Hamilton v. Coster
| Decision Date | 04 June 1924 |
| Citation | 144 N.E. 226,249 Mass. 391 |
| Parties | HAMILTON v. COSTER. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Superior Court, Middlesex County; William Cushing Wait, Judge.
Suit in equity by Mary S. Hamilton against George R. Coster for specific performance of written agreement for purchase of real estate. Decree for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.
C. W. Lavers, of Boston, for appellant.
H. A. Murphy, of Boston, for appellee.
This is a suit in equity whereby the plaintiff seeks to obtain specific performance of a written agreement for the purchase of real estate, and to recover for the loss of interest, for taxes and insurance premiums paid, and expenses of caring for and carrying on the property since July 1, 1922, the date when, by the terms of the agreement, it was to be conveyed by the plaintiff to the defendant. The defendant demurred to the bill, setting forth among other grounds that no sufficient memorandum was signed by the defendant, or by his authorized agent, within the statute of frauds. The demurrer was rightly overruled. The contract purports to be signed by the defendant by one Hill, his attorney. The bill alleges that the agreement was signed by the defendant, and on its face makes out a case for equitable relief. It does not appear from the bill that the attorney was not duly authorized to execute the contract on behalf of the defendant. The question whether Hill had such authority is one of fact and cannot be raised by demurrer. Turners Falls Fire Dist. v. Millers Falls Water Supply District, 189 Mass. 263, 266, 75 N. E. 630; Worcester Board of Health v. Tupper, 210 Mass. 378, 96 N. E. 1096;Bowker v. Torrey, 211 Mass. 282, 97 N. E. 770. See Ahrend v. Odiorne, 118 Mass. 261, 268,19 Am. Rep. 449.
The answer denies that the agreement was signed on the defendant's behalf by his attorney with authority to do so, and states that the contract was not sufficient under the statute of frauds; it admits the payment of $500 to the plaintiff, but alleges that such payment was not made in accordance with the agreement; and also, that the payment was induced by the misrepresentations of the plaintiff and for that reason it should be returned to him.
The trial judge made the following findings:
The judge also found that the plaintiff had been obliged to expend certain sums for taxes, insurance and expenses for the necessary upkeep of the property since July 1, 1922 (when the agreement for sale was to have been carried out), and in performing work upon the property at the request of the defendant before that date, amounting to $2,850, which sum the plaintiff was entitled to recover; and that a decree for specific performance should be entered. A final decree was entered in accordance with the findings and order.
It is well settled that, on an appeal from a final decree in equity, with a report of the evidence, the findings of fact made by the trial judge who has heard the witnesses will not be reversed unless plainly wrong. W. B. Manufacturing Co. v. Rubenstein, 236 Mass. 215, 219, 128 N. E. 21, 11 A. L. R. 1283;Noon v. Bunker, 237 Mass. 585, 587, 130 N. E. 94.
The agreement was signed: ‘Marion S. Hamilton, by R. J. H.’ ‘R. J. Hamilton.’ ‘Geo. R. Coster, by Edgar D. Hill, Atty.’ The question whether the plaintiff's husband had authority to execute the contract in her behalf need not be considered, as the bringing of this suit to enforce her rights under the contract constitutes a ratification of it as matter of law. Gross v. Cohen, 236 Mass. 468, 128 N. E. 714; Noon v. Bunker, supra.
[4] The finding of the trial judge that Hill, the defendant's attorney, was authorized by the defendant to sign the contract, and that the latter ratified the agent's act cannot be said to have been without evidence to support it. Hill testified that he received a check for $500 from the defendant which was turned over to the plaintiff, and that the check was sent to him by the defendant for the purpose of making a deposit in accordance with the agreement.
One Peterson, a real estate broker who acted for the plaintiff in the sale of the estate, testified that the defendant came to see him three times and offered $30,000 for the property; that the defendant told him that Hill was his attorney and acted for him in all business transactions and had a power of attorney; that soon after the agreement was signed the defendant made a fourth visit to the premises to make a list of the furnishings; that he spoke of plans for the occupancy of the premises and said he wanted to...
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...that the signatories that he supplied should act as his agents. Proof of agency is ordinarily a question of fact. Hamilton v. Coster, 249 Mass. 391, 394, 144 N.E. 226;Raymond Syndicate, Inc. v. American Radio & Research Corp., 263 Mass. 147, 152, 160 N.E. 821. The general finding for the de......
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George v. Coolidge Bank & Trust Co.
...Such a theory is contrary to our practice of awarding incidental damages in a decree granting specific relief. Hamilton v. Coster, 249 Mass. 391, 396--397, 144 N.E. 226; Winchell v. Plywood Corp., 324 Mass. 171, 181, 85 N.E.2d 313; Kaplan v. Cavicchia, 107 N.J.Super. 201, 205--206, 257 A.2d......
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Choate v. Bd. of Assessors of City of Boston
...v. Massachusetts Bowling Alleys, Inc., 229 Mass. 30, 118 N.E. 188;R. T. Adams Co. v. Israel, 244 Mass. 139, 138 N.E. 319;Hamilton v. Coster, 249 Mass. 391, 144 N.E. 226;Capitol Amusement Co. v. Gallagher, 268 Mass. 321, 167 N.E. 674. The owner had come to the conclusion that she was unable ......
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Flynn v. Wallace
...no specific date in the contract for the transfer of the obligation to pay real estate taxes, unlike the situation in Hamilton v. Coster, 249 Mass. 391, 396, 144 N.E. 226. An earlier Massachusetts decision, Davis v. Parker, 14 Allen, 94, awarded taxes of $140 to the vendor, where specific p......