (Law Div.1993); Heffelfinger v. Town of Morristown, 209 N.J.Super. 380, 383, 507 A.2d 761 (Law Div.1985).

Because the Legislature directs that the Act shall be "liberally construed," N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10, we have not hesitated to construe "`nonprofit corporation ... organized exclusively for ... educational purposes' to afford immunity to a wide range of nonprofit organizations that provide educational opportunities or other services which promote the public welfare." Morales v. New Jersey Academy of Aquatic Sciences, 302 N.J.Super. 50, 53-54, 694 A.2d 600 (App. Div.1997) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7). Charitable immunity has been extended to many not-for-profit corporations, even where the entities receive some federal, state or local appropriations to defray their operating costs while serving the public welfare. Morales, supra, 302 N.J.Super. at 54-55, 694 A.2d 600 and cases cited therein. "[T]he fact that [a nonprofit corporation] happens to receive some government support would not alter its nature as a charity for immunity purposes" if it performs charitable services and is "essentially supported through charitable contributions." Parker, supra, 243 N.J.Super. at 327, 579 A.2d 360.

However, we have found no authority for the proposition embraced by the trial court that a local board of education, a public entity, is entitled to the statutory immunity simply because it is a not-for-profit entity and has exclusive educational purposes. The legislative history of the Act is to the contrary. See State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 578, 695 A.2d 236 (1997)

("[e]xtrinsic aids, such as legislative history [and] committee reports... may be used to help resolve an ambiguity and to ascertain the true intent of the Legislature").

In 1958, the Legislature responded to a trilogy of decisions by our Supreme Court³ effectively abolishing the common-law immunity offered charitable institutions by enacting N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7 to -11. See Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese, 95 N.J. 530, 533, 472 A.2d 531 (1984)

; Jerolamon v. Fairleigh Dickinson Univ., 199 N.J.Super. 179, 182, 488 A.2d 1064 (App.Div.1985). During the Assembly Judiciary Committee hearings on the Assembly Substitute for Senate Bill No. S-204 conducted on July 17, 1958, the Committee investigated whether insurance rates for charitable organizations would rise in the absence of a charitable immunity statute. Public Hearing Before Assembly Judiciary Comm. on Assembly Substitute for Senate Bill S-204 1, 2 (July 17, 1958). Norman Machman, a representative of the National Bureau of Casualty Underwriters (NBCU), gave testimony regarding this issue as it related to schools. The following colloquy occurred between Mr. Machman and the Chairman and members of the Committee:

MR. MACHMAN: To what extent does the decision and [Senate Bill] 204 affect the schools? To the same extent that it affects other charitable institutions?

THE CHAIRMAN: The effect of [Senate Bill] 204, with reference to schools, was to place the law in the same position as it existed prior to the Supreme Court decisions. The Assembly Substitute keeps that situation intact, namely, as it existed prior to the Supreme Court decisions.

MR. MACHMAN: How does the Collopy case affect the situation?

THE CHAIRMAN: Well, the Collopy case would have rendered schools, the organization of the schools, liable.

ASSEMBLYMAN CONNERY: Destroys any immunity that the schools previously enjoyed with respect to accidents and injuries to persons occurring through the negligence of the agents—employees of the schools, etc.

MR. MACHMAN:

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