Hamilton v. Knight
| Decision Date | 16 February 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:17-cv-04714-TWP-TAB,1:17-cv-04714-TWP-TAB |
| Parties | JAMES HAMILTON, Plaintiff, v. STANLEY KNIGHT, CLINTON FELDKAMP, TY ROBBINS, MORGAN FEENEY, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Pro se complaints such as that filed by Mr. Hamilton are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Obriecht v. Raemisch, 517 F.3d 489, 491 n.2 (7th Cir. 2008).
The assertions in Mr. Hamilton's Complaint are summarized as follows. Each offender at PCF is assigned a security classification of 1, 2, or 3. Level 1 offenders present the lowest security threats and therefore require the lowest level of security and supervision; Level 3 offenders present heightened threats and therefore require heightened security and supervision. At all times relevant to the Complaint, PCF had a practice of housing Level 1 offenders in its East Dormitory and housing Level 2 and 3 Offenders in its South Dormitory. See dkt. 2 at ¶¶ 15, 17.
On March 7, 2017, Mr. Hamilton was reclassified from Level 2 to Level 1 and asked his Unit Manager, Robert Marks, to be transferred from South Dormitory to East Dormitory. Id. at ¶¶ 13, 16. On Marks's advice, Mr. Hamilton sent a written request to Defendant Morgan Feeney, who was responsible for overseeing inmates' housing assignments. Id. at 18. Mr. Hamilton received no response.
On April 21, 2017, Defendant Clinton Feldkamp, an Internal Investigations Officer, interviewed Mr. Hamilton concerning a drug-smuggling operation taking place at PCF. Id. at ¶¶ 29-30. Mr. Hamilton's responses implicated another inmate, Preston Atkinson, in the smuggling operation and were based on information Mr. Hamilton gained while on an outside work assignment with Atkinson. Id. at ¶¶ 31-32. After Officer Feldkamp suggested that Mr. Hamilton may be at risk of retaliation from Atkinson, Mr. Hamilton reiterated his request to be moved to a different housing unit, as Atkinson also was housed in South Dormitory. Id. at ¶¶ 33-35. OfficerFeldkamp indicated that Mr. Hamilton would be assigned to a new housing unit, but no further action was taken. Id. at ¶ 35.
On May 9, 2017, Atkinson returned to South Dormitory from disciplinary segregation and assaulted Mr. Hamilton, seriously injuring his right eye. Id. at ¶¶ 36-43. Atkinson acknowledged that he assaulted Mr. Hamilton because he had "snitched" and stated that other members of his prison gang would continue to assault Mr. Hamilton as a result. Id. at ¶¶ 39, 41-42.
On May 11, 2017, Mr. Hamilton reported the May 9 assault and his injuries to Mr. Marks. Id. at ¶ 48. Mr. Hamilton made clear that the assault was based on his cooperation with Internal Investigations. Id. Mr. Hamilton reiterated his request to be moved from South Dormitory and submitted another written request to Ms. Feeney. Id. at ¶¶ 48-49. Mr. Hamilton received no response.
On June 28, 2017, Defendant Ty Robbins reassigned Mr. Hamilton to the same outside work assignment where he was previously exposed to Atkinson and the smuggling operation. Id. at ¶ 53. Mr. Hamilton informed Mr. Robbins of that experience and his subsequent assault. Id. at ¶ 56. Mr. Hamilton asked Mr. Robbins to give him a different work assignment and to move him out of South Dormitory. Id. at ¶¶ 56-57. Mr. Robbins refused both requests. Id. at ¶ 58.
On July 27, 2017, Mr. Hamilton was assaulted again, this time by a different inmate. Id. at ¶¶ 61-67. This attacker later stated to Mr. Hamilton that the assault was an act of retaliation for cooperating with Internal Investigations. Id. at ¶ 79. Mr. Hamilton suffered serious injuries, including a broken left orbital bone. Id. at 72. PCF staff observed Mr. Hamilton's injuries and sent him for outside medical treatment. Id. at ¶¶ 71-72. The following day, Officer Feldkampinterviewed Mr. Hamilton regarding the assault, and Mr. Hamilton was moved out of South Dormitory. Id. at ¶¶ 74-76.
Mr. Hamilton received operations on both eyes to repair injuries sustained in the assaults. In August 2017, doctors surgically reattached the retina in Mr. Hamilton's right eye, which began to bother him after the first assault. See id. at ¶ 50; 59-60, 70, 80-85, 87. And, although the left orbital bone fractured in the second assault ultimately healed without surgery, doctors performed an additional operation on Mr. Hamilton's left eye in December 2017. Id. at ¶¶ 86, 89. Mr. Hamilton states that he has sustained significant and permanent vision loss in his right eye. Id. at ¶ 104.
Mr. Hamilton alleges two claims, each based on the defendants' failure to protect him from violent assaults by other inmates. Prison officials have a duty to protect inmates from violent assaults by other inmates. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). They incur liability for the breach of that duty when they were "aware of a substantial risk of serious injury to [an inmate] but nevertheless failed to take appropriate steps to protect him from a known danger." Guzman v. Sheahan, 495 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir. 2002)); see also Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749, 758-59 (7th Cir. 2010). To state a claim for failure to protect, the plaintiff must allege that the defendants knew of and disregarded "an excessive risk to inmate health or safety." Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. The defendant "must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." Id. "Once prison officials know about a serious risk of harm, they have an obligation to take reasonable measures to abate it." Dale v. Poston, 548 F.3d 563, 569 (7th Cir. 2008).
First, Mr. Hamilton alleges that Defendants Knight, Robbins, and Feeney had responsibility over inmates' housing assignments and failed to either enact or execute protocols that would have promptly reassigned Mr. Hamilton from South Dormitory to a lower security housing unit following his reclassification from Level 2 to Level 1. Dkt. 2 at ¶¶ 105, 107, 109. According to Mr. Hamilton, this demonstrated deliberate indifference toward a substantial risk that he would be harmed by a violent inmate and directly caused the injuries he sustained when he was assaulted. The Complaint does not allege that Defendant Knight knew of Mr. Hamilton's participation in the smuggling investigation, so it asserts as an abstract matter that Defendants Knight, Robbins, and Feeney must have known that housing a Level 1 inmate in South Dormitory obviously placed him at substantial risk of harm.
As this Court has previously observed, prison officials' failure to separate inmates based on differentiated security risks may be part of a deliberate indifference claim, but that typically "'is not itself a facial violation of the Eighth Amendment.'" Carmichael v. Richards, 307 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1021 (S.D. Ind. 2004) (quoting Burrell v. Hampshire Cnty., 307 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002)). Instead, the plaintiff must show that a pervasive pattern of violence or a series of bad acts evidenced such an obvious risk of violence that the defendants must have been aware of it. See Smith v. Sangamon Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 188, 192-194 (7th Cir. 2013); Washington v. LaPorte Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 306 F.3d 515, 518-519 (7th Cir. 2002).1
This claim is not based on factual allegations that, if true, would demonstrate deliberate indifference. Mr. Hamilton alleges that PCF has a general policy of housing Level 2 and 3 inmates in South Dormitory and housing Level 1 inmates in East Dormitory "for safety reasons." Dkt. 2 at ¶¶ 15, 17. He further alleges that South Dormitory is "known as the hub for inmate drug distribution, and so has the most disruptive and violent reputation in the entire prison." Id. at ¶ 15. But "a deliberate indifference claim cannot be predicated merely on knowledge of general risks of violence," Weiss v. Cooley, 230 F.3d 1027, 1032 (7th Cir.2000). Mr. Hamilton's Complaint does not describe a pervasive pattern of violence or a series of bad acts obviously demonstrating that a Level 1 inmate would be at a substantial risk of harm by remaining in South Dormitory.
Therefore, to the extent Mr. Hamilton claims that Defendants Knight, Robbins, and Feeney violated his civil rights by failing to transfer him out of South Dormitory strictly because of his Level 1 classification, that is a claim upon which no relief may be granted, and it is therefore dismissed. Because Mr. Hamilton does not assert any other claims against Defendant Knight, Defendant Knight is dismissed from this action.
To continue reading
Request your trial