Carmichael v. Richards

• Decision Date: 08 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. IP 02-0992-C-K/T.,IP 02-0992-C-K/T.
• Citation: 307 F.Supp.2d 1014
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana
• Parties: John A. CARMICHAEL, Plaintiff, v. J.D. RICHARDS, Defendant.

307 F.Supp.2d 1014

John A. CARMICHAEL, Plaintiff, v. J.D. RICHARDS, Defendant.

No. IP 02-0992-C-K/T.

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

March 8, 2004.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

David L. Byers, Holwager Byers & Caughey, Beech Grove, IN, for Plaintiff.

Tom G. Jones, Jones Hoffman & Admire, Franklin, IN, for Defendant.

ENTRY ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

BAKER, United States Magistrate Judge.

I. Introduction.

While incarcerated in the Johnson County Jail, Marcus Carter stabbed his cellmate, Plaintiff John A. Carmichael, in the eye with a pencil. As a result, Carmichael sued then-sheriff J.D. Richards for state law negligence and pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, both individually and in his official capacity, claiming that Richards violated Carmichael's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Specifically, Carmichael alleges that Richards failed to take reasonable measures to ensure Carmichael's physical safety because of a policy that allowed maximum security inmates to be celled with medium security inmates. Additionally, Carmichael alleges that his Eighth Amendment rights were violated when Richards failed to provide Carmichael with necessary medical care. Before the Court are two separate motions for summary judgment filed by Richards. Richards' first summary judgment motion is dispositive of this matter.

II. Summary Judgment Standard.

Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. South Tec Development Warehouse, Inc., 337 F.3d 813, 816 (7th Cir.2003). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Abrams v. Walker, 307 F.3d 650, 653 (7th Cir.2002), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). The Court construes all facts and draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Butera v. Cottey, 285 F.3d 601, 605 (7th Cir.2002).

Because the purpose of summary judgment is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims, the non-movant must respond to the motion with evidence setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Michael v. St. Joseph County, 259 F.3d 842, 845 (7th Cir.2001). To successfully oppose Richards' motions for summary judgment, Carmichael must do more than raise a "metaphysical doubt" as to the material facts. See Wolf v. Northwest Ind. Symphony Soc'y, 250 F.3d 1136, 1141 (7th Cir.2001). A scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is not sufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion; "there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-movant]." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

III. Background.¹

As Sheriff of Johnson County, Richards maintained ultimate responsibility for setting the rules and regulations of both the sheriff's department and the operation of the Johnson County Jail. [Richards Dep., p. 13]. During the relevant time period, Major Joe Barger held the position of jail commander and bore the responsibility of overseeing the jail's operation. [Richards Dep., p. 10; Barger Dep., pp. 5, 7]. In this capacity, Barger reported on a weekly basis to Richards regarding the operations of the jail. [Barger Dep., p. 29-30].

During Richards' tenure, the jail had three types of cell classifications: maximum security, medium security and minimum security. [Richards Dep., pp. 26-28]. Richards did not personally classify inmates. In fact, Richards never had any contact with either Carmichael or Carter, his assailant. [Richards Dep., p. 19; Carmichael Dep., p. 22]. Instead, Richards delegated the duty to classify inmates to the jail staff, leaving the individualized classification of an inmate to the discretion of the shift leader on duty at the time the inmate arrived at the jail. [Richards Dep., p. 29]. In other words, the book-in officer classified inmates, including Carter, with the supervisor's advice. [Richards Dep., p. 30].

At the time of Carter's initial custody assessment, May 31, 2000, Mark Grace recommended Carter's classification as maximum security, with the approval of his supervisor, Sergeant David Emery. In addition, Carter's custody assessment identified Carter as a "known management problem." [Barger Dep. Ex. 4]. Carter was in custody on a charge of criminal recklessness with a deadly weapon, a Class D felony, for allegedly stabbing a fellow resident of the Atterbury Job Corps Center in the arm, chest and hand. [Pl.'s Ex. 1]. As a result of Carter's maximum security classification, he should have been placed in Cell Block D, which housed maximum security prisoners in primarily one-man cells. [Barger Dep., pp. 15, 21]. However, during the relevant time period, Carter and Carmichael shared a two-man cell in the C Block of the Johnson County Jail, and did so for approximately three days. [Carmichael Dep., pp. 10-11; Anthony Ferguson Dep., p. 17]. In contrast to Cell Block D, Cell Block C housed prisoners designated minimum/medium security. [Barger Dep., pp. 15-16, 22, 28]. Barger does not know why Carter was not in Cell Block D. [Barger Dep., p. 28].

Pursuant to court order, the Johnson County Sheriff's Department obtained custody of Carmichael through a transfer from the Westville Correctional Facility in order for Carmichael to attend a hearing in the Johnson County Juvenile Court. [Docket No. 56, Ex. 1].² Carmichael's initial custody assessment, performed on June 27, 2000, resulted in his classification as medium security.³ The assessment form also indicated that Carmichael had "no problems." [Barger Dep., Ex. 5]. According to Barger, Carmichael's medium security classification would place him in either the B, C or E block of the jail. [Barger Dep., p. 22]. While maximum security and medium security prisoners should not be placed together, this occurred for approximately a year and one-half during the construction of the new section of the jail and the remodeling of the old section. [Barger Dep., pp. 30-31]. Richards knew of this practice.⁴ [Barger Dep., pp. 30-31].

On July 1, 2000, Carter stabbed Carmichael in the eye with a pencil. [Docket No. 25, ¶ 8; Docket No. 26 ¶ 8; Carmichael Dep., pp. 10-11]. Approximately twenty minutes after the incident, an ambulance from Franklin Hospital arrived and an EMT immediately taped a Styrofoam cup over Carmichael's eye to prevent anything from bumping or hitting the pencil. The ambulance took Carmichael to Methodist Hospital within thirty minutes of arriving at the jail. [Carmichael Dep., pp. 22-23]. Although Carmichael had blurry vision for approximately one year, ultimately he suffered no vision loss as a result of the stabbing. [Carmichael Dep., p. 27].

Carmichael was scheduled to attend a follow-up examination by an ophthalmologist on July 3, 2000. Ho7ever, the jail did not take Carmichael to this appointment because he had been transferred back to Westville Correctional Facility before the follow-up was to occur. [Pl.'s Ex. 2; Carmichael Dep., pp. 28, 40-41; Docket No. 56, Ex. 1]. Thereafter, on July 27, 2000, Westville again transferred custody of Carmichael to Johnson County so that Carmichael could attend a hearing on July 28, 2000. [Docket No. 56, Ex. 1]. At this time, Carmichael alleges that jail personnel failed to give him his medication and eye drops, or otherwise provide him with medical treatment. [Carmichael Dep., pp. 44-45; Pl.'s Ex. 3]. However, Carmichael was unaware what medications he had been prescribed by the hospital, if any. [Carmichael Dep., p. 47]. Additionally, Carmichael "witnessed the jail personnel taking medications away from inmates, even heart medications, and not passing out medications to inmates." [Docket No. 42, p. 9; Carmichael Dep., pp. 28, 30-32].

After the stabbing, Corrections Officer Anthony Ferguson removed Carter to a segregation cell in Cell Block D. [Ferguson Dep., pp. 6, 17-18]. Prior to the assault and while in the Johnson County Jail, Carter had been involved in other altercations with inmates. After a disciplinary hearing on May 19, 2000, the sheriff's department found Carter guilty of attempting to assault another individual and committing battery without a weapon. [Barger Dep., Ex. 2]. As punishment, Carter received "30 days in segregation, 15 days suspended pending no further rules violation. 30 days loss of credit time, 15 days suspended pending no further rules violation."⁵ [Id.].

Since January 15, 2001, the jail has documented approximately 48 fights involving inmates. [Pl.'s Ex. 5]. Additionally, Richards acknowledged several incidents where inmates had been beaten. [Richards Dep., p. 44]. However, Richards was not aware of any other incident at the jail involving the stabbing of an inmate by another inmate with a pencil. [Id.]. Prior to Carmichael's stabbing, inmates were provided with full-sized "No. 2" pencils as part of their hygiene pack. Since the stabbing, the jail replaced the full-sized pencils first with short "golf" pencils and then later replaced the "golf" pencils with flexible pens. [Ferguson Dep., pp. 29-33, 35].

IV. Discussion.

Carmichael alleges that Richards is liable, both individually and in his official capacity, because Richards violated certain rights protected by the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution. "In its prohibition of `cruel and unusual punishments,' the Eighth Amendment places restraints on prison officials, who may not, for example, use...