Hamilton v. Lee

• Decision Date: 27 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 13–CV–4336.,13–CV–4336.
• Citation: 94 F.Supp.3d 460
• Parties: Rohan HAMILTON, Petitioner, v. William LEE, Superintendent, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

94 F.Supp.3d 460

Rohan HAMILTON, Petitioner

v.William LEE, Superintendent, Respondent.

No. 13–CV–4336.

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed March 27, 2015.

Lawrence Mark Stern, Lawrence Stern, New York, NY, for Petitioner.

Anthea Hemery Bruffee, Kings County District Attorney's Office, Brooklyn, NY, for Respondent.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

JACK B. WEINSTEIN, Senior District Judge:

I.	Introduction	465
II.	Facts and Procedural History	466

A.	Crime of Conviction	466
B.	State Court Direct Appeals	467
C.	Motion to Vacate Conviction	468
D.	Writ of Error Coram Nobis	469
E.	Instant Petition	469

III. Applicable Law 470

A.	Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act	470
B.	Exhaustion	470
C.	Procedurally–Barred Claims	471

IV. Denial of Right to Confront 471

A.	Law	471
B.	Application of Law to Facts	472

V.	Introduction of False Evidence	473
VI.	Evidentiary Claims	474

A.	Law	474
B.	Application of Law to Facts	475

VII. Brady Violation 475

A.	Law	475
B.	Application of Law to Facts	476

VIII. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 477

A.	Law	477
B.	Application of Law to Facts	478

1.	Trial Counsel	478
2.	Appellate Counsel	479

IX.	Unavailability of Fingerprint Evidence	480
X.	Certificate of Appealability	481
XI.	Conclusion	481

I. Introduction

Petitioner Rohan Hamilton seeks a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). He is currently serving a twenty-three year prison sentence and a concurrent fifteen-year sentence imposed on January 11, 2007 for Murder in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree.

Petitioner asserts five grounds for relief: (1) he was denied the right to confront witnesses against him; (2) the introduction of perjured testimony deprived him of due process, the right to a fair trial and equal protection under the law; (3) the introduction of false and inflammatory evidence deprived him of due process; (4) crucial Brady material was withheld; and (5) he was denied effective assistance of counsel due to cumulative errors made by trial counsel and appellate counsel's failure to raise all the errors on direct appeal.

Amid the scattershot, he makes one point of interest: his palm print, lifted from a crucial piece of evidence, may have been placed there—or was never there at all—when the police framed him. The evidence is not available to him or his expert because it is still buried under Hurricane Sandy's debris. Thus, he urges, blocked from effective prosecution of this petition, he is entitled to have it granted.

Speculation based on surmise supported by eloquent conjecture of a skilled assigned attorney will not support federal habeas relief. The case was well tried without constitutional error.

The petition is denied.

II. Facts and Procedural History

A. Crime of Conviction

On October 31, 2004, Shanti Paschal, mother of petitioner's son, was found dead in her apartment. Trial Tr. 173–74, Dec. 6, 2006, ECF No. 9–12. She was bound with duct tape and shot several times. Id. At trial, Dr. Algae Chariot, a medical examiner, testified that Paschal died of blood loss from three gunshot wounds to the chest. See id. at 74–83. Autopsy photographs depicting Paschal's injuries were entered into evidence during Chariot's testimony.See id. at 84:11.

Detective Daniel Mulvanerty, of the New York City Police Department's Crime Scene Unit, recovered duct tape used to bind the victim as well as a roll of duct tape, discharged bullet shells, a deformed bullet, and a live round of ammunition from Paschal's apartment. See id. at 124:3–134:11; Letter from Lawrence Mark Stern, Mar. 21, 2015, ECF No. 69. Detective Michael Dryver vouchered the duct tape and sent it to the New York City Police Department's crime lab for further analysis. Trial Tr. at 179:22–180:23.

Detectives Dryver and Jay Hernandez arrested petitioner approximately two months after the murder, on January 8, 2005. See id. at 190:10–16. On the day of his arrest, petitioner gave three statements to Detectives Hernandez and Dryver: one oral, one handwritten, and one videotaped. See Huntley/Dunaway Hr'g Tr. 15:7–30:6 (Dryver), July 11, 2006, ECF No. 9–11. Dryver testified that petitioner was left alone with Hernandez for several minutes during the handwritten statement. Trial Tr. 23:22–24:15. Hernandez was unavailable to testify at the trial. Petitioner was charged under Kings County Indictment Number 327/2005, ECF No. 9–11.

In January 2005, Alynka Jean, a New York City Police Department Criminalist, and an expert in latent print development, performed several tests on the duct tape that had bound Paschal on the night of the murder. Trial Tr. 149:17–159:1. The first three tests did not yield any fingerprints. The fourth test revealed a single print. See id. at 163:1–4. At trial, Jean testified that she had developed a latent palm print from the duct tape removed from the victim's body; photographed the latent print; changed the color to black and white and made it brighter; ran it through a computer program “More Hits” to preserve it; and sent the photograph of the palm print to the print section. Id. at 152:18–159:9. She did not have the original photograph she took of the duct tape at trial. See id. at 160:4–23.

Latent Print Expert Detective Kennedy compared the latent print Jean developed from the duct tape with the ink prints taken from the petitioner. See id. at 205:19–206:2. At trial, Kennedy explained that she accessed the petitioner's prints through the department's computer system to conduct her comparison. See id. at 207:14–15. She testified that the print card she used for her comparison was dated January 8, 2005, the date of petitioner's arrest, and that the notation indicated that the ink prints were taken by Detective Dryver. Id. at 207:3–15. She found that the latent palm print found on the duct tape matched that of the petitioner. As an experienced expert, she fully explained her methodology. See id. at 212:4–216:21.

Petitioner's brother, Uzal Hamilton, testified that, on the night of the murder, petitioner confessed to killing Paschal. See id. at 32:20–33:22. Uzal Hamilton stated on the stand that he had overheard petitioner threaten to kill Paschal during a telephone conversation on October 30, 2004, and that petitioner was in possession of a gun at the time of that argument. Id. at 41:10–43:16.

The victim's mother, Bertha Paschal, testified that petitioner called her on the morning of November 1, 2004 and said, “That's why I killed your bitch ass daughter.” See id. at 92:20–93:26. Bertha Paschal's boyfriend, Reginold Leroy Clark, testified that petitioner called her house again later that morning and threatened him, saying there were many “hiding places” and “dark spots.” Id. at 98:6–12.

Petitioner was convicted by a jury of Murder in the Second Degree, N.Y. Penal L. § 125.25(1), and Criminal Possession of a Weapon in the Second Degree, N.Y. Penal L. § 265.03(2).

On January 11, 2007, petitioner was sentenced to twenty-three years to life in prison and a lifetime term of post-release supervision on the murder charge, to run concurrently with fifteen years of imprisonment and five years of post-release supervision on the weapon charge. Both terms were to run consecutively with a two and one half year to five-year sentence that he was serving for an unrelated offense. See Sentence Tr. 16:16–17:10, Jan. 11, 2007, ECF No. 9–12.

B. State Court Direct Appeals

On May 30, 2008 petitioner, represented by counsel, took a direct appeal to the New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division. See Pet'r's Br. to the Appellate Division, ECF No. 9–1. Through his appellate counsel, petitioner argued first that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when fingerprint and palm print cards were admitted through testimony of a print examiner, rather than the testimony of the officer who took the prints; second, that he was deprived of a fair trial when, over objection, the court admitted autopsy photographs that were so morbid, inflammatory, and cumulative of other evidence that their prejudicial effect overwhelmed any ostensible ground for their admission. Id. at 4–5.

Petitioner filed a pro se supplemental brief separately on April 20, 2009. It contained three additional claims for relief. See Pet'r's Pro Se Supplemental Br., ECF No. 9–3. First, that he was denied a fair trial in violation of his rights under the due process clause because the evidence adduced at trial was false, and known by the prosecutor prior to trial to be false. Id. at 22–31. Second, that he was denied effective assistance of trial counsel. Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim was premised on trial counsel's: (1) implicating him in the charged crime during summation; (2) failing to seek sanctions for alleged Brady violations; (3) failing to request all laboratory reports and prints; (4) failing to conduct a pre-trial investigation; (5) failing to consult an independent fingerprint expert; (6) failing to object to the prosecutor's opening statement; (7) failing to call a purportedly exculpatory witness or to request a missing witness charge; (8) failing to appropriately cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses; (9) failing to object to the admission of ballistics evidence; and (10) failing to give an effective closing statement. Id. at 32–39. Third, that he was denied a fair trial due to judicial misconduct because the judge expressed his opinion during voir dire and allowed the admission of false evidence. Id. at 40–42.

On October 20, 2009, the Appellate Division affirmed petitioner's judgment of conviction with a memorandum decision. See People v. Hamilton, 66 A.D.3d 921, 922, 887 N.Y.S.2d 261 (2d Dep't 2009). It held that petitioner's Sixth Amendment confrontation clause claim was unpreserved for appellate review and without merit. Id. at 921–22, 887 N.Y.S.2d 261. It found that petitioner had not objected to the admission of the print cards on confrontation clause grounds during trial; the cards themselves were not directly accusatory; and they were properly admitted into...