Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank

• Decision Date: 27 December 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-2615,89-2615
• Citation: 928 F.2d 86
• Parties: 54 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1019, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,466, 59 USLW 2410 J.D. HAMILTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 1ST SOURCE BANK, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Page 86

928 F.2d 86

54 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 1019,

55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,466, 59 USLW 2410

J.D. HAMILTON, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. 1ST SOURCE BANK, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 89-2615.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued June 5, 1990.

Decided Dec. 27, 1990.

Philip Marshall Van Hoy, Van Hoy & Reutlinger, Charlotte, N.C., for defendant-appellant.

William L. Auten, Charlotte, N.C., for plaintiff-appellee.

Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, RUSSELL, WIDENER, HALL, PHILLIPS, MURNAGHAN, SPROUSE, CHAPMAN, WILKINSON, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge, sitting en banc. ^*

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

We must here decide when the statute of limitations for filing age-based pay discrimination claims with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission begins to run under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621-34. Plaintiff Hamilton argues that a "discovery" rule applies to the statute of limitations in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d), i.e., that the limitations period does not begin to run until an employee discovers, or should have discovered, that he was a victim of pay discrimination. We hold that, under the plain and unequivocal language of the statute, the 180-day period for filing claims begins to run from the time of the alleged discriminatory act, and that Hamilton's claim of pay discrimination is therefore time-barred.

I.

J.D. Hamilton began working for 1st Source Bank as a vice-president in the Truckers Bank Plan division. He commenced employment in 1980 at the age of fifty-three. On April 21, 1986, the bank fired Hamilton without advance notice, claiming that he had failed to perform his duties. Hamilton filed a timely complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging that he had been discharged because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. Secs. 621-34. The EEOC failed to commence enforcement proceedings within sixty days and Hamilton filed suit in the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d).

In May 1987, in the course of discovery, Hamilton learned that he had received a lesser salary than younger vice-presidents who were in his job category. He then filed a new complaint with the EEOC on September 16, 1987, seventeen months after his discharge, alleging pay discrimination. Again, the EEOC did not commence enforcement proceedings within sixty days. The district court allowed Hamilton to amend his complaint to incorporate the pay discrimination claim.

The case was tried to a jury in June 1988. The jury found that the bank had discriminated against Hamilton on the basis of age both by paying him a relatively lower salary and by discharging him. It awarded him $15,135 in damages on the pay discrimination claim and $99,000 in back pay for the discriminatory discharge. Because the jury found that the bank had willfully discriminated against Hamilton when it fired him, the district court entered an additional judgment of $99,000 in liquidated damages on that claim. See 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(b).

A panel of this court affirmed the jury verdict but set aside plaintiff's recovery of prejudgment interest on the discharge claim, inasmuch as liquidated damages had already been awarded. Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir.1990). The panel ruled that Hamilton's pay discrimination claim was not time-barred under Sec. 626(d), reasoning that the 180-day statute of limitations for a pay discrimination charge does not begin to run until an employee "discovers or by exercise of reasonable diligence could have discovered that she or he was a victim of pay discrimination." Id. at 165. The period for recovery of back pay on the pay discrimination claim was limited to two years prior to the filing of the original complaint. 1st Source Bank petitioned for rehearing en banc, arguing that the "discovery" rule was contrary to congressional intent as well as circuit precedent, and contending that Hamilton's charge of pay discrimination was time-barred. The bank additionally requested a new trial on the discharge claim on the ground that consideration of the pay claim tainted the entire jury verdict.

II.

Title 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d) provides in relevant part that:

No civil action may be commenced by an individual under this section until 60 days after a charge alleging unlawful discrimination has been filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Such a charge shall be filed--

(1) within 180 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred....

(Emphasis added.) The issue we confront is one of simple statutory construction. The question is whether Congress meant what it plainly and unequivocally said in the Act, that all charges of pay discrimination shall be filed within 180 days of the occurrence of the alleged violation. We hold that Congress' command is clear and unambiguous, and that Hamilton's claim of pay discrimination is time-barred.

We distinguish at the outset the question of when the statute of limitations begins to run from whether the statute can equitably be tolled under certain compelling circumstances. See Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Hamilton has repeatedly stated that he is not advancing claims of equitable tolling or estoppel. Thus the only question before this court is when the limitations period began to run on Hamilton's pay discrimination claim.

The "discovery" rule that Hamilton would have us adopt completely abandons the statute. Section 626(d) establishes a period of 180 days for plaintiffs to file claims with the EEOC, starting from the time "the alleged unlawful practice occurred " (emphasis added), not from the time that the employee discovered its discriminatory nature. The language is clear, unlike that of other statutes couched in vaguer terms. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2401(b) (Federal Tort Claims Act filing period commences when "such claim accrues."). Moreover, when Congress has intended a discovery rule, it has proven capable of writing one. See, e.g., 41 U.S.C. Sec. 55(b) (filing period runs from "the date on which the United States first knew or should reasonably have known that the prohibited conduct had occurred"); 22 U.S.C. Sec. 4134(a) (excluding from the filing period "any time during which ... the grievant was unaware of the grounds for the grievance and could not have discovered such grounds through reasonable diligence"). In short, we decline to append to Sec. 626 what Congress did not place there.

A discovery rule would do further violence to the statute by making the 180-day filing period more the exception than the rule. An "occurrence" is a discrete event, whereas a plaintiff's acquisition of knowledge is a continuing process. One can never be sure exactly when on that continuum of awareness a plaintiff knew or should have known enough that the limitations period should have begun. A discovery rule thus substitutes a vague and uncertain period for a definite one. One need look no further than the facts of this case to see the violence such an elastic approach works on the statute: Hamilton did not bring his claim until seventeen months after his discharge, roughly three times the length of the filing period Congress envisioned.

Recent Supreme Court cases support the view that the time period in Sec. 626(d) commences with the occurrence of the alleged unlawful practice. In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), the Supreme Court considered when such an act "occurs" in the context of a university professor's discriminatory discharge claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. ¹ The Court held that the alleged discrimination had occurred when the university denied the professor tenure and informed him of that act, a date over a year before his last day of work. The Court emphasized that "even though one of the effects of the denial of tenure--the eventual loss of a teaching position--did not occur until later ... 'the proper focus is upon the time of the discriminatory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most painful.' " Id. at 258, 101 S.Ct. at 504 (quoting Abramson v. University of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 209 (9th Cir.1979)) (emphasis in original); see also Chardon v. Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6, 102 S.Ct. 28, 70 L.Ed.2d 6 (1981) (limitations period began to run when administrators received advance notice that their appointments would be terminated in a few weeks, not when their appointments actually ended).

Much the same reasoning prevailed in a more recent case. In Lorance v. A T & T Technologies, Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 109 S.Ct. 2261, 104 L.Ed.2d 961 (1989), a group of female employees who had been demoted during an economic slowdown challenged under Title VII a seniority system that had been in effect for four years. The Court began by "identify[ing] precisely the 'unlawful employment practice' " of which the women complained. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2264 (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257, 101 S.Ct. at 503). Because the alleged discriminatory act occurred with the adoption of the seniority system four years earlier, the Court held the employees' claim time-barred, even though the discriminatory effects were not evident until years afterwards. ² Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2265.

Thus, in applying the statute of limitations contained in 29 U.S.C. Sec. 626(d), courts must first identify the alleged unlawful act. The date of that act marks the time from which the 180 days are counted. To the extent that notice enters the analysis, it is notice of the employer's actions, not the notice of a discriminatory effect or motivation, that establishes the commencement of the pertinent filing period. This circuit has faithfully followed that criterion in discriminatory discharge cases, wherein we have counted the 180 days from either the time of...